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ABSTRACT
The three essays in this thesis foster the identification of unexpected influences
of different institutional arrangements on economic outcomes. The first two essays,
experimental in nature, analyze the impact of two different contexts within Public
Goods Games (PGG) environments. The first essay documents exact replications of
four classic experiments in PGG and cast unexpected results in contribution behav-
ior. First, it shows how the attenuation effect in replication studies, well documented
in other disciplines, is also pervasive in experimental economics. Not all previous find-
ings replicate, and effects found in successful replications are much smaller. Second,
it shows that experimental context matters; experimental subjects in Texas tend to
contribute more and free ride less, across different experiments.
The second essay analyzes whether democratic institutions have any impact on
agency problems where group members face a centralized arrangement of sanctioning
power. It offers novel evidence, although a weak effect, of the intrinsic incentives for
pro-social behavior attached to legitimacy in democratic institutions to promote
collective action and higher economic efficiency.
Finally, the last essay offers an empirical alternative to unravel heterogeneous
unobserved traits on credit market customers. Through the use of mixture density
estimation methods and rich administrative data, it identifies different quality-types
of clients for credit demand and default decisions. Credit customers differ in their
individual preferences, as well as levels of foresight, strategic behavior; all unobserved
by the principal (lender). Accounting for these unobserved traits improves the fore-
cast of potential clients’ behavior and offers alternatives for different contracts and
risk-pricing strategies to reduce credit rationing.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The fact that different institutional environments shape economic outcomes is
not new in economics. Nevertheless, beyond any theoretical argument, the study of
such effects represents an empirical challenge and the understanding of cause and
effect, in a scientific flavor, is always ambitious due to the complex nature of social
interaction. To this endeavor, social sciences have to add the fact that the smallest
molecule or unit of study, the individual, as an economic agent, has own will. The
intricacies of human behavior, before studied only in psychological sciences, have
had a great impact in the study of economics. Methods, theories and a new body of
knowledge accounts for a very lively research agenda that has successfully identified
some interesting behavioral regularities, as well as inconsistencies, that offer a new
perspective to old questions of rational choice and decision making.
One remarkable milestone in the discipline is the rise of experimental and behav-
ioral economics to which most of this work subscribes. Not free of valid criticism,
specially due to external validity arguments, the field builds a body of knowledge
that ties highly divorced theoretical and empirical research in economics. The ex-
perimental nature of the field supports a more scientific treatment not only due to
the efforts to isolate economic influences of treatments through randomization, but
also due to the replicability of the research, which offers higher consistency on the
results.
The three essays contribute to the experimental and applied economic research
by identifying unexpected influences of different institutional arrangements on eco-
nomic outcomes, as well as novel econometric applications. The first two chapters
analyze the impact of two different context within Public Goods Games (PGG) en-
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vironments. The first essay documents exact replications of four classic experiments
in PGG and cast unexpected results in contribution behavior. First, it shows how
the attenuation effect in replication studies, well documented in other disciplines
such as medicine, is also pervasive in experimental economics. Not all previous find-
ings replicate and, when they do, their effects are much smaller. Second, we show
that, when it comes to economic decisions, context matters; experimental subjects in
Texas, mostly undergrad students, tend to contribute more and free ride less across
all experiments.
The second essay studies economic efficiency on two different institutional ar-
rangements of sanctioning power: endogenous versus exogenous power delegation.
We analyze whether democratic institutions have any impact on agency problems
where group members face a centralized arrangement of sanctioning power. This
study offers novel evidence, although partially weak, of the identification of intrin-
sic individual incentives of democratic institutions towards cooperation. Incentives
towards collective action increase due to authority legitimacy, regardless of the ac-
tual behavior or performance of the leader; as a result higher economic efficiency is
achieved.
Finally, the last essay, non-experimental, offers an empirical alternative to un-
ravel heterogeneous unobserved traits, arguably individual preferences, on the credit
market. Following Gan and Mosquera (2008) and Gan, Herna´ndez and Liu (2013),
through the use of mixture density estimation methods and rich administrative data,
I identify the presence of private information that intuitively can be interpreted as
different quality-types of clients for default decisions and credit demand. Credit cus-
tomers differ in their individual preferences, as well as levels of foresight and strategic
behavior; all unobserved by the principal (lender). Through out-of-sample perfor-
mance analysis, I show that the estimation method proposed improves the forecast
2
of potential clients’ default behavior over any current regression technique and of-
fers alternatives for different contracts and risk-pricing strategies to reduce credit
rationing and attain higher market efficiency.
Understanding unexpected economic consequences of institutional environments
remains the most interesting empirical research agenda in applied microeconomics.
The three essays of this thesis combine diverse empirical approaches to answer dif-
ferent questions in this common research goal.
3
2. FOUR CLASSIC PUBLIC GOODS EXPERIMENTS: A REPLICATION
STUDY*
2.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces Eckel et al. (2015)*and motivates the discussion over the
importance of replications in Experimental Economics, a topic highly overlooked in
this relatively new field.
Considerable attention has been focused on the problems of publication bias, se-
lective reporting, and the importance of research transparency in the social sciences,
especially in recent years. Publication bias occurs because articles with findings that
are statistically significant, theoretically interesting, and novel are more likely to be
published than null, dull, or replication studies. Selective reporting means that more
interesting or novel findings within a study are more likely to be published, and
insignificant or non-intuitive results left in a file drawer. The evidence on reported
significance levels suggests a serious bias, leading Ioannidis (2005) to assert that
“most published research findings are false.” His model predicted “rates of wrong-
ness” in medical research of 80 percent for non-randomized studies, 25 percent of
randomized trials (the “gold standard” for experimental research), and ten percent
of large-scale randomized trials (“platinum standard”). These correspond roughly
to the rates at which medical study results are overturned. In a related observation,
Schooler (2011) notes that attempts to repeat studies often result in an apparent
decline in treatment effects (such as estimates of drug effectiveness) over time, a
phenomenon he has referred to as “cosmic habituation“(Lehrer 2010), and calls for
a open repository of unpublished results to help combat this problem. Replication
*Reprinted with permission from Eckel, Harwel and Castillo. “Four Classic Public Goods 
Experiments: A replication study,” Research in Experimental Economics, Vol. 18, Emerald 
Group Publishing, forthcoming.
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seems an important element of the response to demonstrated bias in published re-
sults. Closer to home, a recent controversy over the replicability of research results
in social psychology, and in priming research in particular, is highlighted in an open
letter from Daniel Kahneman (Yong 2012), who called on his colleagues in priming
research to respond to the criticism.
I believe that you should collectively do something about this mess. To
deal effectively with the doubts you should acknowledge their existence
and confront them straight on, because a posture of defiant denial is
self-defeating. Specifically, I believe that you should have an association,
with a board that might include prominent social psychologists from other
field [sic]. The first mission of the board would be to organize an effort
to examine the replicability of priming results, following a protocol that
avoids the questions that have been raised and guarantees credibility
among colleagues outside the field (Yong 2012, supplementary material).
The profession was quick to respond. This effort resulted in a special issue of
the Journal of Social Psychology (2014) on replications, which includes, among a
number of other papers, a notable effort by the “Many Labs” replication project to
replicate 13 major results in the field (Klein et al. 2014). This paper reports the
results of experiments conducted in 36 labs with over 6,000 subjects, and finds that
ten effects are robust, one is weak, and two fail to replicate (both priming studies,
as it happens). While the flurry of replication in social psychology was inspired by a
storm of criticism and skepticism, including the discovery of fraudulent behavior by
social psychologists such as Diederik Stapel, Dirk Smeesters and Lawrence Sanna,
economics research has not come under similar attack. Nevertheless, replicability
remains an important aspect of the appeal of experimental research, and is a valuable
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activity. Although Plott (1982) refers to replication as “the heart of experimental
economics,” published replication is not commonplace in experimental economics.
Published replications are most often found as a first step in a new research project
or extension (e.g., Hung and Plott 2001). In the realm of the public goods experiment,
one of the most popular “canonical games” in economics (Eckel 2007), many studies
have replicated prior results in somewhat different environments.
With this in mind, we set out explicitly to replicate as closely as possible sev-
eral important, highly-cited public goods experiments. Students in a PhD course in
Experimental Economics selected four papers to replicate: Isaac and Walker (1988);
Andreoni (1995a); Andreoni (1995b); and Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000). These papers
contain some of the most important results in the study of public goods experiments.
The Voluntary Contribution Mechanism public goods game is a simple environment
designed to test theories about social dilemmas. In these games subjects make deci-
sions in groups, typically of size 2 to 10, and each member of the group must allocate
a fixed endowment between an individual investment, which pays $1 to the decision
maker for each $1 invested, and a public investment, which pays a lower amount (less
than $1 but more than $1/n), termed the Marginal Per Capita Return (or MPCR)
to each member of the group. The incentive structure mimics that of a public good,
and embodies the classic tension between the social optimum of full contributions to
the public good, and individual payoff-maximization, which entails free riding on the
contributions of others. From the earliest studies using this game, results have shown
positive levels of contributions that then deteriorate over time, in most environments
(Ledyard 1995). The first of the studies we replicate, Isaac and Walker (1988) tests
the effect of changing the MPCR, and group size. In the original study, they find
that the MPCR has an important impact on contributions, with a move from .3 to
.75 increasing average contributions and decreasing the number of free riders. The
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effect of changing group size from 4 to 10 is weaker. To our knowledge, no one has
replicated their design. Andreoni (1995a, 1995b) conducted two important variations
on the public goods game. In the former, he examined whether the contribution level
in the game might be due to confusion, since free riding is a dominant strategy, and
found considerable evidence that confusion plays a role. In the second, he explored
the effect of positive or negative framing on contribution levels. These two studies
constitute the second and third replications. In Andreoni (1995a), the experiment
consisted of three treatments: regular, a standard public good game with groups of
size 5 and an MPCR of 0.5; rank, where earnings depended only on the subjects’
relative payoff in the game and there was no payoff to cooperation; and regrank,
which provided the same information on relative earnings as the rank condition, but
earnings were determined as in the regular condition. He found that approximately
half of the total contribution to a public good game could be attributed to kindness
and the other half to potential confusion, but that confusion decreased rapidly across
the first five rounds, while the kindness remained more or less stable. The presence
of confused subjects has been confirmed by Houser and Kurzban (2002) and Ferraro
and Vossler (2010), but in somewhat different environments. Both involve a compar-
ison between play against real counterparts with play against computerized players,
providing a simpler test of confusion than Andreoni (1995a), and both studies also
show that confusion declines over time. The approach taken in Andreoni (1995b) is
to vary the description of the game in two treatments, a positive-frame description,
in which subjects’ contributions to the group account generate a positive external-
ity for others in the group, and a negative-frame description in which contributing
to the individual account generates a negative externality for each member of the
group. The payoff functions are identical in the two treatments; only the description
changes. This manipulation leads to substantially lower average contributions and
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more free riders in the negative-frame treatment. A number of studies have tested
the effect of positive and negative framing in variations on the public goods game,
but none has attempted to exactly replicate the original study. Sonnemans, Schram,
and Offerman (1998) find a similar, but weaker, effect in a binary, step-level public
good experiment; however, Bougherara, Denant-Boemont, and Masclet (2011) show
that framing has an even more powerful effect in a provision-point mechanism pub-
lic good setting. Willinger and Ziegelmeyer (1999) replicate the effect of framing
differences in a public good game with an interior Nash equilibrium; they find that
while positive framing leads to above-equilibrium contributions, negative framing
leads subjects to play the Nash equilibrium. Park (2000) explores heterogeneity in
responses to positive and negative framing and show stronger effects for subjects
who have and individualistic value orientation, in contrast to this with a coopera-
tive value orientation. In a somewhat different environment, Shanley and Grossman
(2007) show that subjects are more willing to contribute to a public good than to
refrain from contributing to a “public bad” that, in essence, deteriorates a public
good; they find no difference in the number of free riders. Grossman and Eckel
(2012) find no effect of positive and negative framing in a “real donation” dictator
game study, where donations go to a charitable organization producing public goods
in the field. Finally, the fourth study, Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), is one of the first
to test the effect of sanctions on public goods contributions. This study adds an
additional stage to each round of the public good game in which subjects can, at
a cost to themselves, punish other members of their group. Punishment is intro-
duced in a “partners” setting, where groups are stable across rounds of the game,
and a “strangers” setting, where groups are reconstituted each round. Punishment
is very effective in enhancing contributions. Since their paper was published, there
have been many studies (too many to survey here) testing various aspects of the
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structure and effectiveness of punishment institutions. (Chaudhuri 2011) provides a
useful survey of research up to that point. In a concluding statement he notes that
the opportunity to punish in such games generally increases contributions, but given
the cost of punishment, does not always enhance efficiency. Besides the issue with
efficiency, he suggests two additional cautions. First, he notes that punishment itself
is a second-order public good, and could require punishment of the non-punishers
(free riders on punishment) as well as the free riders on contributions. Second, most
studies show some anti-social punishment, which appears to be counter-punishment
of high contributors by low contributors.
In most cases we replicate the pattern in the original data, but the treatment
effects are consistently smaller than in the original studies. In some cases, the re-
sults of the original study cannot be replicated, in that the treatment effect sizes
fall below statistical significance. All studies show a positive Texas effect: the UT
Dallas subjects consistently contribute higher amounts to the public good than in
the original studies.
2.2 Experimental design and procedures
All of the experiments were conducted in a way that mimicked as closely as
possible the original conditions of the experiments, with one exception: To ensure
comparability across replications, all experiments were computerized. When possi-
ble, the original program was obtained from the authors, but otherwise the games
were programmed using z-tree (Fischbacher 2007). Payment was adjusted to reflect
current norms of payment for subjects: all received a $5 show-up fee, and average
earnings were $13-$19. Subjects for all experiments were recruited using ORSEE
(Greiner 2004), and sessions took place at the Center for Behavioral and Experi-
mental Economic Science (CBEES) at the University of Texas at Dallas, in April
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and May 2012. A summary of the titles and treatments is included in Table 1. For
IW, and the two Andreoni studies we collected at least as much data as the original
study, but for several of the studies, the show up fee is not reported.
Table 2.1: Original and replication design comparison
Isaac & Walker Andreoni Andreoni Fehr & Ga¨chter
Kindness/Confusion Warm Glow/
Cold Prickle
1988 Repl. 1995 Repl. 1995 Repl. 2000 Repl.
Show-Up n/a $5 n/a $5 n/a $5 15 CHF $5
Fee ($9)
Subjects 84 84 120 120 80 60 112 48
Sessions 12 12 2 12 2 12 5 5
Average Earnings ($) 15 8.68 13.92 8.24 15.28 41 CHF 18.7
($25)
Time (minutes) n/a n/a 50 30 50 41 120 70
Program Plato z-Tree None z-Tree None z-Tree z-Tree z-Tree
2.2.1 Isaac & Walker, group size effects in public goods provision
The 2x2 factorial design includes two treatments, varying the group size (n) from
4 to 10; and the MPCR from .3 to .75, as in the original study. The design also
varies the total endowment of tokens for each individual across groups, with an
eye to keeping the maximum earnings relatively constant across treatments. The
endowment varied in the four person treatment from 62 tokens with the lower .3
MPCR, to 25 in the .75 MPCR rounds. The endowment also varied with the MPCR
in the 10-group treatment. Subjects were endowed with 25 tokens in the low .3
MPCR treatment to 10 tokens in the high .75 MPCR rounds. One treatment is
played for ten rounds in stable groups, followed by a surprise restart and a second
ten rounds with a different MPCR. For the 4-person groups, sessions included 12
subjects (three groups of 4) in anonymous groups. For the 10-person groups, each
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session was a single group. Subjects were randomly assigned to a computer station;
dividers ensured that decisions were anonymous. The replication used z-tree to
code the experiment, where the original authors used PLATO as their computerized
platforms. Subjects completed self-paced instructions that were the same as in the
original study. At the end of each round subjects were shown a summary of group
contributions and their own group and individual earnings from the round. These
were totaled after the final round and converted to dollars at the rate of $0.005 per
token. The average individual earnings, including a $5 show up fee, were about
$15. After subjects completed the first treatment of ten rounds, they were informed
they would participate in another ten rounds. To account for sequencing effects, the
treatment order was counterbalanced, with six sessions having high then low MPCR,
and six the reverse. To be consistent with the work of Isaac and Walker, our data
analysis only considers the data from the second period of 10 rounds. Isaac and
Walker considered the last ten rounds to be conservative.
2.2.2 Andreoni, kindness or confusion
The experiment replicates the three treatments of the original design: named
regular, rank and regrank, which vary the earnings calculation (based on the stan-
dard game or based on rank) and information (standard or standard + rank), as
explained above. The design is between-subjects, with each session consisting of a
single treatment played in groups of five persons for ten rounds, with two anony-
mous groups per session. The endowment is 60 tokens, and the MPCR is 0.5. The
experiment was coded in z-tree; the original study was conducted by hand. The
regular condition is the standard game. In the rank condition, payoffs are calculated
based only on the rank of the subject’s earnings in the game, removing any incentive
to contribute . Effectively, this treatment “makes a zero-sum payoff game out of a
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standard public goods game.” (Andreoni, 1995). Any remaining contributions could
be attributed to confusion. Because these two treatments differ in both the earnings
structure and the information given to the subjects about rank, the third treatment,
regrank, removes the confound in the design by using the standard payoff calculation
but providing rank information. Earnings were about $14 including a $5 show-up
fee.
2.2.3 Andreoni, warm glow versus cold prickle
The design consists of two treatments: a standard game, which is a “positive”
frame mentioning the positive externality of a contribution to the group account
on the other group members, and a negatively framed game, which emphasizes the
negative externality associated with a contribution to the individual account. The
design is between-subjects, with each session consisting of a single treatment played
in groups of five persons for ten rounds, with two anonymous, rematched groups
per session. The endowment is 60 tokens, and the MPCR is 0.5. Like the Andreoni
(1995a) study, the experiment is coded in z-tree; the original study was conducted by
hand. Earnings were about $15 including the $5 show up fee. The positive frame had
standard instructions. In the negative treatment subjects were again given 60 tokens
in each round and were told they may allocate them however they wish between
the two accounts. However, subjects were also given automatic earnings totaling
120 additional tokens each round. They were told that investing in the individual
account offered a one-for-one payoff for the subject but also led to a deduction of
one-half a token from the earnings of all the other group members.
2.2.4 Fehr & Ga¨chter, cooperation and punishment
The 2x2 design varies two elements of the game: whether there is punishment,
and whether groups are stable (partners) or reconstituted each period (strangers).
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Table 2.2: Punishment cost function
Punishment Points 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cost of Punishment 0 1 2 4 6 9 12 16 20 25 30
The group composition is between-subjects, and the punishment element is within-
subjects. In each session subjects in groups of four first complete ten rounds of
punishment, followed by ten rounds without, or vice versa. Each session consists of
12 subjects (three groups of four). Subjects received an endowment of 20 tokens and
the MPCR of the public account is 0.4. The experiment is based on a translation of
the original study and is programmed in z-tree. Earnings were about $19, including
the show up fee. In the no-punishment condition, the standard game is played for
ten rounds. The punishment treatment adds a second stage where subjects can
simultaneously punish one another, at a cost to themselves. The cost of punishing
is the same as in the original paper.
2.3 Results
2.3.1 Isaac & Walker (1988)
Tests of treatment differences using aggregate results from Isaac and Walker
(1988) and the Texas replication are shown in Table 3. The levels of contributions
and proportion of “strong free riders” (subjects with contributions less than 1/3 of
their endowments) can be thus analyzed. For example, the first row of Table 3 tests
whether low and high MPCR generate different outcomes in groups of four players;
the second performs the same test for groups of 10. While in the original study,
high MPCR leads to significantly higher contributions for both group sizes, we are
unable to replicate that result in the Texas data. The impact of group size is never
significant in our data, though it is in Isaac and Walker for low MPCR. However,
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we do replicate three out of four comparisons on the number of strong free riders in
each treatment.
Table 2.3: Isaac & Walker (1988): non-parametric tests and treatment differences
within sample, both studies
Non-parametric tests for equal means Isaac and Walker TX-Replication
(N=12 for 4L and 4H; N=40 for 10H and 10L) z p-value z p-value
Contributions
4L vs. 4H 4.107 0.000 0.691 0.490
10L vs. 10H 3.200 0.001 1.218 0.223
4H vs 10H 0.451 0.652 0.010 0.992
4L vs. 10L 4.666 0.000 0.000 1.000
Number of Strong free-riders
4L vs. 4H 5.101 0.000 2.959 0.003
10L vs. 10H 2.888 0.004 1.115 0.265
4H vs 10L 5.428 0.000 5.158 0.000
4H vs 10H 5.379 0.000 5.158 0.000
4L vs. 10L 4.933 0.000 4.272 0.000
Two-tail test from a normal approximation at 5% significance level. Tests are performed at
the individual level (one observation per individual) using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
In contrast to the original study, tests include the 20 periods (2 sequences) of the experiment.
Strong free-riders are those with contributions < 1/3 ∗ endowment.
Figures 1A and 1B show the pattern of results over time in the Isaac & Walker
and replication data. In both, the left panel graphs the Isaac & Walker data, and
the right the Texas replication. It is easy to see that the treatment differences are
much weaker in the Texas data: neither changes in MPCR or group size appear to
have substantial impacts on contribution levels.
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Figure 2.1: Comparison of Isaac & Walker (1988) with Texas replication
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Table 2.4: Determinants of contributions, regression results
(TX-Replication + Isaac & Walker (1988))
Dependent variable: Percentage Contributions
RE RE Int RE Int Lag
Texas (replication=1) 0.139*** 0.353** 0.353**
(0.0385) (0.149) (0.150)
MPCR (high=1) 0.207*** 0.370*** 0.276***
(0.0435) (0.0161) (0.0131)
Group Size (high=1) 0.0785 0.165*** 0.114***
(0.0755) (0.0198) (0.0176)
MPCR * Group Size -0.0961*** -0.197*** -0.132***
(0.0263) (0.0188) (0.0189)
Texas * MPCR -0.325*** -0.224***
(0.0448) (0.0505)
Texas * Group Size -0.172 -0.433***
(0.143) (0.0960)
Texas*MPCR*Group Size 0.202*** 0.102
(0.0519) (0.0577)
Other’s Average Contribution-OAC(t-1) 0.276***
(0.0304)
Texas *OAC(t-1) -0.201***
(0.0336)
Constant 0.235*** 0.128*** 0.0810***
(0.0634) (0.00826) (0.00433)
N (observations) 3360 3360 3192
N (subjects) 168 168 168
r2 0.0761 0.0970 0.128
Random Effects estimation. Standard errors clustered at group level in parentheses.
Percentage contributions: contribution/endowment by experiment.
Significance at: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level.
Regression analysis on the percent contributions shows significant treatment ef-
fects for both MPCR and group size in the pooled data (Table 4). The first model
also reveals negative interaction term indicating the treatment effect is different for
the larger groups. Notably, there is a positive, significant coefficient on a dummy
variable indicating the Texas replication data. In the second model we add Texas
interaction effects for the treatment variables. The treatment effects are clearly dif-
ferent in the replication; indeed, the interaction effects indicate that there are no
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significant treatment effects for the Texas data, the interaction coefficient offsets the
main effects. The results are unchanged when we also control for the contributions
of others, using a variable capturing the lagged contributions of others in the group
(OAC(t− 1)).
The data for the first replication study fail to replicate the original study results.
While the pattern of results is consistent with the original study, the effect sizes are
quite different from the original study.
2.3.2 Andreoni (1995a): kindness or confusion
Tests for aggregate treatment effects for Andreoni (1995a) are summarized in the
table below. This table shows that we were unable to find a significant difference be-
tween treatments reg versus regrank in the replication data. The difference between
regrank and rank are marginally significant, and we do see significant differences
between the reg and rank treatments. The per-period averages for each treatment
follow a similar pattern to the original results with contributions for regular > re-
grank > rank, and free riders for regular < regrank < rank, but smaller differences
between the treatments.
Table 2.5: Andreoni (1995a): non-parametric tests and treatment differences within
sample, both studies
Non-parametric tests equal means Andreoni TX-Rep.
(n=40 for both studies) z p-value z(A95) z p-value
Contributions
Reg. vs. Reg.Rank 3.766 0.0003 3.772 1.473 0.1407
Reg.Rank vs.Rank 3.602 0.0077 3.58 1.638 0.1014
Reg. vs.Rank 5.091 0 2.995 0.0027
Number of pure free riders
Reg. vs. Reg.Rank 1.817 0.0692 2.281 1.705 0.0883
Reg.Rank vs.Rank 2.88 0.004 2.42 0.492 0.6224
Reg. vs.Rank 3.602 0.0003 1.971 0.0488
Two-tail test from a normal approximation at 5% significance level.
Tests are performed at the individual level using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
z(A95): corresponding tests reported in the original paper.
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The pairwise comparisons for the treatments for all 10 periods are shown in
Figure 2 A-C below. (We illustrate these separately because putting all in one figure
is overly cluttered.) The regular condition shows very similar behavior in the two
studies. The regrank and rank conditions show higher contributions in Texas than
the original.
Figure 2.2: Comparison of Andreoni (1995a) with Texas replication
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In the original paper, confusion is measured as the difference between regrank
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and rank . In both treatments subjects receive information about rank, but only
in the latter treatment does rank alone determine earnings. Andreoni argues that
the comparison between these two provides a clean measure of confusion. In the
Texas data, confusion appears to play a larger role, as contributions are somewhat
higher in the rank treatment as compared with the original. While the level of
confusion declines over time in both data sets, the levels of confusion are higher in
the Texas data and the levels of kindness lower. However the proportion of subjects
that couldn’t be classified as motivated by either is larger in Andreoni’s data.
Table 2.6: Determinants of contributions, regression results
(TX-Replication + Andreoni (1995a))
Dependent variable: Contributions
RE (se: robust) RE (se: cl) RE (se: cl) RE (se: cl)
Texas (replication=1) -1.375 -1.375 -0.450 -3.120
(1.639) (3.231) (1.597) (2.336)
Treatment 2: RegRank -18.93*** -18.93*** -9.503** -10.59*
(1.418) (2.123) (2.575) (1.508)
Treatment 3: Rank -12.78*** -12.78** -6.899* -7.62**
(1.435) (3.933) (2.643) (1.94)
Texas * RegRank 6.025*** 6.025 2.289 3.941*
(2.032) (4.011) (3.062) (1.457)
Texas * Rank 6.352*** 6.352 2.948 3.963
(2.152) (5.374) (2.926) (1.886)
Other’s Avg. Contribution-OAC(t-1) 0.381*** 0.339***
(0.0570) (0.00912)
Texas * OAC(t-1) 0.0741
(0.101)
Constant 26.46*** 26.46*** 11.63** 13.17***
(1.152) (2.059) (2.970) (1.111)
N (observations) 2400 2400 2160 2160
N (subjects) 240 240 240 240
r2 0.104 0.104 0.206 0.207
Random Effects estimation. Standard errors clustered at group level in parentheses for
models 2,3 and 4.
Contributions: tokens per period, 60 each.
Excluded treatment: Regular.
Significance at: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level.
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Table 6 shows a regression analysis, pooling the original and replication data.
The first and second models are the same except in the way the standard errors are
calculated (robust versus clustered at the group level). Using the more conservative
second model, this illustrates the treatment effects in the original study, with the
regrank treatment reducing contributions from the regular treatment, and rank re-
ducing it still further. However the Texas interactions partially offset the treatment
effects, showing that in the replication data the effect sizes are smaller. In some cases
these fall below statistical significance. Texas contributions are higher in both the
rank and regrank treatments.
In sum, we see the same pattern of results in the replication as in the original
data, but the effect sizes are smaller. Confusion as measured in the Andreoni’s study
appears to be somewhat higher in the replication. Texas contributions are higher in
two out of the three treatments.
2.3.3 Andreoni (1995b): warm glow versus cold prickle
The results for Andreoni (1995b) are summarized in table 7 below. The treatment
difference between the positive and negative frame is successfully replicated, with
significant differences in both contributions and the number of free riders.
Table 2.7: Andreoni (1995b): non-parametric tests and treatment differences within
sample, both studies
Non-parametric tests for equal means Andreoni TX-Replication
z p-value z (A95) z p-value
Contributions Pos. vs. Neg. frame 3.51 0.0005 3.44 2.611 0.009
Number of pure free riders Pos. vs. Neg. frame 3.79 0.0002 3.5 3.121 0.002
Two-tail test from a normal approximation at 5% significance level.
Tests are performed at the individual level using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
z(A95): corresponding tests reported in the original paper.
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The tables from the original study were replicated (information available upon
request), and include contributions for each period of play. Figure 3 illustrates the
findings and shows the pattern of behavior over time. The original data (dashed lines)
clearly show the treatment effect, and the Texas data replicate the effect. Notably,
the replication shows a substantially higher level of contributions for both treatments.
Additional tests of statistical significance for the Texas effect were performed and
are available upon request.
Figure 2.3: Comparison of Andreoni (1995b) with Texas replication
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Regression analysis in Table 8 confirms these results. Using robust or clustered
standard errors, the treatment effect for positive frame (in contrast to negative frame)
is positive and statistically significant. There is a pronounced Texas effect in the data,
with Texans contributing on average about twice as much as in the original study.
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Controlling for the contributions of others shows a familiar “matching” effect, with
higher contributions by others associated with higher own contributions (Croson
2007). The interactions effects in the fourth model show that there is no significant
difference in the treatment effect between Texas and the original study, and that the
Texans do not respond differently to the information about prior contributions of
others.
Table 2.8: Determinants of contributions, regression results
(TX-Replication + Andreoni (1995b))
Dependent variable: Contributions
RE (se:robust) RE (se:cl) RE (se:cl) RE (se:cl)
Texas (replication=1) 14.31*** 14.31*** 10.58*** 9.607**
(1.578) (0.661) (0.527) (2.675)
Treatment (Positive frame) 10.43*** 10.43** 7.22*** 7.504**
(1.350) (1.825) (1.041) (1.516)
Texas * Treatment -1.408 -1.408 -1.063 -1.610
(2.218) (1.982) (1.407) (2.381)
Other’s Avg. Contribution-OAC(t-1) 0.223** 0.202*
(0.0473) (0.0802)
Texas * OAC(t-1) 0.0412
(0.117)
Constant 9.720*** 9.720*** 5.757** 6.053**
(0.853) (0.887) (1.399) (1.545)
N (observations) 1400 1400 1260 1260
N (subjects) 140 140 140 140
r2 0.146 0.146 0.175 0.175
Random Effects estimation. Standard errors clustered at group level in parentheses for
models 2,3 and 4.
Contributions: tokens per period, 60 each.
Excluded treatment: Regular.
Significance at: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level.
In sum, the treatment effect of a positive versus a negative frame on identical
public goods experiments is successfully replicated, with one key difference: subjects
in Texas make substantially higher contributions than in the original study.
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2.3.4 Fehr & Ga¨chter (2000)
The results for the Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) paper largely replicate the original
study. Recall that the treatments vary group matching (Strangers versus Partners),
punishment (No-Punishment versus Punishment), and order. Table 9 shows the
average treatment effects for the replication, alongside the same tests with the orig-
inal data. In all cases the treatment effect is replicated in the Texas data, though
treatment effect sizes are smaller (p < .0002).
Table 2.9: Fehr & Ga¨chter (2000): non-parametric tests and treat-
ment differences within sample, both studies
Non-parametric tests: Texas Replication F&G Original
No-punishment vs. Punishment z p-value z p-value
Strangers 3.959 0.0001 7.161 0
Partners 1.992 0.0464 2.803 0.0051
Two-tail test from a normal approximation at 5% significance level.
Tests are performed at the individual level. Wilcoxon match pairs test
reported.
Aggregate results for F&G2000 calculated from original data set.
Figure 4 (a) shows the aggregate effects for the strangers treatment. The Panel
A shows the results when ten rounds with punishment precede ten without, and vice
versa for panel B. When punishment is first, the Texas data are very close to the
original; when punishment is removed, the decay in contributions is slower for the
Texas data. When no-punishment is first, the level of contributions in the Texas
data is considerably higher, but the treatment effect is replicated.
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Figure 2.4: Comparison of Fehr & Ga¨chter (2000) with Texas replication
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We next turn to the partners treatment. Figure 4 (b) shows the aggregate data
when punishment rounds are played first (panel A) and when no-punishment rounds
are played first. In panel A, as in the strangers treatments, the Texas data for pun-
ishment rounds matches the original data, and the decline is slower once punishment
is removed. In panel B, the no-punishment rounds again are above the original; the
punishment rounds are slightly below.
Table 2.10: Determinants of contributions, regression results
(TX-Replication + Fehr & Ga¨chter (2000))
Dependent variable: Contributions
RE (se: robust) RE (se: cl) RE (se: cl)
Texas (replication=1) 4.788*** 4.788** 2.334**
(0.402) (1.371) (0.725)
Treatment (punishment) 8.095*** 8.095*** 6.148***
(0.295) (0.435) (0.270)
Texas * Treatment -3.628*** -3.628** -2.392**
(0.514) (1.349) (0.902)
Partner (=1) 3.245*** 3.245** 1.547
(0.359) (1.133) (0.772)
Treatment * Partner 0.843* 0.843 0.657
(0.462) (1.025) (0.469)
Other’s Avg. Contribution-OAC(t-1) 0.497***
(0.0249)
Received punishment points-RPP (t-1) -0.756***
(0.185)
Constant 3.919*** 3.919*** 1.548***
(0.209) (0.390) (0.326)
N (observations) 3200 3200 3040
N (subjects) 160 160 160
r2 0.338 0.338 0.454
Random Effects estimation. Standard errors clustered at group level in parentheses, for
models 2, 3.
Contributions: tokens per period, 20 each.
Significance at: * 10% level, ** 5% level, *** 1% level.
Finally, we conduct regression analysis with the pooled data from the original
and the replication. These are shown in Table 10. Once again, there is a pronounced
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Texas effect, with Texans contributing on average 3 tokens (about 40%) more than in
the original study. The regression confirms that punishment increases contributions
in both pairings - partners and strangers - but is larger in the partners treatments.
In addition, the interaction between Texas and the punishment treatment is negative
and significant, indicating a smaller (though still significant) treatment effect in the
replication.
From this analysis we conclude that the treatments are replicated. In all condi-
tions, punishment enhances contributions. However, there are two clear differences
from the original study. The first is that there is a “Texas effect” - with subjects in
Texas contributing significantly more on average than in the original study. Second,
the treatment effects are smaller than in the original study, but remain statistically
significant.
2.4 Conclusions
We conducted replications of four highly-cited research papers in public goods
experiments. For the most part we are able to replicate results from prior studies.
In the Isaac and Walker study, we do not find significant treatment effects on con-
tributions for the MPCR in groups of size 4 or 10, but we do find significant effects
echoing the original study on the number of strong free riders. For Andreoni (1995a),
we replicate the pattern of results showing a strong presence of confusion, and, if
anything, show a higher proportion of confusion-based decisions in the replication
than in the original. For Andreoni (1995b) we find a strong effect of framing on de-
cision making, as in the original study. Finally, for Fehr and Ga¨chter, we show that
punishment increases contributions in both partners and strangers pairings, though
our effect sizes are smaller than in the original study. The most notable feature of our
results is that in all cases the treatment effects are smaller in the replication than in
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the original study. Table 11 below summarizes this finding. The left side of the table
shows, for each treatment combination, the effect size for the original study (differ-
ence between treatments), compared with the effect size for the replication. In all
cases these amounts are comparable between the original and the replication, as we
replicated the parameters in the originals. In every case but one (Andreoni, regrank
- rank), the replication effects are smaller than in the original studies. The largest
differences are for the Isaac and Walker paper, and the smallest for Andreoni’s warm
glow/cold prickle framing study. This decline in treatment effects was predicted by
Schooler (2011), who noted a pronounced decline in treatment effects across a wide
variety of types of studies. It seems as if economics experiments are not immune
from this effect. The right side of the table makes a different point. Here for every
treatment we have calculated the difference between the level of contributions in the
original study and the level of contributions in the replication. In all but two cases,
contributions are higher in the replication. That is, across all studies we observe a
Texas effect, with Texans giving at higher levels than in the original study. We can
only speculate as to the causes. The subject pool at UT Dallas may differ from those
of the earlier studies, but this is impossible to test as the original studies contain no
demographic information. The other studies were conducted for the most part at
large state universities (Arizona, Wisconsin). UT Dallas is not the flagship univer-
sity in Texas (that would be UT Austin). In comparison, UT Dallas is smaller, it
has the highest entering SAT scores among Texas universities (because of its focus
on computer science and engineering), and has a larger fraction of ethnically Indian
and Chinese students (48% - though many of these are second-generation), reflecting
the predominance of tech-related industries in the north-Dallas area where the uni-
versity is located. This is in comparison to Arizona and Wisconsin, where about 10
percent of students were minorities in 1995. We are unaware of any studies showing
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Table 2.11: Treatment effects and the “Texas effect:” differences in the average
percentage contribution to the public good
Treatment Effects: The Texas Effect
Difference in Treatments
Original Replication (Rep.-Original) (Rep.−Original)
Isaac-Walker (1998)
4H-4L 36.99 4.46 -32.53 4L 35.26
10H-10L 17.28 4.96 -12.32 4H 2.73
10L-4L 16.47 -0.78 -17.25 10L 18.01
10H-4H -3.24 -0.28 2.96 10H 5.69
Andreoni K/C (1995a)
Reg-regrank 21.3 10.71 -10.59 Reg -2.29
Regrank-rank 10.24 10.79 0.55 Regrank 8.3
Reg-rank 31.54 21.5 -10.04 Rank 7.75
Andreoni W/G (1995b)
WG-CP 17.38 15.03 -2.35 Positive 21.51
Negative 23.86
Fehr-Ga¨chter (2000)
Strangers 39.00 26.85 -12.15 Strangers-NP 27.80
Partners 47.50 22.00 -25.5 Strangers-P 15.65
Partners-NP 19.50
Partners-P -6.00
Units reported are the average percentage contribution with respect to each experiment’s en-
dowment.
P-NP: Punishment first followed by No Punishment, and the corresponding combinations.
systematic differences in contributions associated with these factors.
Higher giving in the game might simply be due to higher levels of personal gen-
erosity among Texans. It is also possible that confusion plays a role, as evidenced by
the somewhat higher level of confusion shown in the replication of Andreoni (1995a).
However, it is not unreasonable to think that Texans might be more generous, stereo-
types to the contrary. (Whenever we tell folks that we have a pronounced Texas effect
in our public goods games, we ask them to guess which way the effect goes, and in-
evitably they assume the worst of Texans.) Texas is strongly conservative, with
Republicans controlling all statewide offices, dominating the state legislature, and
holding both US Senate seats and 25/36 seats in the US House of Representatives.
The Republican candidate has won the presidential race in all elections in the last
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three decades. The major Texas cities, including Austin, Dallas, Houston, and San
Antonio, usually support Democrats, while their suburbs are heavily Republican.
UT Dallas draws largely from Dallas and its suburbs, and so has roughly equal pro-
portions of students who identify themselves as Republican or Democratic. We did
not collect political information in this study. Claims are often made of greater giv-
ing by conservatives. For example, Brooks (2007) claims that conservatives make 30
percent higher donations of money than liberals (even controlling for income), give
more blood and even donate more of their time. Texas ranks 13th among the states
in donations among those who itemize tax deductions, according to the Chronicle
of Philanthropy (August 19, 2012), with donations of 5.1% of discretionary income.
However, most studies using national surveys show little difference in giving by po-
litical orientation (Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo 2005; Margolis and Sances 2013),
and most lab experiments show no difference in secular giving by party affiliation
(Fowler and Kam 2007) or religiosity (Eckel and Grossman 2004).
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3. INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC GOODS GAMES: A
LABORATORY EXPERIMENT ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF
SANCTIONING POWER
3.1 Introduction
“Many forms of Government have been tried and will be tried in this
world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or
all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of
government except for all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time.” Winston Churchill, Speech in the House of Commons
(November, 1947)
One of the main challenges for any society is to establish, motivate and sus-
tain collective action through its institutions, while, at the same time, balancing
individual vested interests that are not so rarely antagonistic. In the presence of
social dilemmas, voluntary contributions to a public good can reflect the level of
collective commitment, especially considering that the contributor faces an oppor-
tunity cost of the use of his resources (e.g., effort, time, money). The way complex
and modern societies have managed to efficiently enforce collective action is through
mechanisms of power delegation. To enhance collaborative efforts towards social
goals, the leader has among his responsibilities and tools the use of the carrot or
the stick, i.e., reward or punishment. Provided his decisions are consequential to the
set of possible social outcomes, abundant research across disciplines concentrates on
the analysis of the leader’s characteristics and the influence of his decisions or poli-
cies (Cartwright, Gilletand van Vugt 2013, Brandts and Cooper 2007, Chaudhuri
and Paichayontvijit 2010). Nevertheless, the effects of many pre-established institu-
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tional arrangements, such as the leader’s selection mechanism, are less understood.
Resent research in experimental and political sciences have turn its efforts towards
this goal. This paper contributes to this research by testing the performance of ex-
ogenous versus endogenous arrangements of sanctioning power in a Public Goods
environment. Under exogenous power-distribution the leader is randomly chosen by
the experimenter (Leviathan), while, under the endogenous case, group members can
choose their leader democratically (Democracy). Our results show that the Democ-
racy outperforms the Leviathan in promoting collective action towards the socially
efficient outcome. Given our parsimonious experimental environment, the observed
leader’s behavior in both arrangements, and controlling for several characteristics of
participants, we argue that the mechanism through which the Democracy dominates
is through authority legitimacy.
Social dilemmas, such as those found on Common Pool Resources and Public
Goods Experiments and sanction institutions, go beyond the political arena. Firms
and organizations face similar challenges to enforce cooperation. Firms need to set
productivity goals that will reflect their economic performance and spend a signif-
icant share of their budget on monitoring systems and supervision to ensure their
managers and work force commit to the same goals. Beyond the principal-agent
problem and the design of incentive-compatible contracts that promote efficiency,
there are instances where peer-supervision is desirable, and potentially reduces the
risks and costs of unwanted outcomes, e.g. selecting a supervisor or team leader
from the workers’ pool (an insider) to enforce the principal’s agenda. Think of the
dilemma that any college’s Dean faces when choosing a Department Head. Should he
choose from within or outside the faculty?; which delegation strategy would result in
higher commitment to educational goals? Public Goods, in theory, are not efficiently
provided under voluntary contribution due to opportunities for strategic behavior
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where the dominant strategy is to free ride. Paradoxically, abundant experimen-
tal literature in laboratory and field studies (Ledyard 1995, Ostrom 1992) has shown
that individuals consistently deviate from such pessimistic predictions. Nevertheless,
cooperation tends to deteriorate towards the non-cooperative equilibrium over time.
Hence, the study of institutional arrangements that enhance and sustain cooperation
remains a desirable goal.
Beginning with the seminal experiment by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000), most re-
lated experiments study the effects of decentralized sanctioning institutions or peer-
punishment, in which every participant has the power to punish or reward others
within the group (see Chaudhuri 2010). An opposing argument, that resembles a
Hobbessian view (1651), leans towards the centralized authority of the state as a
more efficient public goods provider. Not much attention has been devoted to the
study of centralized institutional arrangements. Recent efforts in this line of research
include: Baldassari and Grossman (2011) (BG2011, hereafter), Andreoni and Gee
(2012), Brandts et al. (2013), Kocher et al. (2013), Carpenter et al. (2012) and
O’Gorman et al. (2009).1 Apart from BG2012, none of the studies have focused
exclusively on the effects of power-distribution in a punishment setting and their
designs typically involve other treatments that simultaneously affect contribution
outcomes (e.g leadership, communication).
This paper provides the first experimental evidence in the laboratory that iso-
lates the effects of exogenous versus endogenous power-distribution mechanism in
contributions for social dilemma environments. We look at an incentive mechanism
to improve cooperation in social dilemma situations by looking at the contribution
levels to a PGG under two different centralized institutional arrangements: endoge-
1A recent summary of related literature can be found in Van Lange, Rockenbach and Yamagishi
2014.
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nous versus exogenous power distribution. After a first phase for a standard linear
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism (VCM, henceforth) we introduce (unexpectedly)
a sanctioning institution. The sanctioning power is centralized to one group member,
e.g, the manager, for the rest of the session. In the exogenous mechanism (Leviathan)
one participant is randomly selected from the group as a manager (leader/punisher)
by the computer, while in the endogenous mechanism (Democracy), one participant
is elected by a simple plurality voting rule among the group members. In the second
phase, each period has two stages. The first stage consists of a VCM followed by a
second stage where a tax/punishment mechanism is implemented. The manager has
two decisions: whether leaving subjects payoff unchanged (not to punish) or to pun-
ish one (and only one) group member; and, if punishment is assigned, then choose
who to punish, along with the intensity of the punishment. Similar to real world
institutional schemes, a centralized punishment is costly for the society as a whole
(e.g., bureaucracy and administrative costs), hence, punishment assigned is costly
for all group members (including the manager) and is deducted from the punished
subject, while unassigned punishment is returned equitably to each group member.
Similar to previous results in peer-punishment (decentralized) institutions (Fehr
and Ga¨chter 2000) we find that in a centralized arrangement the presence of punish-
ment opportunities increases contribution levels. Contrary to theoretical predictions,
the power delegation mechanism is not an innocuous feature of a Public Goods Game
(PGG, henceforth). The Democracy treatment enhances cooperation levels over the
Leviathan treatment, suggesting the former as a preferred dominant strategy to en-
hance collective action. Furthermore, considering that punishment is individually
and socially costly, higher welfare levels (measured as net payoffs) are reached in the
Democracy treatment. These findings provide important insights for organizations
that aim to induce its goals in lower management levels by allowing the legitimacy
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of the authority to kick in, a feature disregarded in the classical principal-agent
model, but greatly acknowledged by cooperative firms (firms where stakeholders
share ownership, work and administrative responsibilities). Furthermore, on the po-
litical arena, it supports the importance of electoral legitimacy in political systems
to promote collective action.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II gives a brief
overview of the related literature. In section III, we describe the experimental design
and procedures in detail. Section IV discusses the different theoretical predictions
and the working hypotheses. We report the experimental results in section V. Sec-
tion VI concludes the paper. Instructions for the experiment are included in the
document’s Appendix.
3.2 Literature review
Our paper contributes to several literatures. In the experimental literature, a
growing number of studies have concentrated on the effects of sanctioning opportu-
nities in social dilemmas since the seminal study by Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) They
examine the effectiveness of monetary punishment in promoting contributions to a
PGG under a decentralized peer-punishment scheme. Their experimental setting is
enriched by the fact that punishment is socially costly. Hence, punishment use is
not a credible threat to deter free riding behavior; and, assuming a purely ratio-
nal agent, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) in this game predicts zero
contributions and zero punishment. They show that the existence of punishment
opportunities increase significantly the average contribution levels; however, cooper-
ation cannot be maintained if the threat of punishment, or willingness to punish, is
not credible. At the same time punishment can be ineffective in the presence of rep-
utation formation and revenge opportunities (mainly from free riders). Nikiforakis
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(2008), for example, introduces opportunities for anti-punishment into a PGG and
shows that the willingness to punish free riders decreases significantly, thereby further
undermining the effectiveness of punishment in promoting cooperation. Our design
builds on the importance of sanctioning institutions in cooperation and explores a
sanctioning scheme with neither reputation nor revenge opportunities.
This paper also relates to the literature on democratic participation in social
dilemmas. The importance of democratic institutions has been extensively discussed
in long-run development (e.g., North 1981, LaPorta et al. 1998, Acemoglu et al.
2005). However, the experimental study of democratic institutions is relatively new
in social dilemma games, in most of which the institutions’ incentives are exogenously
imposed by experimenters. A natural development is to investigate endogenously
chosen institutions. In general, when given the chance to vote for the institutional
environment, subjects seldom vote for sanctioning institutions and prefer reward-
ing arrangements, although not the most effective; and if a sanction environment is
already in place, they tend to restrict punishment levels and often punish the free
riders (Decker et al. 2003, Botelho et al. 2005, Ertan et al. 2009, Sutter et al. 2010).
Another different approach to endogenous institutions is to allow voting over the set
up and intensity of the incentives. Putterman et al. (2011) introduce a dynamic vot-
ing scheme where subjects choose whether to punish contributions over the private
or the public good, as well as the parameters of intensity. They show that most sub-
jects (89%) are in favor of penalizing contributions to the private account and there
is learning behavior over optimal sanctioning schemes. Nevertheless, subjects might
also prefer a sanction-free environment for many reasons that include the rational
recognition of the welfare costs involved in punishment. Also, there is still ambiguity
about self-governed group preferences. Most of the previous studies allow decentral-
ized punishment (peer-to-peer punishment), which can result in excess punishment
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and higher short-run inefficiencies. We reduce the potential misuse of punishment
by allowing the punishment of one (and only one) of the group members, without
restricting the punishment intensity or who receives it.
A vast body of literature argues in favor of direct effects of democracy on eco-
nomic performance and policy selection.2 Positive effects are found independently
of the information and sophistication of the subjects, for example, Dal Bo´ et al.
(2010) show that the effects on cooperation on a prisoner’s dilemma game, by mod-
ifying the payoffs, is greater when the policy is chosen endogenously; further, these
effects are independent of the sophistication of subjects and information provided
about the voting stage. We minimize possible leaders’ confounders by setting a
communication-free environment. The only available information is group members’
contributions, which is provided equally in both treatments: endogenous and ex-
ogenous; and it is presented to the subjects without identifiers to avoid reputation
formation. Furthermore, our experimental design avoids potential biases due to in-
stitutional endogeneity and selection bias, i.e. more cooperative subjects are more
prone to democracy, or policies (choices) within a democratic institution promote
higher cooperation. We do not observe significant differences in the manager’s char-
acteristics between mechanisms although democratically elected managers tend to
act more “responsible” and show slightly higher cooperation levels.
From an evolutionary perspective, modern societies overcome these caveats of
social dilemmas through a centralized punishment power or delegation of power.3
Recent experimental literature on PGG concentrates on this institutional arrange-
2For an excellent review and summary see Dal Bo´ 2014.
3Note that centralization of punishment does not guaranty higher efficiency. Dictators tend to
overuse and abuse their power towards non altruistic goals. In experimental studies there is
certain ambiguity in the efficiency of centralized versus decentralized punishment arrangements.
O’Gorman (2009) and Carpenter et al. (2012) find contradicting results in public goods experi-
ments, however differences in the designs might explain the results. For a discussion see Van Lange
et al. 2014.
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ment, in particular on third-party punishment institutions. Andreoni and Gee (2012)
show that a Paladin (“a gun for hire”) can effectively deter free riding behavior and
improve welfare in PGG when compared to peer-to-peer punishment. Guillen et al.
(2006) show how centralized sanctioning institutions have a significant educational
effect in promoting cooperation. Nevertheless, there is no conclusive result when it
comes to the effects of voting in a centralized institutional environment. Since hu-
man leaders can effectively promote social norms and cooperation by promoting an
agenda (Levy et al. 2011), the effects of endogenous arrangements are often clouded
by the fact that outcomes are not independent of the leader’s characteristics. Elected
leaders may have contradicting incentives to those of their constituencies and make
counterproductive decisions, while pro-social leaders can affect outcomes via their
own contribution, group status or their signal credibility (Brandts and Cooper 2007,
Hamman et al. 2011, Kocher et al. 2013, Brandts et al. 2013, Eckel et al. 2007). The
experimental design proposed in this paper allows us to isolate the results from those
in the leadership literature by looking at the direct effect of the manager selection
mechanism on cooperation. We come back to this point on the results section.
A study that is closest in nature to ours, although in a lab-in-the field setting,
is the study by Baldassari and Grosman (2012). They study the legitimacy of the
authority on cooperation in a PGG by comparing random versus a secret ballot se-
lection of a third-party punisher in different producer organizations in rural Uganda.
They find that subjects contributed to the public account about 9% more in the en-
dogenous mechanism. This evidence is relevant considering that decisions in natural
environments summarize a series of unobserved factors (e.g., iterative interaction,
reputation, identity, culture). Nevertheless, in our perspective, this same reason
blurs the possible causal inference. Further, third-party punishment might bias re-
sults provided leaders payoff function does not depend on the group results. To our
37
knowledge, no other laboratory study has concentrated exclusively on the effects on
voting on centralized punishment institutions, and we believe that the evidence in
our design, in a controlled environment, overcomes several caveats from confound-
ing and contaminating effects originated in simultaneously imposed treatments in
previous studies.
3.3 Experimental design and procedures
The experimental design is based on the canonical VCM for a standard linear
Public Goods Game. Table 1 shows the structure and timeline of the experiment.
We test two treatments, each in two phases to analyze between and within-subjects
mean contribution differences.
Table 3.1: Experimental timeline description
Treatment Phase 1 Manager Phase 2 Participants Sessions
(t ∈ [1, 10]) Selection (t ∈ [11, 20])
Leviathan VCM Random Punishment 75 3
Democracy VCM Voting Punishment 80 3
Total 155 6
3.3.1 The voluntary contribution mechanism
Let I = {1, 2, ..., n} denote a group of n subjects who participate in a Public
Goods Game repeated T periods. In each period t ∈ T , each participant i ∈ I
receives an endowment w, which is common to all participants (hence we drop the
index) and will be allocated to either a private account or a public account. We
denote the contribution of individual i into the public account in period t as cit
which must satisfy 0 ≤ cit ≤ w. Let Ct denote the total sum of all the group
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members’ contributions in period t, i.e. Ct =
∑n
j=1 cjt. Hence, the monetary payoff
of individual i in period t is given by:
piit = w − cit + αCt (3.1)
α is the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) of the contribution, which range
satisfies 0 < α < 1 < nα. Full contribution to the public good is socially efficient if
nα > 1. However, the social dilemma appears due to the domain of the MPCR, one
unit contributed to the public good implies a return of α < 1 and the best strategy
for a self-interested rational subject is to free ride, i.e. invest their endowment on
their private accounts.
The parameterization is as follows. Participants are randomly divided into groups
of n = 5 members that remain fixed (“partner matching”) throughout the whole ex-
periment. We choose this number to minimize the possibility of ties in the voting
mechanism. Nobody knows which other participants are in their group, and nobody
is informed of the group composition. Each session includes two phases under differ-
ent regimes. The first phase is a VCM standard Public Goods Game lasting T = 10
periods. Every period, each participant receives an endowment of w = 20 experimen-
tal currency units (ECUs). Every participant decides how to allocate his endowment
to a “group account” or a “private account.” The total amount in the group account
is doubled and divided equally among all group members, hence α = 0.4. Par-
ticipants observe how many points fellow group members contributed to the group
account at the end of each round. To preclude reputation effects, participants are
provided with information about the other group member contributions and payoffs
in random order. Subjects receive the same amount/type of information, hence in-
formation effects become neutral in this setting and differences can be attributed to
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the treatment mechanism (Dal Bo´ et al. 2010).
3.3.2 The punishment environment
The second phase comprises the presence of punishment opportunities. It lasts
for another 10 periods, and each period is composed of two stages. During the
first stage subjects face the standard VCM with the same parameters previously
described. In the second stage, one subject, the manager (punisher)4 in each group,
decides to impose punishment on his fellow group members. To do so, an amount
of tax (x = 4) is automatically collected from each group member and put into a
management account in each period. After the manager acknowledges the tax, he has
two decisions at hand; on the extensive margin he has to decide whether to punish
any of his fellows or not, i.e. to discipline or forgive observed behavior; while on the
intensive margin he has to decide whom to punish and the size of the punishment,
by using the 20 points available each period from the management account. The
manager is free to leave all group members’ earnings unchanged (i.e. not to punish),
in which case the collected tax is returned to every subject; if partial punishment is
assigned, the remaining points are returned equally to each member. Decisions faced
by the punisher are simpler than in previous schemes in the sense that he has to
choose only one group member. The decision of whether to punish a group member
and whom to punish, can reveal some additional information about the punisher’s
preferences. We return to this point in the results section.
We assume a linear 1:1 cost function.5 At the end of each period, the punisher’s
4During the experiment, we subscribe to a neutral language and avoid the use of words such as
“punisher”, “punishment,” and “tax;” we choose “manager”, “reduction,” and “points collected”
instead.
5The intensity of reward and punishment varies in different experiments. For instance, Fehr and
Ga¨chter (2000) use a strictly increasing and convex cost function. In Sefton et al. (2007), the ratio
of cost for punisher and target is also 1:1. Nikiforakis (2008) provides the strongest punishment,
one unit of which cost target three units. Sutter et al. (2010) discussed the effect of intensity.
They compared the effectiveness with or without leverage, i.e., the ratio of 1:1 or 1:3. Or see the
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decisions (punished subject and intensity) are reported on each member’s terminal.
A general expression for subject i’s payoff function in period t, considering within
group unconstrained punishment, can be written as follows:
piit = w − cit + αCt︸ ︷︷ ︸
VCM
−
tax/punishment mechanism︷ ︸︸ ︷
x− pit + 1
n
(nx− pjt) (3.2)
where pit is the punishment imposed on subject i in period t.
This expression is useful to analyze different efficiency levels of the tax/punishment
mechanism;6 nevertheless, to simplify the intuition of the environment and restrict
the punishment assignment to only one group member (j) and minimize punishment
inefficiencies, the payoff function for individual i becomes:
piit =

20− cit + 0.4Ct , if no punishment is assigned (VCM)
20− cit + 0.4Ct − (0.2pj) , if punishment assigned to j, or j 6= i
20− cit + 0.4Ct − 1.2pi , if punishment assigned to i, or i = j
(3.3)
Two aspects of this expression are worth noticing. Costs incurred in the tax /
punishment mechanism are binding not only on the group members, but also on
the leader’s payoff. Hence, this environment reproduces the equilibrium incentives
from Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) where the best strategy is to free ride (cit = 0) and
not to punish (pj = 0); while, at the same time, acknowledges a natural feature
discussion in the survey by Casari (2005) for the design. Our design is similar with the leverage
case, since the cost of punishment is equally shared by all the members.
6Possible extensions of this analysis can involved specific modifications of this simple environment;
for example, changing the tax parameter we can analyze the deterrent influence of potential pun-
ishment. Also, punishment efficiency in this environment can be simply assessed by using different
cost functions, something that has been analyzed before.
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of certain organizations where costs of any policy implemented are shared among
every member.7 A second aspect is that there is not a bankruptcy rule. Bankruptcy
(piit < 0) is possible if, in a particular period t, a high contributing member (not the
manager) is in a group composed mostly by free riders and receives exemplary (high)
punishment. We considered this to be a rather extreme case and pursue the present
mechanism for its simplicity, without further restrictions.8
3.3.3 The treatments
The PGG with punishment is played under two different arrangements for the
distribution of power: exogenous versus endogenous.
In the exogenous power distribution (XPD), the Leviathan, one participant in
each group is randomly selected as a punisher (manager) by the computer.9
The endogenous power distribution (NPD), the Democracy, is based on the demo-
cratic election of a leader (punisher/manager) by a simple plurality voting rule. The
computer breaks the tie in case it rises (i.e., 2:2:1).10 Everyone can submit one vote
7BG2011 implemented a third party punisher who plays an external monitoring role. His payoff
function is different from anyone else in the group in the sense that it does not depend on the group
contributions (he does not contribute to the PGG) but rather on his decisions over punishment
assignment. We think this potentially generates different incentives for the manager. Other
regarding preferences become a confounder for self maximizing behavior in third party punishment.
For example, the manager’s perception over levels of inequality aversion might be stronger when
being an outside observer than when facing the cost of any punishment decisions that affects his
final payoff.
8Throughout our experiment we did not observe bankruptcy, i.e. no one’s payoff was negative in
any period and punishment was typically assigned to the free riders. Overall, punishment used
fluctuates in the whole range, however, 93% of punishment assigned is equal or lower than 10 Points
(mean= 2.23, median= 0). Different tax/punishment calibration can be tested in replications, and
we encourage this practice.
9The randomization procedure can raise some concerns, in particular, subjects may not trust the
computerized randomization procedure. The extent to which this might affect our results is un-
certain; however, it is common practice in current experimental settings and we subscribe to this
practice.
10We use a plurality voting rule that does not require further selection stages. In the experimental
results we did not observed the case in which each subject receives one vote (although it is a
latent possibility). We control the differences in votes the managers received in the subsequent
econometric analysis.
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but is not allowed to vote for oneself. Subjects cast their votes simultaneously and
anonymously. The only signal voters have at hand come from the historical contri-
bution record of each group member on the first phase.11 They were informed of this
being the only chance for them to be able to link the information about contributions
to a fellow group member.
Finally, To avoid strategic contributions between phases, subjects were not in-
formed about details of the second phase until the end of the first one. They only
know there will be some changes proposed during the development of the experiment.
Implementation: The experiment was conducted at the Economics Research
Laboratory (ERL), at Shenzhen University (SZU), in China. We used “z-Tree”
(Fischbacher, 2007) for the computer programing and interface. The sample used
includes 155 subjects, all are students from several majors at SZU. The sample in-
cludes 47% of women; 39% were economics undergraduate students. Participants
had never participated in a Public Goods experiment. Each session lasted about 90
minutes. Before entering the experimental laboratory, participants were told that
they would receive a show-up fee of 10 RMB (Chinese Yuan)12 which was paid in
cash upon completion of the session. As usual, they were also informed that they
would have other opportunities for extra payoffs based on their performance. They
were not provided any other experimental details before hand.
After being randomly seated at separate computer terminals, subjects received
written instructions that were also read aloud by the experimenter. Experimental in-
11The information includes total and per period contributions. Some concerns may raise due to
the available information. The information independence comes from the fact that subjects
observe contributions in each period in both treatments, hence any information about group
composition is equally transparent. One fair criticism that needs further scrutiny is the fact that
authority/institutional legitimacy on the endogenous versus exogenous power distribution can be
confounded with trust in better chosen leaders, e.g., never a free rider, provided they do select
leaders based on previous contributions. We come back to this point in the leadership section.
12At the time of the experiments the exchange rate was 6.10 RMB per USD 1.00.
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structions, included in the Appendix A, use neutral language, avoiding terms such as
“public good,” “contribution,” “punishment,” “leader,” and “democracy.” To ensure
complete understanding by all subjects, a set of basic test questions were presented
and had to be correctly answered before each phase began. At the end of the exper-
iment subjects filled out a post-experimental questionnaire, including demographic
questions, as well as attitudes about experimental procedures and payoff.
3.4 Theoretical predictions
The basic behavioral hypothesis from classical non-cooperative game theory, built
on the assumption of a self-interested rational subject, predicts that “free riding”
behavior is a dominant strategy in a sanction-free VCM. Further, introducing pun-
ishment opportunities in the PGG does not affect the equilibrium prediction of pure
free riding behavior. In the second stage of each period, due to the punishment cost,
it is not a “rational” strategy for the leaders to impose any punishment on a fellow
group member. Thus the threat of punishment is not credible and the subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) remains the zero contribution for each participant.
This predictions are unconditional on any mechanism of power distribution (leader’s
selection procedure).
Nevertheless, empirical and experimental evidence have shown consistently the
failure of such strict predictions of standard non-cooperative game theory (Ledyard
1995, Chaudhury 2010) and the research agenda has expanded to explore alterna-
tive explanations for observed contributions. Social preferences and other regarding
preferences hypothesis have greatly enriched the behavioral aspect of the theory.13
The social-preference-based story suggests that leaders will punish free riders due
13Social preference includes altruism and warm glow in Andreoni (1990) and Andreoni (1995),
inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Bolton and Ockenfels 2000), positive and negative
reciprocity (Charness and Rabin 2000, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004), fairness (Rabin 1993,
Roth 1995), among others.
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to considerations that go beyond individual strategic behavior.14 If the punishment
observed is altruistic (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000) in the sense that it pursues social
improvements in future interaction, then it is a “rational” strategy in repeated PGG
and we should observe improvements in cooperation as the game develops. A driving
force behind the existence of altruistic punishment are the emotions (negative emo-
tions) triggered by free riding behavior (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2002). Consistent with
these hypothesis, our experimental subjects contribute around 40% of their endow-
ment in the initial period of the VCM and contributions decrease to around 20% in
the final period of the first stage. However, once punishment is at play contribu-
tions rise to around 55% of the endowment in the first period and the pattern of
contributions is consistently increasing throughout the second phase, independently
of the leader’s selection treatment. The final stage represents a one shot game where
punishment cannot be enforced anymore, cooperation deceases but returns to around
the same initial level. We also observe that the most likely punished member of the
group is the free rider.
As in previous studies, punishment can also come from inequality aversion ar-
guments. Furthermore, contributions in a punishment environment can come from
aversion to be the underdog. If altruistic punishment is at play and leaders impose
the average contribution as a social norm, the probability to receive punishment for
the free rider is high in our design (the second to last free rider does not receive any
punishment). Hence a “race to the top” incentive mechanism has also a role in our
results. No one wants to be the only one punished.
However, different from peer-to-peer punishment incentives, in a centralized power
distribution, emotions and altruistic punishment should run through the leader who
14A large body of literature discusses the driving forces to punish free riding in PGG. Reciprocity
and fairness (Falk et al. 2005; Carpenter 2007; Casari and Luini 2012); justice and equity
(Kahneman et al 1986), among others.
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is the one called to impose a social norm, hence we focus on the relationship between
the leader’s selection mechanism and cooperation levels of all group members. Theo-
retical and empirical arguments in social psychology, sociology and political sciences,
support more optimistic outcomes in the endogenous power-distribution institution.
Institution or authority legitimacy, has been argued, plays an important role in social
choice (Weber 1948, Lipset 1959). However it remains a category vaguely defined
(Brandts et al. 2014) and difficult to isolate in experimental settings. The legitimacy
of an authority or an institution may not come from an specific political organization
but from the group’s perception over the way its preferences (values) converge with
the ones of the political institution in place (Lipset 1959, p.86-87). In other words,
institution or authority legitimacy can arise under heterogeneous power delegation
mechanisms.
In view of these arguments we hypothesize the following:
Hypothesis 1: The contributions’ performance among institutional arrange-
ments follows the following order: NPD>XPD>VCM.
As mentioned, the fact that sanctioning institutions improve cooperation in the
public goods provision justifies the last inequality. Beyond this well established find-
ing, we argue that legitimacy through the manager’s selection mechanism has a direct
a role in enhancing collective action. The channel through which legitimacy plays a
role in the effectiveness of the institutional environment is subject to debate. The
legitimacy of the institution entails an objective evaluation over the appropriateness
of the political structure to pursue specific social goals, as well as an affective assess-
ment that members of a group perform, consciously or unconsciously, over a range of
beliefs and perceptions over what those social goals are (Lipset 1959). In the same
line of argument, democratic institutions can affect economic performance through
two main channels: institutional incentives (i.e. institution’s performance, leader’s
46
performance and path dependency) or individual behavior (i.e. influencing pro-social
behavior). Both channels coexist in a “real world” setting and, although we do not
disregard the effects of the former we favor and concentrate on the latter and ana-
lyze the extent to which this channel affects the economic performance. Incentives
towards collective action go beyond “rational” arguments and are routed deeply in
other aspects of intrinsic human behavior.
We predict the Democracy (endogenous) treatment will be more effective in pro-
moting contributions than the Leviathan (exogenous). If there is evidence of changes
in pro-social individual behavior on the institutional performance, it must be the case
that this argument holds despite of the manager’s contribution behavior or punish-
ment frequency. In other words, we should expect most group members, regardless
of their hierarchic position within the group, to contribute more in the democracy.
Hypothesis 2: There is heterogeneity in the effectiveness of punishment between
treatments. NPD should be higher than in XPD at initial periods since elected man-
agers may feel more responsible to discipline the free riders than their exogenously
selected counterparts. Even though, the dynamics of punishment should show a de-
creasing pattern in both treatments, on latter periods it should be the case that the
NPD falls below the XPD, provided the institutional effectiveness converges faster
to the social norm in the NPD and higher cooperation levels are in place.
Hypothesis 3: Higher efficiency, measured as net earnings (payoffs), is reached
in the endogenous power distribution, i.e. the net interaction of the previous two
hypothesis results in better welfare outcomes in the NPD versus the XPD.
3.5 Results
The main goal of this study is to test the effect of endogenous versus exogenous
power distribution, the Democracy versus the Leviathan treatment, on individual
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contributions in the PGG; further, we argue that the only mechanism behind this
behavior is institutional legitimacy. The results are discussed as follows. The perfor-
mance across institutional regimes is analyzed in Section 5.1. Section 5.2 discusses
the econometric results. Section 5.3 analyses whether or not there is a leadership ef-
fect, i.e., test whether the performance of the leader (punisher) differs across regimes.
3.5.1 General results
Table 2 (Panel A) summarizes the overall average of contributions, punishment
behavior and profits under the three regimes. The lowest average contribution levels
are observed in the VCM in the baseline for both treatments; subjects contribute on
average 7.08 out of 20 ECU in each period (35% of the endowment) By comparing the
between treatments baseline we do not find they are statistically different (p=0.18 for
a Man-Whitney U test). As in previous studies in the Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) flavor,
our baseline also reproduces evidence of deviation from the standard theoretical
prediction of free riding behavior, in fact contribution patterns match closely.
Subjects face the punishment environment in period 11, after the groups where
assigned a leader by one of the two proposed mechanisms. Contributions in both
treatments increase when punishment opportunities are at hand. The Leviathan
treatment increases contributions to around 58% of the original endowment (11.60
ECU), while the Democracy treatment improves in average to 67.5% of endowment,
to 13.50 ECU, almost 91% higher than in the baseline VCM. It is worth noticing that
the existence of punishment shapes the initial behavior, without individuals having
any previous experience with their leader’s influence in the game, contributions start
well over the baseline initial point. The Leviathan treatment’s average contribution
begins at about half of the endowment (10 ECU) and ascends slightly over time up
to period 18 where it reaches around 13 ECU before declining again back at 10 ECU.
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Table 3.2: Average performance comparison
Panel A: Contribution (Points)
Treatments Baseline: VCM Punishment Punishment-VCM
Leviathan 6.920 (0.259) 11.604 (0.248) 4.684 (0.359)
(N = 750) (N = 750) (p = 0.000)
Democracy 7.230 (0.229) 13.049 (0.237) 5.819 (0.330)
(N = 800) (N = 800) (p = 0.000)
Democracy-Leviathan 0.310 (0.345) 1.445 (0.343) DD: 1.135 (0.390)
(p = 0.182) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.000)
Panel B: Punishment (Points)
Leviathan Democracy Democracy-Leviathan
4.207 (0.220) 4.706 (0.244) 0.500 (0.165)
(N = 750) (N = 800) (p = 0.764)
Panel C: Profit (Points)
Treatments Baseline: VCM Punishment Punishment-VCM
Leviathan 26.920 (0.259) 29.921 (0.262) 3.001 (0.369)
(N = 750) (N = 750) (p = 0.000)
Democracy 27.230 (0.229) 31.164 (0.268) 3.934 (0.353)
(N = 800) (N = 800) (p = 0.000)
Democracy-Leviathan 0.310 (0.345) 1.242 (0.376) DD: 0.932 (0.427)
(p = 0.140) (p = 0.000) (p = 0.029)
Standard errors are in parentheses. p values are reported for a Mann-
Whitney U tests. Two-sided t-tests report similar results.
The Democracy treatment’s average contribution begins at a higher level (about 12
ECU) and also ascends to its highest level (slightly higher than 14 ECU) in period
18 and declines to 13 ECU at last. Figure 1 displays the time trend of contributions
by institutional arrangement.
In the between treatments analysis, we found evidence that shows how collective
action is improved by allowing group members chose their leader (punisher). Con-
trary to a SPNE solution concept, subjects react contributing significantly higher
when they choose their leader as opposed to when he is imposed. According with
our first hypothesis, the difference between the Democracy and the Leviathan is pos-
itive; and, unconditional on other factors, it ascends to around 1.14 ECU (5.7% of
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the endowment). The result is highly significant for nonparametric Mann-Whitney
U test (p=0.00).15
Result 1. Punishment opportunities in both treatments, endogenous (Democracy)
and exogenous (Leviathan) power distribution, trigger significantly higher
contributions than the standard VCM. Subjects contribute at consistently
higher levels in the Democracy treatment than in the Leviathan. (H1:
NPD > XPD > V CM)
Figure 3.1: Average contributions by treatment
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Punishment represents a private and a social cost, hence its use can potentially
15t-Tests report similar results.
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lead to overall economic inefficiencies (welfare losses). Table 2 (Panel B) also reports
the general results of the experiments in these two aspects. The average punishment
ascends to 4.21 ECU and 4.71 ECU in the Leviathan and Democracy, respectively.
However, this difference is statistically insignificant (Mann-Whitney U test, p =
0.76), i.e., there is no difference between punishment behavior across treatments.
Nevertheless, it is worth noting the difference in the declining pattern. While both
treatments decrease parallel for most of the phase, the Leviathan treatment shows
some ambiguous punishment, its levels increase sharply in the final two periods to
up to 6 ECU. In the Democracy treatment punishment continues its declining trend
to almost zero.
Nearly 80% of the leaders chose to use punishment in the initial period for the
Democracy treatment, while only 60% of leaders do it in the Leviathan. Differences
in punishment trends are negligible between treatments; however, the likelihood of
punishment is almost zero in the Democracy for the last period, but about half of
punishers continue to punish in the Leviathan treatment. Consistent with our second
hypothesis, even though average contributions in the Democracy treatment are higher
(by about 1.1 ECU units), on average, elected leaders react more severely to free
riding behavior, using around 3 punishment points more than the punishment applied
by randomly-chosen leaders. This partially supports the second hypothesis. In the
same line of argument, punishment in the Democracy treatment is more consistent
in its decreasing pattern, while average punishment has a U-shaped pattern in the
Leviathan. We found these results rather striking considering that contributions are
mostly parallel between treatments (except for the last period). There is no apparent
reason for a randomly chosen leader to change punishment behavior dramatically in
the last periods, although the very last period might represent some form of altruistic
punishment, specially considering there is no further stages to the game. Figure 2
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displays detailed information about temporal patterns of intensity and frequency of
punishments.
Result 2. Frequency and average intensity of punishment are not significantly
different between the endogenous and exogenous distribution of power,
although we find heterogeneous punishment patterns. In particular, leaders
democratically elected show higher levels of altruistic punishment. Randomly
chose leaders react somewhat arbitrarily and show an average intensity of a
U-shaped form.
Finally, when it comes to economic efficiency, measured simply as the profit in
each period, i.e. the period earnings minus the punishment, 16 we naturally find
very similar patterns as the contributions (see Figure 3a). The average earnings in
the VCM (first phase) is 27.08 ECU, while the average payoff in the Leviathan and
Democracy is higher (and statistically different from each other, p=0.029). Average
payoff reaches 29.92 ECU and 31.16 ECU, respectively. Payoffs are always higher in
the Democracy treatment except for period 15; these differences accentuate more if
we exclude the punished subjects (mostly free riders, see Figure 3b). The punishment
differences between the erratic behavior in the Leviathan treatment versus a more
consistent declining trend in the Democracy treatment affect the payoff results shown.
Payoffs are the net effect between contribution behavior and punishment applied (or
not used), hence, as argued in our hypotheses, we find evidence that centralized
punishment institutions enhance social efficiency. Furthermore, higher welfare levels
are reached in the endogenous power distribution (more compliance with social norms
and less punishment needed). The last result confirms our third hypothesis.
16Efficiency in this setting can be measured also in relation with potential earnings in each period
(Eckel et al. 2010). Conclusions are the same.
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Figure 3.2: Punishment behavior
(a) Average punishment assigned
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Result 3. Higher efficiency is reached in the endogenous distribution of power
(Democracy treatment); net payoff is significantly higher than in the
Leviathan treatment.
Fehr and Ga¨chter (2000) find that punishment initially causes a payoff loss rel-
ative to the VCM, both in the strangers and the partners treatment. Yet there are
relative payoff-gains in the last two periods out of ten in the strangers treatment,
whereas the relative payoff-gains are positive from period 4 to the end in partners
treatment. The relative payoff-gain in the final period is about 20% in the partners
treatment and 10% in the strangers treatment. In punishment regimes with high
(3) and low punishment leverage (1). Sutter et al. (2010) finds no significant gains
relative to the standard VCM. Hence regarding the average overall payoff gains in
the final period, the Leviathan arrangement is at least no worse than their partners
treatment, whereas the Democracy clearly outperforms the others. These differences,
we argue, come from the decentralized punishment institution where everyone can
punish any other group member, leading to higher inefficiencies (less effectiveness, or
over punishment for a similar effect). In our design only one subject can be punished
in each period, the likelihood of being effectively punished is lower conditional on
being close to the social norm (group’s average contribution). At the same time, the
free riding behavior becomes more salient for the punisher, hence there are incen-
tives to push contributions upwards to avoid being the underdog (a “race to the top”
effect) This two forces at play show that behavioral results are relevant even in such
difficult institutional conditions, which strengthens our argument.
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Figure 3.3: Subjects’ payoff
(a) Overall profits
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(b) Profits excluding free riders (punished subjects)
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3.5.2 Econometric results
We perform a formal econometric analysis to support the results shown, and
analyze the determinants of contributions (Cigt) in each institutional arrangement
conditional on other factors (observed and unobserved) that might affect subjects
performance throughout the experiment.
A natural extended regression specification to analyze the results is the following:
Cigt = γ1(D∗P )it+γ2Democracy(D)i+γ3Punishment(P )t+Z ′igΦ+X ′iΓ+αg+λt+εigt
(3.4)
where the subindex i represent the experimental subject, g the corresponding
group and t the time period.
The coefficient of interest that captures the average treatment effect of the en-
dogenous power distribution is γˆ1. Similar to a diff-in-diff approach, the regressors
of interest, the product of the Democracy for those subjects in this treatment and
the Punishment institution in the second phase, represents the difference between
the Democracy and the Leviathan treatment.
To capture the deterrence effect of punishment and compliance to the social norm,
the model includes Φ, which contains C−ig,t−1, the lag of the average contribution of
other fellow members in group g, Pg,t−1, the lag of the general amount of punishment
executed by the punisher within the group. Pi,t−1 represents the punishment received
by individual i, if he was punished in the previous period, and the trend t within
each phase.
Finally, Xi is a vector of individual demographic controls that include: gender,
major, math score in the National Entry Exam,17 year in college, whether or not
17National Higher Education Entrance Examination-NCEE is an academic test held annually for
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they received an scholarship, urban or rural area, family income, ethnicity, whether
they have a job, party membership, whether or not a single child in family, and
trends within each phase.18 As usually assumed in experimental analysis, due to
randomization (and the Law of Large Numbers), εigt∼ NIID[0, σ2ε ], nevertheless, we
tested several model specifications that include individual,19 group (α) and time (λ)
fixed effects. As corresponds, we dropped the time invariant controls for comparison
on the results shown.
Our identification strategy relies on random assignment of the treatment, in other
words, there are no systematic differences between the control and treatment groups
(i.e., Leviathan and Democracy in our experiment) that would have caused the out-
come levels to be different in the absence of treatment; furthermore, if any differences
arise they are observed and we can control for them.20
Several specifications of equation (4) are presented in Table 3. Column 1-2 show
the results from GLS regression with random effects.21 Columns 3 show the results
for an individual fixed effects model.
Similar to the raw (unconditional) results shown in Table 2, the coefficient of
interest has exactly the same magnitude (γ1 = 1.135) and is strongly significant.
Also, consistent with previous findings (see Gu¨rerk et al. 2006), just the presence
of punishment opportunities increase the contribution levels, in average, punishment
opportunities increase contributions by around 4.7 ECU, when unconditional on
senior high school students to apply for higher education.
18Party membership refers (redundantly!) to the Communist party. Due to technical difficulties,
these controls were not available in one session. We tested the results with the reduced sample
and found no significant differences.
19Dropping covariates Xi and estimating a parameter δi instead.
20The natural estimation strategy that follows is parallel to a a difference-in-differences approach.
In the context of laboratory experiments, the identifying assumption is satisfied, and although
some violations to the randomization process are documented (see Table 6), we controlled for
individual fixed effects which is the most flexible specification to control for unobserved (time-
invariant) individual heterogeneity.
21Tobit panel regressions yield the same qualitative results.
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Table 3.3: Determinants of contributions, regression results
Dependent variable: Contributions (ECU)
Random effects (GLS) Fixed Effects (ind.level)
(1) (2) (3)
Democracy vs.Leviathan (PxD) 1.135*** 0.623* 0.642*
(0.390) (0.348) (0.346)
Punishment (P) 4.684*** 2.200*** 2.280***
(0.280) (0.272) (0.272)
Democracy (D) 0.310 0.0239 0†
(0.711) (0.526) (.)
Other’s Avg.Cont. (t-1) 0.666*** 0.647***
(0.0210) (0.0218)
Punishment received (t-1) -0.0911** -0.0718*
(0.0406) (0.0405)
Punishment in the group (t-1) 0.0108 0.00417
(0.0218) (0.0219)
Trend (within phase) -0.236*** -0.230***
(0.0323) (0.0322)
Constant 6.920*** 3.446*** 3.560***
(0.511) (0.438) (0.256)
R2 (overall) 0.136 0.412 0.411
N 3100 2945 2945
Standard errors in parenthesis. Sample differences are due to the use of lags.
† Variable dropped. Time invariant once controlled for individual FE.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
other factors. Note that the differences in treatment, once controlling for the changes
in the institutional arrangement, are not significant.
The regressions analysis allows us to evaluate these results conditional on other
factors, that are part of the game setting, and that might affect subjects’ behavior
throughout the experiment. When controlling dynamically for information available
to the subjects in each period, the average treatment effect decreases to almost half
of the unconditional result (γˆ1 = 0.623). Its statistical significance is also affected
(the standard errors are about the same, hence it is the magnitude of the coefficient
what drives the attenuation effect), however, it checks out for a 10% significance
level. The effect of others’ average contribution, which represents the social norm
imposed within the group, is positive; in other words, subjects react to the within
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group behavior adjusting their posterior contributions. This effect is significant and
explains an increase of about 0.7 (ECU). The deterrent effect of punishment is con-
tradictory but very weak (0.09 units), which suggest that most results are driven by
the punishment opportunities and not necessarily the way punishment is executed.
Recall that in our design only one subject can be punished, hence, we argue that the
general incentive for contributions withing the second phase is a “race to the top,”
i.e., no one wants to be the only one punished in the group. Finally, the average
trend within phase is decreasing and significant.
We collected and test several controls withing our study. We found that men
contribute consistently more and also that party membership (Chinese Commu-
nist Party) also plays a role in contribution behavior by increasing contributions.
Nonetheless, the most flexible approach to control for time invariant observable and
unobservable individual characteristics is to use a fixed effects estimation. We tested
several additional specifications.22 Column 3 includes the same estimation of equa-
tion 4 allowing for individual fixed effects. Results are robust for various specifica-
tions in all variables analyzed.
When it comes to assignment of punishment it becomes clear that punishment
is assigned based on a reference for the social norm (the non free riders average
contribution). Table 4 shows some related regression results. Columns 1 and 2 show
the estimates for a linear probability model (panel, random effects),23 in which the
dependent variable is an indicator of whether or not the subject is punished. Column
3 and 4, analyze the amount of punishment received by subjects. Recall that the
22We tested for observed controls, group fixed effects, time fixed effects and combinations. Table
7 contains some of the specifications. Also, we estimate Tobit models for similar specifications;
results remain consistent and conclusions are the same, but report RE and FE models for easiness
of interpretation. Results available upon request.
23Similar conclusions are drawn from a panel Probit estimation. For easiness of exposition we show
the linear probability version. Other results are available upon request.
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leader has up to 20 point available each period, hence the intensity of punishment
reveals the response sensitivity of the leader to the observe violation. Both results
show the same pattern. Deviations from the social norm, and in particular, free riding
behavior (see the negative deviation) increase the probability to receive punishment.
Furthermore, the average additional punishment ranges from 0.4 to 0.7 points. More
importantly, there is no evidence for different punishing behavior between treatments,
the Leviathan and the Democracy. This has important implications in terms of
efficiency in the endogenous distribution of power.
Table 3.4: Punishment decisions
Random effects (GLS)
Dependent variable
Punished (= 1) Punishment received (Points)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy 0.0058 0.0046 0.269 0.255
(0.0184) (0.0164) (0.217) (0.199)
OMC absolute deviation
∣∣Cit − C¯−it∣∣ 0.030*** 0.396***
(0.0023) (0.0256)
OMC negative deviation
∣∣Cit − C¯−it < 0∣∣ 0.056*** 0.695***
(0.0026) (0.0283)
OMC positive deviation
∣∣Cit − C¯−it > 0∣∣ -0.0024 0.0292
(0.0028) (0.0307)
Constant 0.0185 0.0275** -0.341** -0.240
(0.0149) (0.0134) (0.173) (0.159)
R2 (overall) 0.086 0.246 0.115 0.272
N 1550 1550 1550 1550
OMC: Other group members’ contribution.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
3.5.3 An inquiry on leadership behavior
The extent to which the type of leader influences collective action deserves some
attention in social dilemmas and sanctioning institutions. In this section we analyze
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whether it is the type of leader, as opposed to the institutional framework, what
drives our results.
The fact that leadership plays an important role in cooperation, coordination and
collective action has been well established in experimental research. In this litera-
ture, a leader has specific roles and, in general, takes a publicly observable action so
the followers can acknowledge it and react accordingly by best responding. Leaders
exercise their influence in many ways: leading by example (i.e., choosing first), com-
munication (e.g., sending an encouraging message), networks (e.g., by their location
within a network), etc. There is also evidence on the influence of the leader’s social
status where weakly induced status, normally by a trivia quiz and a public star recog-
nition (Ball et al. 2001), differentiates contribution or cooperation behavior in non
trivial ways (Eckel and Wilson 2007, Kumru and Verteslund 2010, Eckel et al. 2010).
High-status leaders influence followers more effectively. In social dilemma games and
sanctioning institutions, actions taken by the leader are very salient for the group
members, to the point that, other things equal, the type of leader determines the
final outcomes. Hence, it is natural to think that the leader’s selection mechanism in
these environments favors the endogenous institutional framework (voluntary lead-
ers), although their level of influence is debatable (Arbak and Villeval 2007, Brandts
et al. 2014).
We take discrete distance from this literature in important ways. The leader
in our environment is either randomly imposed or democratically selected for the
whole sanctioning institution phase (second phase), however, any leader’s action is
anonymous and simultaneously taken with the rest of the group members, i.e., there
are no followers in terms of decisions. Furthermore, provided that contribution
information is presented to the players in random order, it is not ex ante clear
for a subject whether the leader of the group contributes more or less than any
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social norm, i.e., the leader’s action (contribution/punishment) cannot be identified
from the actions of any other member. Many priors might come at play in both
treatments, however; since the leader cannot inflict self punishment, his incentives
to contribute are in fact lower during the second phase. Also, since the leader’s
punishment decisions are socially costly, punishment actions are binding for his payoff
just in the same way they affect the other group members.
Table 5, Panel A, reports the comparison of contribution levels between leaders
and other group members within treatments. The first section reports these dif-
ferences for the first phase (VCM with no punishment). It provides evidence that
the randomization mechanism worked in the Leviathan treatment, i.e. those leaders
chosen do not behave differently from the others; while, in the Democracy treatment,
elected leaders typically are high contributors. More importantly in these results,
notice that our design gives the leader natural advantage over the rest of the group
members. Different from decentralized punishment environments, the selected leader
keeps its appointment throughout the rest of the experiment, hence, he is not at risk
of receiving any punishment. The leader can choose to free ride safely (anonymity
ensures no other concerns). Nevertheless, the power distribution mechanism triggers
some positive “responsibility” impulse on the leaders (see Figure 4). In other words,
those called to impose the social norm, feel compelled to comply, regardless of the
selection mechanism.
It is worth noticing, however, the differences across treatments. In the first pe-
riod of the second phase (punishment institution) leaders in both treatments react
positively, however, leader’s contributions in the Democracy treatment are more con-
sistent throughout the whole phase than in the Leviathan, where contributions drop
dramatically on the last period. The second section shows that overall difference in
average contributions in the second phase (tax/punishment institution) is not sta-
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Figure 3.4: Average contribution by group hierarchy
(a) Managers’ average contribution
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(b) Other members’ average contribution
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tistically significant (12.86 versus 12.22, p = 0.051, MW U test). Differences arise
between treatments. Leaders in the Democracy treatment contribute significantly
more than their group fellows (14.80 versus 12.61, p = 0.00, MW U test); this
difference is not significant in the Leviathan treatment (p = 0.139, MW U test).
Table 3.5: Leadership
Panel A
Managers Others p-value
Mann-Whitney U test
(H0: equal means)
Baseline-VCM (C¯t≤10, Points)
Overall 8.952 (0.184) 6.612 (0.434) 0.000
Leviathan 7.247 (0.639) 6.838 (0.283) 0.900
Democracy 10.550 (0.564) 6.400 (0.239) 0.000
Punishment (C¯t>10, Points)
Overall 12.859 (0.416) 12.223 (0.189) 0.051
Leviathan 10.793 (0.631) 11.807 (0.267) 0.139
Democracy 14.794 (0.503) 12.613 (0.265) 0.000
Punishment-VCM
Overall 3.906 (0.464) 5.610 (0.002) 0.000
Leviathan 3.547 (0.718) 4.968 (0.356) 0.031
Democracy 4.244 (0.598) 6.213 (0.342) 0.001
Panel B
Leviathan Democracy p-value
Mann-Whitney U test
(H0: equal means)
Baseline-VCM (C¯t≤10, Points)
Overall 6.920 (0.259) 7.230 (0.229) 0.182
Manager 7.247 (0.639) 10.550 (0.564) 0.001
Others 6.838 (0.283) 6.400 (0.239) 0.600
Punishment (C¯t>10, Points)
Overall 11.604 (0.248) 13.049 (0.237) 0.000
Manager 10.793 (0.631) 14.794 (0.503) 0.000
Others 11.807 (0.267) 12.613 (0.265) 0.049
Punishment-VCM
Overall 4.684 (0.319) 5.819 (0.299) 0.001
Manager 3.547 (0.718) 4.244 (0.598) 0.203
Others 4.968 (0.356) 6.213 (0.342) 0.002
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Panel B in Table 5 reports the same information organized to test for differences
of managers and non-managers between treatments. Again, when looking at con-
tribution levels on the first phase (VCM-NP), the voting artifact shows the positive
selection of leaders for those on the Democracy treatment, while contributions are
not statistically different for other members, across treatments. When the punish-
ment institution is in place (second phase), we reject the hypothesis of equal mean
contributions either for leaders (p = 0.00) or for other group members (p = 0.049); in
other words, the Democracy treatment induces significantly higher contribution lev-
els than the Leviathan for both, managers and non-managers. Furthermore, given
the fact that subjects in the Democracy treatment are given a signal about their
leaders, an skeptic reader might argue that this evidence supports the idea of a
confounding leadership effect.24 Even though this skepticism has some room in our
design, in the third section of Panel B we test for the differences in the changes in
behavior between phases, by treatment. Consistently with our main hypothesis25
contribution differences between phases are significant for other group members,
while changes in contribution behavior across phases and treatments are statistically
the same (p = 0.203)
The channel through which leadership plays a role is still somewhat ambiguous
and requires further exploration. However, we argue that there are intrinsic incentives
that need to be considered, a self commitment behavior in response to being allowed
to choose a leader, the authority legitimacy ; and, therefore, observed behavior is
independent of leadership qualities. Regardless of the channel of influence, this
is suggestive evidence that supports the idea that endogenous distribution of power
24We are somewhat sympathetic with this skepticism, and further efforts will be directed to isolate
this effect.
25Hypothesis 1: the Democracy treatment outperforms the Leviathan and differences are uncondi-
tional on the leaders’ behavior
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(Democracy treatment) favors contribution levels and outperforms other institutional
arrangements in social dilemma games with sanctioning opportunities.
3.6 Concluding remarks
We report new evidence of a laboratory experiment using a linear public goods
game that focuses on endogenous sanctioning power. Departing from most related
experiments under endogenous institutional arrangement, in which participants are
allowed to vote for their preferred incentive mechanism in a decentralized institution
(Gu¨rerk et al. 2006; Sutter 2010), our experiment compares the effectiveness of
exogenous versus endogenous distribution of sanctioning power under a centralized
institutional arrangement.
Similar to previous findings, we find that sanctioning opportunities, either en-
dogenous or exogenously assigned, outperform the standard voluntary contribution
mechanism (VCM), both in terms of higher average contribution and earnings (so-
cial efficiency). Beyond the punishment effects on contributions, our experimental
results present novel findings. We find that the endogenous power-distribution insti-
tution, the Democracy, promotes higher cooperation and efficiency than the exoge-
nous power-distribution institution, the Leviathan treatment, in a centralized power
environment. A possible explanation, the one we attribute our results within this
analysis, is authority/institutional legitimacy, in the sense that presented evidence is
driven by intrinsic incentives within the endogenous power distribution, conditional
on the existence of punishment opportunities, i.e., there is a “self commitment” mech-
anism that activates in a democratic electoral framework. Whether this behavior is
confounded by leadership or inequality aversion requires more in-depth analysis. We
discard the pure leadership argument since, at least in our environment, managers
do not change contributions differentially between phases, while differences observed
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in other group members are significant, unconditionally of treatment. Furthermore,
leader’s actions are not distinguishable from other’s, and are simultaneously taken.
A final point should be made in terms of the external and internal validity of these
results. Can these results be driven by the sample being drawn in China, a country
with a centralized government? Our initial reaction is that this seems very unlikely.
Without prejudice of further research on different cultural and institutional envi-
ronments, as well as a call for replications that confirms or debates previous results
in the discipline;26 if anything, the fact that a population that faces a centralized
power distribution reacts positively to an institutional arrangement that involves a
democratic election, only reaffirms our suspicion that there are intrinsic motivations
in a democratic institutional framework that affect effective choices. How this insti-
tution is linked to contributions is a research question that we try to address in this
research. Nevertheless, it is still an open empirical question to define how context
dependent experimental results are.
In summary, the introduction of a democratic participation mechanism into sanc-
tioning power institution for a public good provision, reduces the free-riding prob-
lem in social dilemmas and promotes higher cooperation without sacrificing social
efficiency (cost/effective). These results expand on the agency problems and the
contracts that enforce cooperation disregarding the agent/manager selection mecha-
nism. Furthermore, they offer valuable insights to explain differences in governance
outcomes of common pool resources and provision of public goods whether in the
lab or in the field. On the political arena, our results support the faith in liberal
democracies, conditional on having an institutional framework in place that holds
their members accountable.
26See Eckel et al. (2015) forthcoming.
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4. INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES AND CREDIT BEHAVIOR: AN EMPIRICAL
INQUIRY ON CONSUMER UNOBSERVED HETEROGENEITY
4.1 Introduction
One known fact about the discounted utility model, rarely discussed, is the in-
distinguishable nature of the psychological motivations for intertemporal choice. Al-
though its simplicity provides interpretative advantages, a large body of literature
has investigated its behavioral limitations (see Frederick et al. 2002). Empirically,
structural approaches that rely on particular utility functions would not recover any
generalizable information over these motivations. Beyond the choice dynamics, the
most important feature of credit markets is the agency problem derived from the
imperfect information framework. Typically, one of the incumbents in any credit
contract, namely the agent, has more information over its willingness and capability
to repay a loan, information that is not necessarily revealed by the clients or captured
by very rigorous credit assessment procedures. By means of a finite mixture density
approach, I investigate the possibility to recover (at least in a partial sense) some
information over individual preferences, strategic behavior and willingness to repay a
loan, by uncovering the unobserved quality-types of clients on the credit market, and
show some of the statistical advantages of modeling credit behavior by identifying a
latent process.
In the core of the neoclasical model, subjects face different decisions over con-
sumption, savings, investment and credit demand, over a life cycle. Intertemporal
choice over these variables depends mainly on forward looking considerations over
future income and budget constraints, what is known as the Permanent Income Hy-
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pothesis (Friedman, 1956). The free access 1 to credit, allows agents to allocate
resources intertemporally, only now they need to consider the financial burden asso-
ciated with the use of credit.2 Following the “rational behavior” hypothesis, financial
decisions and, in particular, loan’s demand, are the result of rational choice and in-
dividual maximizing behavior; in other words, economic agents, consciously or not,
rely on some form of cost/benefit analysis to determine their intertemporal allocation
of consumption; i.e. define the stream of credit loans/payments that best serves their
long term interests. However, a feasible choice in the short run is to “default,” that
is, fail to honor the loan payments on a particular period to keep current liquidity,
and bear whatever consequences might follow, which are far from the mere financial
costs. The traditional way to summarize such behavior in most credit markets is
the credit score (or score-card) which has become a powerful tool to signal reputa-
tion and creditworthiness of clients. The influence of this information mechanisms
can not be underestimated, and now days it goes beyond basic financial restrictions,
from affecting future access to credit, interest rates and borrowing limits; to less
obvious areas including auto or home insurance prices, employment screening and
tax compliance (Fisher and Lyons, 2010).
Traditional credit score practices are built either on available debt balance or,
in the best case scenario, through the use of micro level data on historical informa-
tion about consumption and demographic characteristics, leaving out a wide range
of unobserved factors that affect behavior. That is the case of models that explore
the Default Probability (DP) plagued with endogeneity problems due to the lack
of information over individual preferences and selection bias. How to account for
1By free access in this case I mean free entry, i.e. no liquidity constraints.
2The foundations of the representative agent model used in macroeconomics rest on this intertem-
poral (dynamic) approach. See Deaton (1992) for other insights over the implications of time
consistency in other macro models.
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the particular idiosyncrasies of credit users is an important empirical and theoretical
question. Experimental practices have developed a wide range of methods (elic-
itation methods) as revelation mechanisms for individual preferences, some more
successful than others; yet its applicability outside the laboratory is cumbersome
and even questionable. A suitable empirical alternative, proposed by Gan and Mos-
quera (2008) that I revisit in this paper, is to add some basic statistical structure
to the intertemporal choice problem described in order to identify client’s hetero-
geneous types. This approach offers a good compromise between the estimation of
structural parameters which, combined with some additional information that can
be considered orthogonal to the population errors, support the identification of the
model.
From a policy perspective, knowledge of the individual heterogeneity of clients
is highly desirable. On one hand, reducing the information asymmetries in the
lender/borrower relationship may lead to improvements on the credit risk manage-
ment of the company by reducing the adverse selection problem, i.e. selection of
riskier clients. The importance of adequate private risk management in financial
institutions cannot be stressed enough; if credit risk becomes systemic, the social
consequences are catastrophic, it is enough to see how bad risk management in the
so called subprime loans have caused in the financial crises in US and Europe in
recent years. Aside from this dark perspective, knowledge of credit types can also
result in more efficient credit allocations, potentially reducing credit rationing condi-
tions in competitive markets. As supported by equilibrium models under rationing
conditions, having multiple contracts based on signaling mechanisms can potentially
improve (Pareto) market efficiency.
The paper’s contributions can be summarized as follows. First, it proposes an
empirical approach to identify the existence of private information in the credit mar-
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ket that results in different quality-types of clients. The estimation procedure offers
better withing and out-of-sample predictions of delinquency rates/default (better
relative fit) for a two types equilibrium; in other words, accounting for unobserved
heterogeneity there are important improvements on screening techniques applica-
ble to the financial industry. When it comes to the credit demand, due to higher
variance, we identify up to five quality-types of clients and the specification helps
to interpret behavioral differences in the elasticities of the economic variables. Sec-
ond, it expands the reach of previous studies (Gan and Mosquera, 2008; and Gan,
Herna´ndez and Liu, 2013) by extending the domain to the analysis of education and
labor information, with potentially higher relevance for type identification. Finally,
it supports the use/collection of additional information and experimental elicitation
mechanisms for individual preferences to disentangle the problem of heterogeneous
types identification on a mixture density framework. Additionally, it includes a dis-
cussion of the partial identification problem present in such models and how the
experimental elicitation mechanisms can help improve the consistency of the results.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some of the main results
and previous findings from the relevant literature. Section 3 covers a theoretical
discussion about the model that offers some intuition over the results. Section 4
describes the empirical approach adopted for the type-consistent estimation. Section
5 summarizes the main results and out-of-sample performance. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Literature review
4.2.1 Individual preferences and financial decisions
When it comes to credit many factors are involved in the decision making process
and, depending on the institutional setting, they can be analyzed as part of an
individual or a group decision problem. In micro-finance programs (joint liability),
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most studies concentrate on assessments of group homogeneity (Cassar et al., 2007)
and trust (Karlan, 2005). In general, trustworthy individuals3 and homogeneous
groups are significantly less likely to default.
Among individual preferences, those related to risk and time are ubiquitous in
economic analysis and financial literature, and rigorous experimental analysis is rel-
atively scarce and challenging mainly due to the lack of access to detailed micro
level data from financial institutions. On the other hand, technical efforts over avail-
able information are doubtfully causal in a strict sense and are forcefully far from
a Randomized Control Trial. The difficulties of such approaches are obvious, either
for budgetary, commercial or moral reasons. Yet, some of the correlational stud-
ies available offer some compelling evidence and constitute a body of knowledge in
itself that shows how both types of preferences, can be considered determinant fac-
tors that shape economic behavior and financial decisions. In this line, Arya, Eckel,
and Wichman (2011) analyze how impatience and risk aversion of individuals help
explain the FICO credit score.4 They find that measures of impulsivity, time prefer-
ences and trustworthiness are highly correlated, however, they found no compelling
evidence about risk aversion. Meier and Sprenger (2010) study the present bias phe-
nomenon for a field experiment with low and moderate income families in Boston.
They show that present-biased individuals, i.e. people that have strong desire for
immediate consumption (or instant gratification), keep higher credit balances than
dynamically-consistent individuals. Eckel et al. (2005) find evidence from a sam-
3Note that “trustworthy” in experimental work involves trust received by the members of the
group receiving the loan, not trustworthiness in a general sense, which can be misunderstood as
“creditworthiness.”
4The FICO (Fair, Isaac, and Company) credit score, is the pioneer and most widely credit score
used in the US and is based on clients information from three major credit bureaus: Experian,
Equifax, and TransUnion. It is a holistic measure of creditworthiness based mainly on payment
history (35%), revolving debt ratios (30%), among other factors: length of credit history, type of
credit, new credit lines, etc.; and its index goes from 300 to 850.
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ple of Canadian working poor individuals and show that “...risk-averse individuals
are more present-oriented;” also, present bias and preferences over short/long term
consumption/saving decisions are highly correlated. Eckel et al. (2007) study how
debt aversion, risk attitudes and time preferences are correlated with investing and
borrowing decisions about post-secondary education in a diversified working class
sample. Even though they find no significant evidence for debt aversion, they show
that measures of risk and time preferences, used as control variables in their analysis,
are significant factors for the human capital investment decisions.
Important extensions of the time preferences analysis are models that account
for time inconsistency and present bias, known as Hyperbolic Discount models. This
approach offers important insights over consumer and credit behavior. Laibson et
al. (2007) show that subjective discount factors are far different depending on the
time horizon of credit card debt and asset accumulation for retirement. In particular,
discount rates are higher for short-term goals than for long-term ones, which implies
that subjects have conflicting time preferences, i.e. they act patiently and impatiently
at the same time, depending on the time horizon for each decision. Importantly, when
accounting also for risk aversion in the simulation they show lower discount factors.
The indivisible aspect of risk and time preferences is currently an empirical challenge
and some new experimental methods address this issue (Andreoni and Sprenger
2012). Nevertheless, the multilevel problem of individual preferences is still far from
definitive and needs to be analyzed also from a broader psychological perspective. A
wide body of research in psychology and marketing focuses on self-control measures,
impulsivity, mental accounting and other traits; and shows how they offer some
explanatory power over general financial behavior (Shrefrin and Thaler 1988 and
Prelec and Simester 2001).
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4.2.2 Consumer credit analysis
Consumer credit analysis, much as any economic problem, can be addressed from
the supply or demand side of the problem, not always successfully distinguishable
from each other, mostly due to the constraints over data availability and known
identification challenges. Observational studies over the intricacies of consumer de-
cisions are abundant.5 In the US, most empirical studies support the idea that the
Permanent Income Hypothesis fails to account for the presence of biding liquidity
constraints in the credit market, and offer some evidence of alternative theoretical
approaches, namely, models of buffer-stock savings (Carrol 1997) or precautionary
savings. Grant (2007), using the US Consumer expenditure survey (1988-1993) finds
that around 31% of US households face credit constraints; furthermore, demographic
variables play an explicative role and the incidence of such constraints is higher for
single females, well educated households and middle income households. Racial dif-
ferences also appear important although they seemingly come from the demand.
Gross and Souleles (2002), using administrative data for credit card users, show the
existence of binding liquidity constraints in the credit market. By looking at changes
over the credit limits, balances and consumer individual interest rates, they estimate
a long-run Marginal Propensity to Consume out of liquidity of around 10-14%, which
is heterogeneous depending on whether subjects start closer to the credit limit. They
also estimate an average long-run elasticity of debt to interest rate of around -1.3,
again heterogeneous conditional on the relative starting position with respect to the
credit limit. Additionally, around 90% of households keep very liquid assets (savings
and checking accounts) at very low interest rates while at the same time keeping
credit card balances (Bertaut and Haliassos 2005). This evidence supports the idea
5See Bertola et al. 2006 for a detail summary.
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of strategic behavior over credit management.
4.2.3 Credit analysis and finite mixture models
On the empirical side there is not a one-size-fits-all methodology for credit anal-
ysis. Statistical methods have a long tradition that dates back to the discriminant
analysis proposed by David Durand in 1941. Much ground has been covered since
and, nowadays, methods vary from ordinary linear regression analysis, OLS, probit
/ logit estimation, to some more sophisticated that include: nonparametric smooth-
ing, mathematical programming, discriminant analysis, data mining, Markov chains
models, neural networks; among others.6 In essence, all methods have the same ob-
jective, separate the “Good” from the “Bad” in terms of creditworthiness.7 As simple
as this may sound, there are several challenges related to modeling credit behavior.
Even with detailed information, individual tastes and preferences are traditionally
out of the reach of any underwriting technique, hence; by ignoring them, lenders face
important credit allocation risks.
Finite mixture models, within the more general set of latent class models, have
a long history in statistics and offer a flexible approach for a type-identification
strategy. This estimation method has been applied in different areas of sciences8
predominantly in marketing and consumer analysis, where they are commonly used
for market segmentation (See Tuma and Decker, 2013).9 In economics, pioneering
work is Heckman and Singer (1984) who analyze the relationship of a Non-parametric
6See Hand and Henley (1997) and Thomas (2000).
7It is important to keep in mind that default per se is not an inconvenient action from the point of
view of the lender, as long as the debt is honored eventually; this allows for interest charges that
result in higher profit. A “bad” action would be not paying at all.
8Some related approaches include: Zero-Inflated Poisson, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial, Poisson
Hurdle Model, Gaussian Mixture Model, Regime(Markov)-Switching Model.
9Other areas include medicine, where applications fluctuate between drug heterogeneous sensitivity
to genetic unobserved/uncontrolled factors (See Schlattmann, 2009); and psychology, where these
models contribute to the analysis of behavioral differences over preferences and tastes (See Lubke
et al. 2005).
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Maximum Likelihood Estimator within a labor search and duration model environ-
ment and showed how this problem can be reduced to a discrete mixing distribution.
Other related work includes Keane and Wolpin (1997) for a labor and human cap-
ital inquiry; Gan, Huang and Mayer (2008) who identify the presence of private
information in insurance markets and Feinstein (1990) who identifies heterogeneous
responses for law violations and crime detection.
Applications over credit markets are scarce. Alfo et al. (2005) use similar tech-
niques to analyze firms classification based on creditworthiness. Gan and Mosquera
(2008) (GM08 hereafter) investigate the default probability for credit card users
that encompasses traditional scoring techniques and a mixture density estimation to
identify the existence of two types of clients. I revisit their approach in this paper
and analyze some caveats and extensions. Another contribution is the work of Gan,
Herna´ndez and Liu (2013) who analyzed the repayment behavior in group lending
(joint liability) and show how accounting for group types improves the predictive
power of traditional models of default probability. Nevertheless, depending on the
problem at hand, the use of this estimation approach comes at the cost of weak and
ad-hoc identification arguments; the identification sections offers some insights over
this problem.
4.3 Credit decisions, asymmetric information and signaling: theoretical discussion
One of the main allocative inefficiencies that a competitive credit market faces is
credit rationing. Credit rationing occurs when the lender limits the amount of loans
offered (credit supply), at a given interest rate, even though there are borrowers
willing to accept higher interest rates to access the credit market. In other words,
there is an unsatisfied excess demand for credit due to the fact that rational lenders
are not willing to incur in higher credit risk levels that could lead to lower profits
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(credit risk management). Credit rationing manifests in several ways. On one hand,
there are clients excluded from the market although they are indistinguishable (on
observables) from others receiving credit, at any interest rate; or on the other, reli-
able clients either receive lower credit limits or hold lower balances than they would
otherwise. In a perfectly competitive market, the interest rate (the price of credit)
should increase to eliminate the excess demand, however, the nature of imperfect in-
formation and uncertainty avoids such simplified market response and interest rates
tend to be sticky. A seminal work that describes the equilibrium and credit rationing
conditions under imperfect information is given by Jaffee and Russel (1976) (JR76
hereafter). They describe the existence of a (Nash)equilibrium under credit rationing
for a single (pooling) contract, i.e. a pair 〈L,R〉, that can be strictly preferred to the
non-rationing (competitive) equilibrium. Furthermore, they argue that deviations
from the credit rationing equilibrium, to a multiple (separating)-contract equilib-
ria are intrinsically unstable and there is no Nash equilibrium possible. Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981) offer an alternative characterization for credit rationing equilibria where
the market interest rate, chosen by lenders over a profit maximization argument, does
not clear the market although it is at an equilibrium level. In their setting, credit
rationing occurs because rising the interest rate (or collateral requirements) would
negatively impact the pool of clients that enter the market (adverse selection), induc-
ing better clients to leave the market due to the costs while at the same time riskier
clients accepting the conditions. Furthermore, higher interest rates might negatively
affect investors’ incentives (moral hazard) who might choose riskier projects to com-
pensate for the financial costs of the loan. Lenders have no incentive but to choose
an average interest rate that diversifies is pool of clients and maximize their profits.
Milde and Riley (1988) (MR88 hereafter) add uncertainty conditions to the JR76
basic approach and describe how, if signaling is allowed for loan-size and interest
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rates, a multiple-contract Nash equilibrium arises as a possibility in the market.
A detailed analysis of the theoretical development of these arguments is beyond
the purpose of this paper. I summarize in this section some of the main insights and
challenges of the theoretical approach that motivates the empirical work.
4.3.1 The competitive model
Assume an intertemporal utility function for 2 periods,10 that is additively separa-
ble (time separable); the maximization problem of any agent i (dropped for notational
convenience) is:
max
〈c1,c2〉
U(c1, c2) = U(c1) + αU(c2)
s.t. c1 = y1 + L
c2 = y2 −RL
(4.1)
Where U(.) is (any) concave function11 and a time discount factor α = 1/(1+δ) for a δ
subjective time preference parameter. L represents the loan principal, yt is income in
period t = 1, 2 and R = (1+r) represents an interest factor. Individuals are identical
and face an interest rate r from a competitive credit market. Any borrower faces
this maximization problem and chooses over the consumption smoothing pattern,
taking everything else as given (i.e. exogenously defined). Since this is essentially
a sequential argument, the budget constraint can be written as: c2 = y2 + R(c1 −
y1). The use of this (binding) constraint in the maximization problem implies not
defaulting. JR76 defines the borrower that restricts his consumption to this condition,
as the honest type.
This can be translated into the following unconstrained optimization problem
10I concentrate in a two periods intertemporal choice problem for exposure simplicity, however the
main theoretical conclusions extend to a dynamic finite/infinite horizon set up. See Deaton (1992)
and Attanasio (1999) for the basic model details.
11As usual, concavity implies U ′ > 0 and U ′′ < 0.
78
where the agent chooses over the loan amount:
max
L
U(L+ y1, y2 −RL) = U(L+ y1) + αU(y2 −RL) (4.2)
From the FOC of the maximization problem (Euler equation) we derive the Marginal
Rate of Substitution:12 MRSc1,c2 =
U ′(c1)
U ′(c2)
= αR; hence the loan-size-choice of a
client is determined by the ratio between the interest rate and the agent’s time
preference
(
αR = 1+r
1+δ
)
; in other words, how much the individual is willing to give
up of consumption in period two, to consume a unit in period one.13
Up to this point, it is clear that the consumption pattern (consumption smooth-
ing) depends on the relative size of the subjective time preference coefficient and the
market interest rate. If we are willing to assume some level of risk aversion, as is com-
mon in economic studies, i.e. concavity of U(.); we add a layer over the optimization
problem. It is common ground on theoretical and experimental work to recognize
that these preferences are interrelated, in fact, as Frederick et el. (2002) mentions,
they “... create opposing forces in intertemporal choice: diminishing marginal utility
(concavity of utility function or risk aversion) motivates a person to spread consump-
tion over time, while positive time preference motivates a person to concentrate con-
sumption in the present.”14 Ignorance of this relationship affects any possible related
inference. Relatively recent work on experimental economics has shown that joint
elicitation of risk and time preferences helps adjust parameters previously identified
12The MRS between periods represent the underlying preferences independently of the utility func-
tion chosen (preference invariance). This can be seen by applying any monotonic transformation
v(u) to the utility function (Varian, 1992).
13In experimental studies, when time preferences are measured independently, the subjective im-
plied discount factor (typically 1/(1 + r) = 1/R) is obtained from a sequential multiple price
list (see Frederick et al. 2002 and Harrison et al. 2008 for a summary); the higher the discount
factor (the lower the interest rate), the more inclined towards present consumption an individual
is. Such results assume risk neutrality.
14Frederick et al. (2002), p.359. Text in parenthesis is mine.
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using independent assumptions over risk or time neutrality.15
A full characterization of consumers on only these two dimensions: time and risk
preferences, would consider the continuum of both parameters involved (all possi-
ble combinations of risk seeking/neutral/averse and patient/time neutral/impatient
subjects). Such characterization is useless for analytical and empirical purposes,
just in the same way that infinitesimal differences in consumption patterns are not
informative about human behavior. “People are different” however, in terms of un-
derstanding economic behavior, we are more interested in how people are similar.
It is straightforward to derive a loans’ demand function from the FOC, which is
a function of the interest rate level R, and the individual preference parameters (we
assume a determined /certain income level for both periods):
L∗ = L∗(R,α, κ) (4.3)
From the concavity of the utility function we can directly infer ∂L/∂R < 0,16
i.e. a downward sloping demand function in the 〈L,R〉 space for the competitive
market case (see Figure 1). Relaxing this assumption and allowing fluctuations of
the risk parameter on the risk seeking range, highly complicates the analysis; that
is, regardless of the interest rate level, we still need to say something about the other
parameters, and specifically, the sign of ∂L/∂κ and ∂L/∂α.
4.3.2 The Milde & Riley / Jaffee & Russel model revisited
Milde and Riley (1988) offer theoretical conditions for Pareto efficiency in an
equilibrium model with separating contracts, as opposed to a single (pooling) con-
tract, which; under capital costs for the lender, results in a rationing equilibrium.
15See the work of Harrison et al. (2008) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012).
16Jaffee and Russel (1976) showed these conditions for a general case.
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Figure 4.1: Loan’s demand and indifference curves
4.3.2.1 Borrowers “quality” type-identification
Following MR88 by adding an uncertainty factor to the second period consump-
tion, we can restate the original constraints in the general model (equation 1) ; hence
we have:
c1 = y1 + L
c2 = max
{
Z, Y˜2 −RL
} (4.4)
where, Y˜2 = u˜+ θ and E(u˜) = 0.
The term u˜ is an stochastic component (second period income exogenous shock)
for which we assume the existence of a cdf, G(u); differentiable and strictly increasing
in G ∈ (0, 1) (see assumption A1 in MR88). θ is a type component that is a function
of (observed) income level on the second period (Y2). In this paper, I interpret
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Z as a “bankruptcy threshold” 17 and corresponds to a heterogeneous unobserved
individual factor;18 thus the second period consumption, hence the default decision
for any subject j will be determined by:
u˜+ θj −RL Q Zj (4.5)
The uncertainty factor affects the optimization decision. Agents now optimize
over the loan expected return. To explicitly allow for heterogeneous levels of risk
aversion, without loss of generality, assume the following: i) U(.) has the canonical
CRRA form, ii) Z = 0 (which reduces the problem to the two types case) and iii)
let the default decision hold with equality at u∗; by direct use of this constraint on
the agents utility function, the unconstrained optimization problem becomes:
max
L
U(c1, c2) =U(L+ y1,max {Zj, u˜+ θ −RL})
=U(L+ y1) + α
∫ ∞
u∗
U(u+ θj − Zj −RL)dG(u)
=
(L+ y1)
1−κ
1− κ +
α
1− κ
(∫ ∞
u∗
(u+ θj − Zj −RL)dG(u)
)1−κ (4.6)
Gan and Mosquera (2008) derive the FOC and characterize the equilibrium con-
ditions for a similar problem. They showed that, for a competitive credit market with
flexible interest rates and a risk averse agents (κ > 0); ∂L∗/∂κ < 0, in other words,
“the amount of loan demanded is lower for those individuals with higher risk aver-
sion.”19 One technical note on their approach is that they assume full uncertainty
in the second period income, thus imposing an explicit independence assumption be-
17MR88 would define this term as a legally determined minimum income.
18A somewhat appealing interpretation of such heterogeneity, at the cost of generality, comes from
JR76 where a similar uncertainty factor comes from a penalty default where Z = Y˜2 − Y2.
19That is to say that for L > L∗ ⇒ ∂R/∂L < 0 and for L < L∗ ⇒ ∂R/∂L > 0, due to the concavity
of U(.)
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tween the types and their income level. This is a restrictive assumption (somewhat
implausible) considering that income signals the type of an individual involved in the
credit market, just in the same way that it does so in the human capital literature.
As mentioned in the more general model, individual identification of both param-
eters is cumbersome theoretically as well as empirically.20 Nevertheless, to account
for such preferences explicitly, experimental measures can help identify the presence
of private information. I come back to this point in the identification section and do
not extend on the mathematical tractability of these results since, as mentioned, they
impose restrictive assumptions that lead the interpretation over particular types of
preferences that cannot be distinguished empirically without further information.21
For the two types case, it can be seen that in equation 5, accounting for the
bankruptcy threshold, Zj = 0 ⇒ u˜ + θj − RL = 0. We defined the stochastic shock
as E(u˜) = 0, therefore the expected second period income level, defined by the type
of the individual, leads to zero consumption (E(Y˜2) = θ = RL).
Abusing the notation, we can extend the analysis to j-types by the parameter θj
for j = 1, ..., J . “Types,” in this regard, are a combination of underlying factors or
individual characteristics that together represent different quality-clients. Using the
bankruptcy threshold (exogenous and unobservable), now by type of agent Zj, we can
generalize the default identification conditions. Intuitively, every type of agent has
a different Zj, i.e. the agent’s type determines his second period consumption level,
20See Gan and Mosquera’s (2008) appendix. They derive the corresponding conditions for risk aver-
sion, using a CRRA utility function, and for time preference, using a quasilinear utility function,
independently from each other. In their approach, admittedly, there is no explicit way to identify
these preferences from each other. In theory, whether it is the traditional principal/agent prob-
lem, or asymmetric information in mechanism design, types can be any two antagonist categories
based on an underlying model specification; theoretical characterization is, in this regard, loose.
21GM08 do consider a parameter β that works as a discount factor in the model, however they do not
offer any interpretation as to its roll in the FOC. Taking this into account, in our interpretation
(from equation 5) their results will translate into the risk dominance ground, i.e. time preferences
are strictly dominated by the risk factor and the range of their analysis restricts to the “patient
type” i.e. δ > r within this framework.
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thus his choice, over default or not, depends on his subjective threshold. As a result,
for J types of agents the selection into types comes from the following identity:
u˜+ θj −RL = Zj (4.7)
Under very general conditions22 high quality individuals signal by accepting smaller
loans since they face reduced uncertainty in the second period, either from better
ex-ante beliefs over the success of their investment (the actual use of the loan) or
from their better income expectation (due to their type); while lower quality subjects
at a given interest rate, signal by asking for higher loans. From equation 7, we can
define the probability of default of a particular type as G(RL + Zj − θj), hence the
repayment probability is [1−G(RL+ Zj − θj)], and combining the demand side of
the analysis, the main conclusions for the equilibrium model can be summarized as
follows:
 L∗(θj) is a decreasing function in θj; and,
 [1−G(RL+ Zj − θj)] is an increasing function of θj.
Whether it is for the heterogeneous external “moral” or “economic” costs of de-
fault faced by each agent (JR76), or due to existence of private information related to
individual preferences; the quality-type corresponds to an ex-ante unobserved combi-
nation of factors, hence any argument towards the ex-post classification of subjects
requires some intuition over explicit information available.
4.3.2.2 Lender and market behavior under competitive conditions
The equilibrium conditions from the supply side of the problem are straightfor-
ward. Following JR76 and MR88, assume a large number of lenders obtain their
22See MR88, proposition 7, p.113. A central assumption for this result is the additive form of the
utility (production) function.
84
resources from the capital market at an interest rate i (or more generally the op-
portunity cost of the resources), for whatever loan amount the lender has to pay
(1 + i) over the principal. Considering that lenders are risk neutral they maximize
their loan expected profits, accounting for potential outcomes that involve the uncer-
tainty shock u˜ and the unobserved types θj, the maximization problem of the lender
becomes:
E
[
piθj(L,R)
]
= RL [1−G(RL+ Zj − θj)]− (1 + i)L (4.8)
In words, the expected profit from the lender corresponds to the net expected
loan repayment.
The supply curve, that is the set of loan contracts in the 〈L,R〉 space that satisfy
the competitive market condition of E
[
piθj(L,R)
]
= 0 (the iso-profit curve), con-
sidering the repayment probability give the client’s types, can be derived implicitly
from the FOC:
R =
(1 + i)
(1−G(RL+ Zj − θj)−RLg(RL+ Zj − θj)) (4.9)
The supply’s slope can is as follows:23
dR
dL
=
(1 + i)
L [1−G(RL+ Zj − θj)−RLg(RL+ Zj − θj)] −
R
L
(4.10)
This last equation is useful for our intuition. Under perfect competition, E [piθ] =
0 and R = (1 + i); thus the slope is equal to zero only if the difference between
the repayment probability and the value at risk of the total loan is equal to 1 (the
denominator of the function). If the market faces no risk, i.e. the probability of
23Using the implicit function theorem. See Gan and Mosquera (2008) for similar results.
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default is zero (hence the value at risk is also zero), then there is no rationing and
the market supply covers all the demand, the competitive equilibrium. Back to the
types characterization, the competitive equilibrium can only be possible if in the
second period the loan size of repayment is below the bankruptcy threshold for every
type, that is, beyond this point, and under mild risky conditions the slope of the
supply curve is positive up to a point where the interest rate compensates for the
credit risk due to indistinguishable clients (all clients are covered, and everyone pays
back the loan). The sign of the slope at this point needs additional assumptions over
the probability distribution; however, under no rationing conditions, as JR76 argue,
“the particular shape of the supply function does not affect (the) main results.”
A multiple-contracts equilibrium is also possible in this setting and it helps iden-
tify types of clients allowing for a preferable allocative equilibrium where less clients
default due to better match of loan sizes, yet; high quality clients would increase
their utility level at a lower loan and interest rates.
In summary, from the supply side of the market, the main conclusion over types’
identification is intuitive: the expected profit of the lender improves with a pool of
better clients.
 E
[
piθj(L,R)
]
is an increasing function in θj
Under certain set of assumptions24 MR88 argue that the loan signaling process
derives from the exit conditions in the market, specifically; the higher the loan size
the risky the environment the lender faces. As a result under a pooling contract
where there is no signaling, lenders that exit the market are those at the right
end of the iso-profit function, those with higher/riskier loans. Separating contracts,
that is to say, contracts that allow for heterogeneous signaling (through R and L
24Being the most important the form of the “production function” of the loan in MR88 model. See
section III, pg.111 for details.
86
in a competitive market, or simply L in a more restrictive environment) reduce the
rationing possibilities due to lender’s exit since there is more information over the
actual risk the lender faces. In the core of the MR88 analysis is embedded the
existence of an stable equilibrium with multiple contracts, that is to say, borrowers
at bod ends of the quality spectrum signal by their loan size and lenders identify such
idiosyncrasies and exploit them through different contract conditions to manage their
overall market credit risk and profits.
When it comes to interest rates, in most credit markets25 they are given by
the lender, or at least there is an scarce room for negotiation between the incumbent
parties in financial contracts, specially in consumption credit markets.26 Even though
price competition is possible, it can be limited for several reasons. In the presence
of informational asymmetries, the adverse selection problem implies that low quality
individuals are more willing to accept higher interest rates to access the credit market,
signaling also through higher loan amounts; as a result, the credit risk that the lender
faces when reducing interest rates to attract more clients is higher. Hence there are
lower incentives for price competition, however; even the adverse selection problem
remains present (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981).
Relaxing the environment for imperfect competition conditions, we can think of
other reasons for heterogeneous elasticities on the credit market. Current clients
(incumbent) have particular contract conditions due to the private information that
the lender has collected through the credit history; as a result lenders can offer
25It is the case in Ecuador, the country in which the empirical section is based.
26In the US, credit cards take advantage of information from credit bureaus to offer some pro-
motional rates of even heterogeneous rates depending on the product and client’s credit history.
Also, some heterogeneity of interest rates can be observed on contracts in specific credit markets
where there is more information, such as housing credit or even corporate credit market where
companies face different interest-rate-schedules depending on amounts and other contract condi-
tions such as collateral or mortgages. Nevertheless, for the most part, in consumer credit (e.g.
credit cards), interest rates, although heterogeneous, are given by financial companies.
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preferential treatments for creditworthy clients or any other non-pricing strategy as
a reward for their “loyalty” (Sharpe 1990). The switching costs could simply imply
that clients are more comfortable with the policies of the current lender. On the
other hand, there are also search costs involved. Calem and Mester (1994) argue that
search costs are higher for high quality clients since their loan’s demand elasticity
is lower, i.e. they are less sensitive to interest rate changes, and doing an effort to
locate information is relatively more costly. Either due to search costs, switching
costs or costumer irrationality (Calem and Mester 1994) imperfect competition is
a more realistic framework. Imperfect competition only requires that r > i for the
lender to enter the market, however, since the market faced in the empirical approach
is closely defined by a constant interest rate (r > i), in the 〈L,R〉 space it implies a
flat supply curve.
The arguments summarized in this section provide some basic theoretical frame-
work to interpret the type’s identification coefficient. They also capture closely the
credit card market structure. From the lender’s perspective there is a trade-off in
the selection process. Clients that always pay their monthly balance in full (never
default) are the most “safe” choice for a lender in terms of risk, although not neces-
sarily the most profitable. Credit companies profit out of two main sources: interest
charged over revolving balances and fees charged to the establishments for assuming
their clients’ debts. This latter source, namely credit card processing fees, fluctuates
with market, type of establishment, consumption category including some room for
“loopholes,” negotiation and markups. In the US, for example, these fees go from 1.5
% to 3% of the actual purchase plus some additional flat amount depending on the
nature of the transaction. Always-payers represent only one source of profits for the
credit card company through the processing fees. Clients that keep a revolving bal-
ance but pay eventually, are the most profitable source since they increase lender’s
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profits through the two channels. In the lender’s perspective a good combination
of these two types is the most profitable. Finally, clients that default permanently
represent the higher risk to the company and, if no debt renegotiation is in place,
they may become effective losses. This last category is the kind of clients to avoid.
The types identification offers an suitable alternative to improve over the adverse
selection problem.27
It is common ground the fact that informational asymmetries and uncertainty
generate market inefficiencies, probably beyond credit rationing, due to the presence
of adverse selection problems and moral hazard. Reducing these market inefficien-
cies is an empirical challenge and the industry has undertaken important efforts to
minimize the informational asymmetries, however there is still much room for im-
provement. The identification of consumers’ types, that is to say the identification
of a combination of client’s characteristics that respond to different unobserved mo-
tivations towards decisions (ceteris paribus), allows for strategic solutions that foster
market efficiency improvements.
4.4 Empirical approach
4.4.1 Data
For the types identification I use rich administrative data of actual credit card-
holders. The data set belongs to anonymous administrative records of clients from
a credit company in Ecuador in 2014. It contains individual historical records of
credit behavior and demographics that include: age, marital status and household’s
family members. Job type information during the application process and profession,
27Ryan Guina (2011) (cashmoneylife.com) cites Barry Nalebuff for describing these three types
of clients as Maxpayers, Revolvers and Deadbeats while including two other categories as the
Arbitragers or those that get credit and earn interest in the market, a practice that is illegal in
many countries; and the Reformed Credit Card Users / Non-Users; those that quit using credit
cards after bad experiences.
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available on the data, are used to infer variables about education and responsibility
conditions.
One traditional criticism in the use of financial data for scoring purposes is the
fact that, inevitably, information is available only individuals already selected in the
screening process to enter the credit market; not from a random sample of clients.
As Hand and Henley (1997) argue, this is a widespread practice and the inference
derived, referred as reject inference, depending on the characteristics of the data set,
is reasonable if “the new score-card (based on current clients) is based on a super
set of the characteristics used in the original score-card (used in the admittance
selection process).”28 Whether or not this creates a big selection bias is an open
empirical question, furthermore; some of the limitations in the types identification
could result from this lack of information if excluded clients correspond to a particular
type untraceable in the estimation process. The strictest the admittance rules of a
credit company, the higher the bias. The company that provided the information
has a fairly reasonable selection process, and according with personal interviews with
credit analysts, current selection policies have relaxed some of the previous years’
requirements. Once accounting for age restrictions (people over 18 years or older),
and a particular requirement related to college degree for young professionals, the
selection process is based on general signals of creditworthiness that are common
practice in finance: employment and banking history, salary and assets.29 Without
28My own notes in parenthesis.
29According to Chatterjee et al. (2005), FICO credit score is based mainly on payment history
(35%), amounts owned (30%) and length of credit history (15%). This type of score lacks a lot of
the information available in financial markets. Access to some of this information for creditwor-
thiness assessment is prohibited by law in the US since the seventies (Equal Credit Opportunity
Act and Fair Housing Act, 1976), on the grounds of potential prejudice and discrimination over:
age, race, color, religion, national origin, gender, marital and family status (number of children)
and whether or not you receive public assistance; while other information is traditionally con-
fidential either for personal, institutional or identity protection: age, assets, salary, occupation
and employment history. Availability and use of the data for credit underwriting or screening
depends on the standing legal framework, different country wise; yet, more information allows for
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overlooking this aspect, traditional scores are based on available data from current
clients and this paper follows this path.
The data set has up to 171,044 observations randomly partitioned in two samples.
60% of the observations to be used in the estimation model, or control sample, and
40% to be used in the out-of-sample analysis, treatment sample. 41% are women,
the overall average age of cardholders is 45, 33.5% have a college degree (accord-
ing to profession) and the average income is USD 1840.83. Around four thousand
observations (2.6%) were eliminated due to inconsistencies.30
Table 4.1: Median income, net-worth and debt by client’s status (USD)
Overall sample Default Cardholders
Income Net-Worth Tot.CC.Debt Balance/Income Income Net-Worth Tot.CC.Debt Balance/Income
By age
age< 35 1300.00 0.00 2402.92 1.05 1286.00 0.00 2980.12 1.54
age 35− 50 1578.00 20000.00 4054.87 1.19 1500.00 16000.00 4776.75 1.55
age 51− 65 1700.00 50000.00 3998.38 1.31 1500.00 45000.00 4577.62 1.67
age> 65 1500.00 64241.50 2606.11 1.12 1500.00 59200.00 3077.10 1.57
By income quintiles
Q1 900.00 10000.00 2271.25 1.07 900.00 9000.00 2753.70 1.38
Q2 1200.00 9000.00 2687.43 1.21 1200.00 7000.00 3342.81 1.58
Q3 1500.00 15000.00 3179.95 1.18 1500.00 11800.00 3944.05 1.63
Q4 2000.00 28500.00 4215.68 1.22 2000.00 21995.00 4995.29 1.64
Q5 3000.00 50000.00 6457.17 1.22 3000.00 42082.00 8224.78 1.76
By education
High school 1500.00 25000.00 3647.72 1.21 1500.00 18000.00 4269.45 1.58
College 1500.00 16000.00 3123.79 1.12 1400.00 12000.00 3654.91 1.57
By gender
Male 1600.00 25000.00 3636.47 1.15 1500.00 17000.00 4165.00 1.53
Female 1400.00 17990.00 3235.47 1.22 1319.00 13500.00 3935.20 1.62
By civil status
Single 1300.00 0.00 2622.98 1.01 1300.00 0.00 3180.62 1.51
Married 1600.00 31000.00 3874.68 1.24 1500.00 25000.00 4471.17 1.58
Widower 1400.00 55000.00 2821.53 1.30 1200.00 45514.50 4101.23 1.91
Divorced 1500.00 29000.00 3775.57 1.31 1486.50 25000.00 4429.07 1.76
Balance/Income is the ratio of monthly pending balance / monthly income.
more accurate assessments, and possibly a more efficient allocation.
30Inconsistencies include: reporting less than USD 700 salary (misreporting, according to credit
analysts), younger than 20 years old, more than 7 family members and missing data for assets
and payments.
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The main analysis concentrates on identifying the types of clients on default
behavior for those with pending balances of over 30 days (10.31% of the sample).
This is a relatively stringent condition, however it captures a credit card delinquency
behavior that goes beyond possible payment mistakes. Because of the nature of the
sample it allows us a good compromise towards the applicability of the estimation
procedure.31
The second part of our results extends the application to the credit demand
and types identification. Using the information from individual clients I analyze
their extended credit card demand from all sources available, i.e. total credit card
demand.
4.4.2 Empirical model
4.4.2.1 Default probability
Estimation of the default probability is a traditional latent variable problem where
we only observe whether an individual has defaulted or not, and not the actual prob-
ability; hence, the dependent variable is a dummy for D = 1 [balance > 30days].
Direct estimation of binary outcome models, either by OLS, Probit or Logit strate-
gies, inevitably disregards biases derived from ignorance of the individual preferences,
i.e. ignorance of types in our framework. More generally, the default behavior (out-
come) might be the results of two different data generating processes non identifiable
by traditional techniques.
To account for the unobserved individual heterogeneity we come back to the
31Scores can consider different periods for credit card delinquency. In general, one day default
implies an individual misses his minimum payment over the consumption of the last cycle (31
days). Although missing one payment can be an involuntary mistake, 30 days after it certainly
involves some deliberate action. According to interviews with the credit analyst, message warnings
and telephone calls start from the second day of delinquency and legal collection activities typically
start after 90 days, however they can start as soon as the second delinquency day, depending on
the history of the client.
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types characterization described previously in the theoretical section. Assume the
existence of J types and define the unconditional probability of a client of being
from a particular type as Pr(θj = θ1) = p1 , Pr(θj = θ2) = p2,..., Pr(θj = θJ) =
(1−∑J−1j=1 pj).
From equation 5 we know that a client of a particular type j defaults if its second
period consumption is lower than his bankruptcy threshold, hence we have:
D = 1
[
u˜+ θj −RL ≤ Zj
]
(4.11)
Note that there are two sources of heterogeneity explicit in this expression (ex-
ogenous and unobserved). On one hand θj summarizes the heterogenity that comes
from human capital factors that help explain individual’s income (e.g. cognitive
skills). On the other, Zj represents those factors related to individual’s expecta-
tion or preferences towards minimum consumption (e.g. keep consumption status).
Loosely speaking, both sources are jointly capture in the individual’s quality-type
and are, in this framework, indistinguishable from each other. To simplify the em-
pirical argument in this section and abusing notation, I summarize both in one only
quality-type parameter θj = (θj−Zj).32 Thus, the conditional expectation of default,
i.e. the probability of default conditional on being a particular type, for a known cdf
function G(.), can be defined as follows:
E(D|θj) = Pr(D = 1|θj) = Pr(u˜+ θj −RL ≤ 0) = G(RL− θj) (4.12)
By the Bayes’ theorem, the unconditional probability of default for an individual
32An alternative interpretation, as in GM08, would be to assume that individuals have homogeneous
minimum consumption expectations (Zj = 0), reducing the problem to have positive net income
on the second period.
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i and J unobserved types is given by:
Pr(Di = 1) =
J∑
j=1
Pr(Di = 1, θi = θ
j
i )
=
J∑
j=1
Pr(Di = 1|θi = θji )Pr(θi = θji )
(4.13)
Pr(Di = 0) =
J∑
j=1
[
1− Pr(Di = 1|θi = θji )Pr(θi = θji )
]
(4.14)
The default probability of an agent in this setting depends directly on two general
aspects: the contract choice given the conditions in the 〈L,R〉 space, and the intrinsic
quality-type of the client. Taking into account the client’s (observable) information
available, we can approximate the probability in equation 12 by a linear function
of the individual characteristics related to creditworthiness (Xi) or observed credit
behavior and loan conditions (Li). Hence, we have that:
G(R¯Lj − θj) ≈ G(ϕ+Xiβ1 + Liβ2) (4.15)
A similar approximation is assumed for the unconditional type probability where
we introduce characteristics identified (somewhat arbitrarily) as correlated to the
individual preferences, among others. On the next section we extend the discussion
about this point. We let the function for types be a function of observed factors (Zi)
that help identify the individual’s type e.g. individual characteristics, human capi-
tal information, experimental measures for individual preferences and other related
covariates:
θji ≈ Ziγj + υi (4.16)
94
Again, if a well behaved cdf function Fi(.) exists for υi, then the unconditional
probability is a function of the available information for types, hence:
Pr(θi = θ
j
i |Zi) ≈ F (Ziγj) (4.17)
Finally, we replace these equations on the default/non-default probability equa-
tions 13 and 14, and get:
Pr(Di = 1) =
J∑
j=1
G(ϕj +Xiβ
j
1 + Liβ
j
2)F (Ziγj) (4.18)
Pr(Di = 0) =
J∑
j=1
[
1−G (ϕj +Xiβj1 + Liβj2)F (Ziγj)] (4.19)
Two things are worth noting about the equations. On one hand, the estimated
coefficients may vary by type, i.e. we allow for complete flexibility of the coefficients,
hence; we should expect heterogeneous elasticities on the probability, conditional
on the type.33 Another important aspect of the statistical procedure is that the
set of variables described in Xi and Li do not need to be fully disjunctive with re-
spect to Zi, however for partial identification some exclusion restrictions are needed.
Without further arguments there is certain level of arbitrariness about the informa-
tion used in each set of variables. Similar to Gan and Mosquera (2008), I include
socio-demographic variables such as age, gender, number of children and marital
status. Additionally, I extend the identification to labor and education information
of potentially higher relevance for the type identification. Finally, I also include an
instrument for whether the client enter the credit market during periods of interest
33GM08 present the same model for the two types case. I expose this extended version for general-
izability, however, due to identification restrictions, the empirical application reduces to the same
two types for the probability model.
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rate volatility versus a more recent price stability. 34
We can easily derive the Maximum Likelihood function directly from the proba-
bility equations for a Bernoulli distribution. Then, for a type-consistent estimation
for a subject i we maximize the corresponding log-likelihood function:
` = ln(L) =
n∑
i=1
Diln [Pr(Di = 1)] + (1−Di)ln [Pr(Di = 0)] (4.20)
4.4.2.2 Credit demand
Credit demand, same as default decisions, is an intrinsic choice problem for an
agent and, as suggested in the theoretical section, such choices are also type con-
tingent. Traditional supply and demand analysis require a good identification for
the simultaneous equation problem, e.g. using instrumental variables that help dis-
tinguish an exogenous source of variation of prices (Gross and Souleles 2002, Grant
2007, and Crook et al. 2007). Interest rates in our case are relatively constant in
the credit market (sample from Ecuador) for the consumer segment. Although there
is some heterogeneity of r, competition by prices is not very active. Furthermore,
differently from the US, within a particular credit card company, clients face the
same consumption interest rate; normally the legal maximum (see Figure 2).
Given little to non variation in interest rates, elasticities estimation is constrained.
However, conditional on having a credit card debt (debt > 0) to capture the type-
consistent coefficients of the credit demand we rely on a more mainstream finite
mixture model were, opposed to our previous approach, has as a continuous depen-
dent variable, the logarithm of total credit card debt registered on the Credit Risk
Bureau, i.e. credit card debt accumulated over all the client’s credit cards. Given
34Gan, Herna´ndez and Liu (2013), when analyzing group types, used variables such as literacy, land
ownership, housing conditions, occupation and caste (for rural India).
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that types are not ex-ante observed by the lenders, significant types variation, I
argue, can only come from the credit demand behavior.
The estimation process, for J types, is similarly performed through maximum
likelihood of the following function:
` =
n∑
i=1
{
ln
[
J∑
j=1
pj(Ziγj)gj
(
yi|ϕj +Xiβj1 + Liβj2
)]}
(4.21)
Similar to our previous approach, g(.) could take any functional form.
I present results based on g(.) being a normal function (standard normal in the
case of G for the default probability); however, changes in functional form, such as
an alternative logit function, do not alter the inference.
Finally, one common adjustment to ensure the probability of the types belongs
to the (0, 1) interval, and
∑
j p
j = 1, is to use the multinomial logit form as follows
(equivalent to the F (.) distribution in the default equation):
pj(Ziγj) =
exp(Ziγj)
1 +
∑J−1
l=1 exp(Ziγj)
(4.22)
4.4.3 Identification problem revisited
The estimation procedure proposed offers a suitable alternative for more consis-
tent estimation of structural parameters in the credit market analysis, however, such
advantages are not free of criticism. This approach is more flexible to traditional
methods, particularly compared to those in Industrial Organization. Although I still
rely on a parametric distribution for the choice equation, there is no a priori as-
sumption about the distributional form of the unobserved heterogeneity but a more
parsimonious definition over the number of support points of an unknown distribu-
tion, i.e. the number of types (Heckman and Singer 1984, and Hess et al. 2011).
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Figure 4.2: Evolution of market interest rates (annual) and credit card default rate
in Ecuador.
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This flexibility, however, has some caveats, in particular, the linear approxima-
tions of the types and default probability could suffer from endogeneity problems
from omitted variables (OVB) or the classical measurement error (CME) problem.
In the default approximation, if θj is unobserved then we will be under OVB if
Corr(θj, Xi) 6= 0 and Corr(θj, Li) 6= 0. There is plenty of evidence in the experi-
mental literature that shows how individual preferences, in particular, risk and time
preferences are correlated with financial decisions, educational choice and human
capital accumulation, job search behavior, cognitive skills, among others. Further-
more, there is also evidence of biological and neurological determinants of individual
preferences that may influence actual behavior. Some examples of this latter issue
include Apicella et al. (2008) that find some correlation levels between testosterone
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levels and risk taking behavior, as well as Ramaswami et al. (1993) that relate par-
tial suppression of brain areas and its relationship to behavior and decision making
process.
A way to overcome this informational limitation is to use measures that identify
specific aspects of individual preferences and use them as proxies in the basic estima-
tion procedure. There are several elicitation mechanisms for risk and time preferences
readily available for such endeavor and the possibility of using such information would
help identify with more certainty the nature of the type identification, as oppose to
a general quality-type. Nevertheless, such applications, specially on the field, are not
cost/effective, specially taking into account that in experimental economics these
mechanisms involve actual payments.35
A second best alternative are survey-type measures. Although they are not neces-
sarily monetarily incentivized (see Dohmen et al. 2011) they can offer some revealing
information over the nature of the preference phenomena and individual types.
To see this more clearly, assume the types approximation include (linearly) un-
observed factors in Wi:
θji = Ziγj +Wiλj + υi
θji is unobserved by the econometrician, from the information in the linear ap-
proximation for types and in the default probability, a fully characterized estimation
would result from:
G(R¯L− θj) ≈ G(ϕ+Xiβ1 + Liβ2 + Ziγj +Wiλj)
35In experimental economics, the common practice is to apply monetarily incentivized mechanisms
since there is a need to argue confidently over the salience of the payment to reveal actual
economics decisions. In psychology this is not necessarily the case and hypothetical measures,
although noisier, might be used instead (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).
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Ignorance of Wi affects estimation in two ways. First, if Corr(Zi,Wi) 6= 0,
then we would incur in the CME problem and estimation of γj should suffer from
attenuation bias. Second, if Corr(Wi, Xi) 6= 0 ∧ Corr(Wi, Li) 6= 0, then again,
we fall into the persistent OVB. Including proxies of individual preferences would not
solve entirely the problem since we can only include a limited and usually incomplete
information set (Gan et al. 2011). However, the types identification “solves” the
problem by letting all unobserved factors (unobserved heterogeneity) be captured by
the specification of the number of types included in the model, i.e. determine the
level J for the parameter θ. I call this identification beyond functional form in this
paper.
Identification assumption: Conditional on the types, factors (covariates)
that affect the default probability are independent; in other words, factors that
characterize the types affect the default probability (and credit demand) only through
the type probability (Gan et al.2011).36
The identification strategy is intuitive. On one hand, the types determination
captures the unobserved variation as a sufficient estimator of potential confounders
(individual preferences). At the same time, when additional information (Wi) is
available, similar to the excluding restriction on a 2SLS identification, we require a
strong correlation of Wi with respect to the types probability (first stage), while not
being an explicit determinant of the default probability.
36Henry, Kitamura and Salani (2014) discuss the partial identification problem of mixture models in
a similar fashion. The “exclusion restriction” for them discussed can be translated to the orthog-
onality condition of Wi with respect to the outcome variables (in our case: default probability
Di, and credit demand.), conditional on the types and other regresors.
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4.5 Results
4.5.1 The probability of default
The preferred specification (summarized in Table 3) reports significant differ-
ences in the parameters estimated for the two quality-types of clients in the credit
market. Most of all, there are significant differences from the baseline models esti-
mated (OLS, Probit or Logit in Table 2). I interpret this as evidence of presence
of private information in the credit market and as a consequence, different behav-
ioral responses (strategic behavior) in credit card holders. Furthermore, the baseline
model estimates show very significant coefficients while the type consistent model
shows that the influence of the covariates is heterogeneous conditional on the types,
hence statistical significance in most cases is driven by only one of the types and not
both at the same time.
Lets first look at the probability of type identification. The type identification
comes from the subset of variables included in the Type equation. The model speci-
fication relies on the fact that if a type-identifying variable affects the default rates,
it does so only through the type probability, hence the estimated coefficients are not
directly traceable back to the baseline coefficients. We use a fairly wide set of vari-
ables for the type identification that include education and labor information, not
previously analyzed. I find evidence that the type heterogeneity is weekly related
to the type of job of the credit holders, in particular credit card holders with high
or medium responsibility jobs are significantly more likely to belong to the high-
quality-type. Other job descriptions available, like military or police jobs, are not
significantly informative.
Interestingly, age is a very informative factor. The older an individual is, the more
likely it falls into the high-quality-type category. At the same time, significance of
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Table 4.2: Default probability and marginal effects, baseline models
Default = 1 [age of portfolio >=30 days (implicit default)]
(1) (2) (3)
OLS Probit Logit
β / SE β / SE Mfx β / SE Mfx
Demographics
Age(in years) −0.0001 −0.0015 −0.0002 −0.0042 −0.0002
(0.0003) (0.0025) (0.0047)
Age squared 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000*** 0.0001*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Woman=1 0.0043** 0.0481** 0.0050** 0.0925** 0.0049**
(0.0019) (0.0212) (0.0430)
Married=1 −0.0025* −0.0090 −0.0009 −0.0305 −0.0016
(0.0014) (0.0120) (0.0230)
Widower=1 0.0039 0.0376 0.0039 0.0719 0.0038
(0.0051) (0.0498) (0.1083)
Divorced=1 −0.0042** −0.0125 −0.0013 −0.0376 −0.0020
(0.0021) (0.0183) (0.0374)
College(pf)=1 −0.0019 −0.0090 −0.0009 −0.0290 −0.0015
(0.0020) (0.0154) (0.0345)
Science degree 0.0069*** 0.0565*** 0.0059*** 0.1207*** 0.0065***
(0.0019) (0.0152) (0.0324)
H/M Responsibility(wd)=1 −0.0045** −0.0282* −0.0030* −0.0656* −0.0035*
(0.0019) (0.0163) (0.0377)
Mltry/Police(pf)=1 −0.0035 −0.0179 −0.0019 −0.0316 −0.0017
(0.0033) (0.0317) (0.0619)
Family Members (#) 0.0016** 0.0161*** 0.0017*** 0.0351*** 0.0019***
(0.0007) (0.0061) (0.0133)
Main cities
Quito −0.0078***−0.0670***−0.0070***−0.1294***−0.0069***
(0.0021) (0.0191) (0.0391)
Guayaquil −0.0010 0.0027 0.0003 0.0202 0.0011
(0.0021) (0.0187) (0.0379)
Cuenca 0.0023 0.0171 0.0018 0.0158 0.0008
(0.0019) (0.0167) (0.0342)
Ambato 0.0028 0.0052 0.0005 0.0209 0.0011
(0.0018) (0.0162) (0.0334)
Economic variables
Income(USD) −0.0000 −0.0000***−0.0000***−0.0000***−0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tot. Net Worth (USD) −0.0000** −0.0000** −0.0000** −0.0000** −0.0000**
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tot.CC Debt/Income −0.0084***−0.0353***−0.0037***−0.0704***−0.0038***
(0.0014) (0.0098) (0.0197)
% Debt at Risk on CRB 0.2927*** 1.1233*** 0.1177*** 2.0968*** 0.1122***
(0.0132) (0.0523) (0.0921)
Ownerwhip Type −0.0048***−0.0302** −0.0032** −0.0680** −0.0036**
(0.0016) (0.0153) (0.0301)
Properties (#) −0.0023 −0.0237 −0.0025 −0.0470 −0.0025
(0.0027) (0.0264) (0.0572)
Houses(#) 0.0029** 0.0223* 0.0023* 0.0426* 0.0023*
(0.0014) (0.0114) (0.0244)
Cars(#) 0.0002 0.0060 0.0006 0.0108 0.0006
(0.0011) (0.0107) (0.0229)
Debts on CRB(#) −0.0028***−0.0079***−0.0008***−0.0121** −0.0006**
(0.0004) (0.0026) (0.0060)
Returned Checks=1 −0.0028 0.0537 0.0056 0.0756 0.0040
(0.0087) (0.0466) (0.1048)
Ytd.Avrg.Payments/Cr.Balance −1.3268***−5.8248***−0.6103***−10.6474***−0.5696***
(0.0224) (0.1325) (0.2713)
Microcredit=1 0.0048 0.0218 0.0023 0.0472 0.0025
(0.0037) (0.0264) (0.0543)
Portfolio/Tot.Debt −0.0497***−0.4345***−0.0455***−0.9617***−0.0515***
(0.0057) (0.0350) (0.0654)
Mth.Bal.Payment/Income 0.1099*** 0.6545*** 0.0686*** 1.2792*** 0.0684***
(0.0093) (0.0515) (0.0917)
Time of membership (months) −0.0000***−0.0003***−0.0000***−0.0005***−0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant 1.3326*** 3.7486*** *** 6.9263*** ***
(0.0249) (0.1400) (0.2813)
Observations 102657 102657 102657
R2 0.384
Pseudo R2 0.401 0.397
AIC −3249.499 40723.659 41023.645
BIC −2991.942 40981.216 41290.741
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at city levels.
Estimations are based on the control sample for the study.
Marginal effects (Mfx) calculated at the median.
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the nonlinear age function (age squared) suggest evidence of behavior that follows the
life cycle hypothesis where the quality relationship (related to the credit demand)
has a saturation point. Figure 3 offers more evidence of the life cycle patterns.
While average income keeps a more stable relationship in older ages (3a), credit card
demand decreases significantly around retirement age of 65 (3b).
Another factor that significantly explains the type identification is the number
of family members of the credit card holder. Whether an individual is the type that
builds or belongs to large families, the more likely he falls into the low-quality-type.
Causality in such statement is troublesome, evidently the higher the household needs
the higher the debt burden, or the higher the bankruptcy threshold (defined in the
model), hence the higher the incentives to default. Nevertheless, it is a defining char-
acteristic that significantly helps explain the types, thus improves the class sorting.
Something similar occurs with the client’s gender. In our estimation results, although
with lower significance (10%), women are less likely to belong to the high-quality-
type. In our sample, the median women’s income is slightly lower than their male
counterparts; around USD 200.00 and USD 280.00 difference (delinquent clients in-
cluded). However, differences are steeper when it comes to net-worth, between USD
3500.00 and USD 7000.00 difference. Interestingly, although men tend to hold higher
credit card balances overall, when looking only the delinquent accounts, the ratio of
balance/income is practically the same by gender (see Table 2). Income per se is
not a significant factor on the type equation, however, it is still possible that gender
differences on quality-type are driven by lags on the effects of the gender income-
gap. In the U.S. the Equal Credit Opportunity and Fair Housing Act (1976) forbids
the use of gender information for credit scoring. After its enactment it is claimed
that gender differences disappeared (Bertola et al.2006). In our sample, although we
can not say much towards the source of these differences, it is clear that they are
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persistent and help explain partially the types differentiation.
Finally, in the search for instruments that allow for the exclusion restriction to
work, I included a dummy variable for whether the subject enter the credit market
during a period of interest rate stability. Figure 2 shows changes in interest rates
in the market (effective and legal maximum). Interest rate controls were imposed
in Ecuador during years 2009 and 2010. They act as an exogenous shock in the
market. Beyond account age (and possibly an adaptive institutional process), there
are no significant differences between clients separated in both periods (on observ-
ables). The hypothesis is that attitudes towards credit are different for clients that
faced periods of interest rate uncertainty. A complete theoretical treatment of such
argument is out of the scope of this study; nevertheless, I let explicit the estima-
tion results for future exploration. Clients that enter the credit market during a
period of interest rate certainty are more likely to be of high-quality-type, however
the statistical significance is weak (10%).
I do not find significant evidence of type differentiation due to any other fac-
tors. Without further exploration it is hard to interpret what quality-types repre-
sent, however; accounting from insights over experimental evidence, I argue that the
relationship found about individual preferences in experimental studies holds on this
results. In experimental evidence, the age is negatively correlated with present bias
(instant gratification), higher time discounting (impatience) and higher risk aversion;
accounting for age into the type identification would imply that a low-quality-type
of client falls better into that description. Something similar can be said about
measures of financial responsibility (Eckel, Johnson and Montmarquette, 2005) or
financial literacy. Individuals that score higher on those measures tend to have bet-
ter foresight over consumption planing (consumption smoothing). I also argue that
the identification of responsibility jobs suits that argument (although not cleanly)
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Figure 4.3: Life cycle patterns for income and debt
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if we are willing to believe that such responsibility is a signal of some financial or
managerial skills. In particular, higher job-responsibility clients are less likely to be
a low-quality-type. Further analysis over these preferences should come from spe-
cific measures that are certainly orthogonal to the credit behavior, such information
is not currently available and efforts are being developed to include more specific
identification.
When looking at the Choice equation, I observe that, other things equal, low-
quality-type clients are more likely to default. This relationship is clear from the
constant in the model which captures the conditional outcome differentiation. In
general, there are important behavioral differences between types when it comes to
equity versus liquidity sensitivity. Although negligible in magnitude, high-quality-
types reduce the probability of default when current income increases. This can
be evidence of strategic behavior; while at the same time, changes in net-worth are
more significant for low-quality-types. Furthermore, the higher the current monthly
balance the client holds, increases the probability of default for both types but it
is relatively higher for the high-quality-type, while the opposite happens with the
average monthly payments, higher payments reduce the probability of default greatly
for low-quality-types.
There is also evidence of presence of moral hazard when types are identified
in the market. For example, if a low-quality-type becomes a business owner, his
probability of default increases significantly, as evidence of riskier decisions involved.
Business ownership has the opposite sign for high-quality-types, however its effect is
not statistically significant. Something similar occurs when it comes to credit access.
The higher the number of debts a client holds on the credit risk bureau the higher
the probability of default for low-quality-types, while the opposite holds for the high-
quality-types. In the same line, the higher the total debt/income ratio, the lower
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the probability of default of high-quality-types. Both pieces of evidence push the
same idea: the availability of credit resources affect heterogeneously the probability
of default of credit card users conditional on their types, something not captured in
traditional default analysis techniques.
A more intuitive approach can be captured through the marginal effects, i.e. how
much the default probability is affected by a change of one unit on the relevant
regresor. Table 4 summarizes the marginal effects for two versions of the Type
Consistent model, abusing previous notation we described them as follows:
 Type-consistent “unconditional” approach:
Pr(Di = 1) = p
1(Ziγ1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Type equation
Choice equation︷ ︸︸ ︷
G(ϕ1 +Xiβ
1) +p2(Ziγ2)G(ϕ
2 +Xiβ
2)
 Type-consistent “conditional” approach:
Pr(Di = 1) =

G(ϕ1 +Xiβ
1) , if pˆiθ˜1 > pˆiθ˜2
G(ϕ2 +Xiβ
2) , if pˆiθ˜1 < pˆiθ˜2
where the posterior probabilities are calculated as,
pˆiθ˜j =
pj(Ziγj)G(ϕ
j +Xiβ
j)∑J
j=1 p
j(Ziγj)G(ϕj +Xiβj)
Evaluated at the median levels for a “typical” client, and considering those re-
gresors that are statistically significant; interestingly, the economic variable that
captures a great deal of the default probability, and that shows heterogeneous effects
by type of client, is the ratio of the Year-to-date Average Payment over the pending
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credit balance. The higher the average ratio, the lower the default probability by
around 22%. High quality types reduce their probability greater by around 16 per-
centage points over lower types. In the same line, an increase in the ratio of pending
debt (Portfolio) over total debt reduces the probability of default by around 4.4%
for high quality types, a reduction over 4 percentage point higher when compared to
the average effect of lower types.
I describe in this section results for a two-types model. A natural extension, as
suggested on the theoretical section, would be to empirically identify the presence
of higher types. There is no definitive answer as to define a particular number of
types, in general, there is a trade off between a finer classification and the model
predictability. Henry et al. (2014) suggest the empirical limitation of partial identi-
fication that comes from the outcome variable support, hence for a binary outcome
model, the feasible number of types is limited to two.37 To explore more in depth a
possible finer classification I rely on the credit demand side of the signaling process.
4.5.2 Default analysis: out-of-sample performance
From a practical perspective, the most important application of any credit scoring
technique is to achieve a useful stratification of clients as to allow the implementation
of different price strategies and access, restrictions, advertisement policies, depending
on the goals of the principal (lender). Great efforts in the credit market industry are
destined to this goal, always taking into account the trade-off between the lender’s
credit risk profile and its profit maximization in any transaction.
Out-of-sample predictions for either credit access or behavior analysis, i.e. when
the subject is already a client, greatly improve in the approach presented of a finite
mixture density estimation. When compared to traditional techniques (baseline mod-
37See Henry et al. (2014), lemma 2.
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Table 4.3: Default probability: type consistent model
Baseline models Type Consistent model
Logit Probit Low Type Hight Type
Type equation (demo.)
Age (years) -0.0115 -0.00526 - 0.0819***
(0.00770) (0.00385) - (0.0130)
Age squared 0.000210*** 0.000102*** - -0.000856***
(0.0000782) (0.0000389) - (0.000128)
Woman=1 0.0916*** 0.0474*** - -0.122**
(0.0284) (0.0143) - (0.0491)
Married=1 -0.0338 -0.0105 - 0.0606
(0.0348) (0.0176) - (0.0601)
Widower=1 0.0653 0.0336 - -0.327*
(0.115) (0.0571) - (0.196)
Divorced=1 -0.0457 -0.0153 - 0.0836
(0.0580) (0.0291) - (0.0985)
College (pf)=1 -0.0265 -0.00739 - -0.0809
(0.0377) (0.0190) - (0.0624)
Science degree=1 0.120** 0.0558** - 0.0201
(0.0483) (0.0243) - (0.0816)
High/Medium Job Responsibility -0.0563 -0.0235 - 0.237***
(0.0361) (0.0182) - (0.0594)
Mltry/Police force -0.0302 -0.0177 - -0.149
(0.0773) (0.0384) - (0.128)
Family Members (\#) 0.0432*** 0.0198** - -0.157***
(0.0163) (0.00822) - (0.0248)
Stability ’r’-period -0.103*** -0.0514*** - 0.136**
(0.0395) (0.0200) - (0.0587)
Income(USD) - -0.0000283
- (0.0000219)
Constant - -0.815***
- (0.314)
Choice equation (econ.)
Income(USD) -0.0000356** -0.0000191*** -0.0000752 -0.0000242**
(0.0000140) (0.00000698) (0.000110) (0.0000105)
Tot. Net Worth (USD) -0.000000813** -0.000000412** -0.0000712*** -0.000000372
(0.000000365) (0.000000180) (0.0000189) (0.000000266)
Tot.CC Debt/Income -0.110*** -0.0548*** -0.176* -0.112***
(0.0113) (0.00563) (0.0970) (0.00878)
Debt at Risk on CRB (%) 2.109*** 1.129*** 0 0.276***
(0.0797) (0.0431) (.) (0.0698)
Ownership Type -0.0615 -0.0270 0.456*** -0.00359
(0.0375) (0.0188) (0.153) (0.0245)
Properties (\#) -0.0514 -0.0262 0 0.00723
(0.0449) (0.0225) (.) (0.0332)
Houses(\#) 0.0311 0.0161 0.689 0.0371*
(0.0310) (0.0155) (0.453) (0.0225)
Cars(\#) 0.00337 0.00219 -11.76 0.0242
(0.0224) (0.0112) (1165.0) (0.0167)
Debts on CRB(\#) -0.0203** -0.0119** 0.194*** -0.0561***
(0.00905) (0.00462) (0.0436) (0.00751)
Returned Checks ($=1$) 0.0647 0.0481 0.959** 0.0313
(0.0791) (0.0406) (0.483) (0.0608)
Ytd.Avrg.Payments/Cr.Balance -10.74*** -5.869*** -12.66*** -6.241***
(0.106) (0.0554) (1.546) (0.0819)
Microcredit($=$1) 0.0461 0.0209 -0.0498 -0.00660
(0.0597) (0.0311) (0.271) (0.0482)
Portfolio/Tot.Debt -0.839*** -0.372*** -0.0324 -1.058***
(0.0610) (0.0303) (0.214) (0.0505)
Hist.Wgtd.Diferred/Tot.Debt 0.479*** 0.234*** 0.372 0.374***
(0.0662) (0.0332) (0.275) (0.0500)
Debt Refin. ($=$1) -0.816 -0.375 0 -0.298
(0.520) (0.272) (.) (0.343)
Mth.Bal.Payment/Income 1.331*** 0.679*** 0.339*** 1.021***
(0.0289) (0.0146) (0.115) (0.0250)
Time of membership (months) -0.000931*** -0.000503*** -0.0491*** 0.000276*
(0.000250) (0.000124) (0.0112) (0.000142)
Constant 7.066*** 3.822*** 10.44*** 3.919***
(0.207) (0.105) (1.541) (0.0831)
Predicted type probability 1 1 0.15 0.85
Observations 102657 102657 102657
AIC 40976.2 40681.2 35177.4
BIC 41291.0 40996.0 35711.5
Log Like. -20455.1 -20307.6 -17532.7
LR stat-test (pv) / wrt. TC 5844.8 (0.0) 5549.2 (0.0) Reference
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis (not-clustered).
Some coefficients are set to zero for estimation purposes (convergence).
Cities fixed effects (not included in the table) for Quito, Guayaquil, Cuenca, Ambato.
109
Table 4.4: Default probability: marginal effects (at median)
Conditional on types Unconditional
L-type Mfx(L) H-Type Mfx(H) Overall Mfx
(median) (median) (median)
Choice equation (econ.)
Ownership Type 0 1.67% 0 -0.03% 0 7.18%
Returned Checks (=1) 0 6.23% 0 0.28% 0 7.21%
Microcredit (=1) 0 -0.10% 0 -0.06% 0 7.16%
Debt Refinanced (=1) 0 0.00% 0 -2.04% 0 7.21%
Properties (#) 0 0.00% 0 0.03% 0 0.03%
Houses(#) 0 0.51% 1 0.15% 1 0.13%
Cars (#) 0 -8.62% 0 0.10% 0 0.09%
Debts on CRB(#) 3 0.14% 2 -0.23% 2 -0.20%
Time of membership (months) 33 -0.04% 80 0.00% 76 0.00%
Ytd.Avrg.Payments/Cr.Balance 0.96 -9.27% 1.00 -25.90% 1.00 -22.49%
Tot.CC Debt/Income 1.12 -0.13% 1.19 -0.46% 1.18 -0.40%
Mth.Bal.Payment/Income 0.39 0.25% 0.42 4.24% 0.41 3.68%
Income (USD) 1500.00 0.00% 1500.00 0.00% 1500.00 0.00%
Total Net Worth (USD) 0.00 0.00% 25000.00 0.00% 22000.00 0.00%
Debt at Risk on CRB (%) 0.009 0.00% 0.00 1.15% 0.00 1.14%
Hist.Wgtd.Deferred/Tot.Debt 0.439 0.27% 0.47 1.55% 0.47 1.35%
Portfolio/Tot.Debt 0.231 -0.02% 0.17 -4.39% 0.18 -3.81%
Mfx: Marginal effects for regresor x.
Conditional results assigns the corresponding outcome based on the class assigned
through the posterior probabilities.
els) the Type Consistent estimation, offers better overall predictions for the “treat-
ment sample.” The observed delinquency rate (default) in this sample is 10.4%. The
model that better approximates it is the Type Consistent model in its unconditional
version. The conditional approach, i.e. considering the parameters of each type once
the client is classified by its posterior probabilities, is in general more rigorous, and
although it offers a better selection of clients in terms of their “quality” it can overly
restrict the profits that come from borrowers that even though default, end up pay-
ing the whole credit. These clients, as mentioned, are a dual source of profit, one
through the use in a commercial establishment and also through the interest rates
due to the payment delay.
Table 5 compares the predictive performance of the Type Consistent model at a
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Table 4.5: Out-of-sample prediction performance
OLS Forward Logit Probit TC-Unconditional TC-Conditional
Avg. pred. default probability (obs: 10.4%) 10.16% 10.2% 10.0% 10.3% 17.8%
Type I Error: Reject ’good’ clients 1.3% 1.6% 1.9% 9.3% 9.8%
Type II Error: Accept ’bad’ clients 61.4% 55.2% 55.8% 21.8% 19.3%
Predictive performance 92.5% 92.8% 92.5% 89.4% 89.2%
Ineficacy ratio 8.12 7.74 8.06 11.88 12.12
TC (Type Consistent)-Conditional assigns the corresponding probability based on the class
assigned through the posterior probabilities.
Default defined over a probability higher than 50%.
Predictive performance: percentage of individuals correctly classified on a 2x2 ordering table.
Inefficacy ratio: wrong / right classifications.
50% default rate cutoff (Reject = 1[DefProb. > 0.5]). The more rigorous the selec-
tion mechanism, the higher the credit rationing the market faces since more clients
are excluded regardless of their actual quality or willingness to pay. The most rigor-
ous specification is the conditional Type Consistent model, hence the probability to
reject good clients, defined here as Type I error, is higher; nevertheless, the uncon-
ditional version remains on similar levels of the baseline models. More importantly,
a relative measure of the adverse selection problem each model incurs is the Type
II error, i.e. failing to reject clients that are qualitatively less creditworthy. The
Type Consistent model greatly outperforms other models, regardless of the version
used. The unconditional version of the Type Consistent model shows a probability of
this error of 21.8%, while the conditional version reduces this probability to 19.3%,
both less than half of the rate in the best baseline model (Stepwise Forward Logit).
The trade off between predictive accuracy and selection rigurosity is evident in the
results by looking at the predictive performance and the inefficacy ratio, although,
their differences are small.
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Figure 4.4: Lorenz curves for Type I and Type II errors: out-of-sample prediction
performance.
(a)
(b)
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A global way to observe the differences in performance of the models in the
selection process is to simulate the percentage of excluded clients base on their default
probability and over the whole range of potential acceptance cutoffs that a lender
can implement. Similar to Gan and Mosquera (2008) and Gan et al. (2013), the
Type Consistent estimation, in both variations, outperforms the baseline models and
offers a better selection criteria for the relevant ranges of any scoring mechanism.
Figure 4 plots the Lorenz curves for the probability of both errors and the baseline
models used as reference. While on the Type I error, for admittance cutoffs higher
than 8%-10%, the TC model performs worst, overall stochastic dominance can be
observed for the Type Consistent model for the Type II error for most of the cutoff
ranges.
4.5.3 Credit demand
When it comes to credit demand, the types classification is easily extended to
higher level. In general, statistical fit improves with the number of types up to a
saturation point.38 The results support the theoretical argument of the presence of
private information and different strategic behavior, classifiable into different quality-
types of credit card holders in the market.
Based on an iterative process of model selection (Henry et al. 2014 ) and using
traditional information criteria for statistical fit 39 the preferred specification reaches
a model of 6 types, that is to say; the proposed model that accounts for unobserved
heterogeneity, identifies the presence of at least 6 quality-type of clients (See Table
6).
38Keep in mind that the number of regresors also increases.
39Information criteria typically used are the AIC, BIC. Combined with the actual likelihood level,
they offer sufficient means for statistical model selection. Additionally, fmmlc in Stata (Luedicke
2011) offers an “entropy” measure (Ramaswamy 1993) that based on the posterior probabilities
captures the power of the components’ classification in the model. I report this measures for
completeness. Incidentally, the highest entropy is reached on the preferred specification chosen.
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Table 4.6: Percentage types classification and model fit comparison
Component Baseline (1 Type) 2 Types 3 Types 4 Types 5 Types 6 Types
1 100 88.44 53.91 15.4 14.62 14.48
2 11.56 6.35 4.5 3.94 3.93
3 39.74 49.33 23.84 23.82
4 30.77 15.71 15.69
5 41.89 41.81
6 0.26
Entropy 0 0.520 0.408 0.367 0.479 0.532
LogLik (lf.) -131569.56 -123964.62 -122050.13 -121284.19 -120504.93 -120415.33
AIC (r.) 263199.13 248049.23 244294.25 242836.38 241351.86 241246.67
BIC (r.) 263480.96 248612.88 245205.48 244095.18 242958.25 243200.64
Estimations performed using the fmm Stata module from Deb (2007) and post estimation
command fmmcl from Luedicke (2011).
Percentage classification based on most likely class from the posterior probabilities.
Entropy measure based on Ramaswamy (1993).
There are important differences in the magnitude and significance of the deter-
minant coefficients for the demand equation (ln(Total Credit Card debt)). Further-
more, conditional on having any debt (100% of our sample) ordinary estimation
(such as OLS) of a demand equation involves inevitable endogeneity problems due
primarily to OVB. Under the identification assumption imposed, once controlled
for unobserved heterogeneity, estimation results are consistent and offer interesting
insights over heterogeneous demand motivations.
Table 7 presents the baseline models and Table 8 summarizes the main results of
this section. Similar to the default analysis, coefficients for the “Type equation” are
not directly comparable to those on the baseline model (OLS) however they offer a
first glance at the differences in significance of the factors involved on credit demand,
when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. While most of the coefficients in the
baseline model are significant, only a few appear to offer valuable information for
the types classification. Furthermore, some types of clients are clearly identifiable
based on this demographic factors while others do not. Take “age” as an example,
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it statistically explains the credit demand in the baseline model, however it fails
to offer any differentiable information over the types classification for the demand
model. Other regresors, such as becoming a widow, having a college degree, having a
high or medium responsibility job description and entering the market over a period
of interest rate stability (less market uncertainty), all are factors that show statistical
significance heterogeneously on types.
The choice equation shows how powerful the estimation strategy is when it comes
to extract behavioral differences of the elasticities (or semi-elasticities) of economic
variables with respect to credit demand. All regresors except one are significant in
the baseline model while the Type consistent model shows identifiable behavioral dif-
ferences of each regresor conditional on the clients’ type. Take the two heaviest types
in the classification (Type 3 and 5, Table 10) based on the posterior probabilities
(see section of empirical model for details); regresors for both are different in mag-
nitude and statistical significance, implying that clients classified into these classes
have identifiable heterogeneous underlying preferences (strategic behavior). Failing
to account for this would result on inconsistent estimation and biased inference.
Clients classified as Type 3 (23.82%) in average are more responsive to increase their
demand than those classified as Type 5 (41.81%) when they increase their time of
membership, their ratio of monthly balance payment over income and they become
business owners. The opposite effect is described when looking at other relevant
regresors in the model. Interestingly, other things equal, clients classified as Type
2 (3.93%) show a lower unconditional credit demand when compared to the other
Types40. At the same time, their demand sensitivity is significantly higher for the
ratio of monthly balance payment over income, returned checks and number of debts
on the credit risk bureau. Different to the rest, equity composition (houses, cars,
40Note, by looking at the “Sigma” coefficient that their distribution dispersion is higher
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Table 4.7: Credit demand [ln(Total CC. Debt)]: baseline models
(1) (2)
OLS OLS cfe
β SE β SE
Demographics
Age(in years) 0.0437*** (0.0049) 0.0437*** (0.0050)
Age squared −0.0005*** (0.0000) −0.0005*** (0.0000)
Woman=1 0.0055 (0.0109) 0.0003 (0.0123)
Married=1 0.0740*** (0.0147) 0.0856*** (0.0096)
Widower=1 0.1027*** (0.0203) 0.1113*** (0.0186)
Divorced=1 0.0888*** (0.0191) 0.0980*** (0.0207)
College(pf)=1 0.0109 (0.0102) 0.0133 (0.0093)
Science degree −0.0138 (0.0087) −0.0151* (0.0089)
H/M Responsibility(wd)=1 0.0796*** (0.0092) 0.0792*** (0.0089)
Mltry/Police(pf)=1 0.0179 (0.0124) 0.0078 (0.0096)
Family Members (#) −0.0068** (0.0029) −0.0065** (0.0027)
Stable ’r’-period −0.2332*** (0.0175) −0.2325*** (0.0168)
Main cities
Quito 0.1886*** (0.0329) 0.2467*** (0.0029)
Guayaquil 0.3074*** (0.0320) 0.3670*** (0.0039)
Cuenca −0.1556*** (0.0329) −0.1009*** (0.0063)
Ambato −0.1865*** (0.0326) −0.1317*** (0.0061)
Economic variables
Income(USD) 0.0002*** (0.0000) 0.0002*** (0.0000)
Tot. Net Worth (USD) 0.0000*** (0.0000) 0.0000*** (0.0000)
Tot.CC Debt/Income 0.0642*** (0.0033) 0.0633*** (0.0037)
% Debt at Risk on CRB −0.1014** (0.0409) −0.1206*** (0.0353)
Ownership Type 0.0578*** (0.0095) 0.0530*** (0.0077)
Properties (#) −0.0648*** (0.0127) −0.0626*** (0.0120)
Houses(#) −0.0560*** (0.0079) −0.0568*** (0.0078)
Cars(#) 0.0424*** (0.0066) 0.0426*** (0.0063)
Debts on CRB(#) 0.3653*** (0.0072) 0.3644*** (0.0076)
Returned Checks=1 0.2614*** (0.0234) 0.2501*** (0.0191)
Ytd.Avrg.Payments/Cr.Balance −0.2815*** (0.0706) −0.2939*** (0.0671)
Microcredit=1 −0.2654*** (0.0228) −0.2550*** (0.0254)
Portfolio/Tot.Debt 0.1042*** (0.0383) 0.1109*** (0.0369)
Hist.Wgtd.Deferred/Tot.Debt 1.1233*** (0.0776) 1.1209*** (0.0784)
Times Debt Refin. [#:1 to 5] 0.1102 (0.0763) 0.0796 (0.0788)
Mth.Bal.Payment/Income 0.3726*** (0.0165) 0.3650*** (0.0153)
Time of membership (months) 0.0012*** (0.0001) 0.0012*** (0.0001)
Constant 4.7746*** (0.1035) 4.7447*** (0.0894)
Observations 88794 88794
AIC 263199.134 261975.021
BIC 263480.956 262247.450
LogLik −131569.567 −130958.511
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1. Standard errors in parenthesis (not-clustered).
Cities fixed effects (not included in the table).
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properties) and becoming a business owner are not important determinant factors
for credit demand for these clients.
I will not extend on the individual interpretation of the coefficients as they are
extensively exposed. The punchline of this section is that when controlling for het-
erogeneous preferences (unobserved) allows for the identification of behavioral differ-
ences that are valuable information for types stratification. Such knowledge allows
lenders to improve over risk pricing strategies and credit risk management.
Different to the default probability, the focus of the credit demand analysis is on
the identification of heterogeneous determinants rather than the out-of-sample pre-
dictions. Extensions of this work can include tests of forecast performance, however
I consider this of second order interest for this research. Other extensions include a
cost/benefit analysis of the implementation of the type consistent model by evaluat-
ing the “value at risk” in each strategy.
4.6 Conclusions
Individual preferences are a fundamental aspect of intertemporal choice problems;
however, capturing this heterogeneity and, in particular, relating it to relevant pref-
erences such as those over risk and time, is a theoretical and empirical challenge. An
important aspect of the intertemporal problem is related to the access to credit mar-
kets. Subjects have different intrinsic motivations to decide over the size of a loan,
the actual use of the credit and whether to payback the loan or default. Building
on a basic model for a two periods intertemporal problem of loan demand, following
Gan and Mosquera (2008) and Gan et al. (2013), I derive a basic statistical structure
to identify client’s unobserved heterogeneity, classified into quality-types, and offer a
first interpretation that fosters to build a bridge over the empirical evidence of our
statistical approach and that from other experimental measures.
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Table 4.8: Credit demand [ln(Total CC. Debt)]: type consistent model
Baseline model Type Consistent model
OLS (cl.se) Type 1 Type 2 Type 3 Type 4 Type 5 Type 6
Type equation (demo.)
Age(in years) 0.0437*** - -0.0349 -0.1920 -0.1685 0.1669 -0.1092
(0.0049) - (0.1450) (0.1437) (0.1452) (0.1452) (0.1445)
Age squared -0.0005*** - 0.0006 0.0020 0.0016 -0.0018 0.0011
(0.0000) - (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
Woman=1 0.0055 - 0.4719 0.4603 0.5093 0.5124 0.5827*
(0.0109) - (0.3420) (0.3439) (0.3452) (0.3424) (0.3418)
Married=1 0.0740*** - -0.6085 -0.5134 -0.5193 -0.1954 -0.3121
(0.0147) - (0.4034) (0.4057) (0.4063) (0.4048) (0.4039)
Widower=1 0.1027*** - -2.0129*** -1.8388** -1.1779 -1.4952** -1.5705**
(0.0203) - (0.7459) (0.7591) (0.8278) (0.7568) (0.7420)
Divorced=1 0.0888*** - -0.5951 -0.4393 -0.1592 -0.0663 -0.2355
(0.0191) - (0.6315) (0.6368) (0.6429) (0.6333) (0.6328)
Family Members (#) -0.0068** - -0.1742 -0.0258 0.0353 -0.1233 -0.0838
(0.0029) - (0.1155) (0.1165) (0.1228) (0.1151) (0.1147)
College(pf)=1 0.0109 - 1.0291* 1.0059* 0.7330 1.0775** 0.8848
(0.0102) - (0.5435) (0.5457) (0.5469) (0.5475) (0.5461)
Science degree -0.0138 - -0.7743 -0.7852 -0.4763 -0.8337 -0.7966
(0.0087) - (0.5445) (0.5479) (0.5493) (0.5473) (0.5464)
H/M Responsibility(wd)=1 0.0796*** - 0.3696 0.4788 0.5210 0.9471*** 0.4975
(0.0092) - (0.3506) (0.3528) (0.3532) (0.3552) (0.3505)
Mltry/Police(pf)=1 0.0179 - 0.2428 0.0454 -0.2749 0.3670 -0.1054
(0.0124) - (0.5863) (0.5945) (0.6249) (0.5946) (0.5916)
Stable ’r’-period -0.2332*** - -0.0043 0.4244 20.8720*** -0.0974 -20.7047***
(0.0175) - (0.3215) (0.3236) (0.3584) (0.3218) (0.5183)
Income(USD) - - 0.0001 -0.0004* -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0002
- - (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Constant - - 4.9186 8.2002** -11.1287*** 0.0423 8.0466**
- - (3.3647) (3.3030) (3.3072) (3.3473) (3.3215)
Choice equation (econ.)
Ownership Type 0.0578*** -0.0708** -0.1255 0.1589*** 0.1611*** 0.0692*** 0.0570***
(0.0095) (0.0331) (0.0786) (0.0271) (0.0167) (0.0163) (0.0005)
Properties (#) -0.0648*** -0.0695** -0.1713* -0.0471 0.0002 -0.0634*** 0.1458***
(0.0127) (0.0342) (0.1023) (0.0435) (0.0225) (0.0207) (0.0006)
Houses(#) -0.0560*** -0.0240 0.0550 -0.0734** -0.0431*** -0.0451*** -0.0991***
(0.0079) (0.0215) (0.0565) (0.0351) (0.0141) (0.0136) (0.0005)
Cars(#) 0.0424*** 0.0492*** 0.0854* -0.0164 0.0293*** 0.0251** -0.0138***
(0.0066) (0.0171) (0.0485) (0.0190) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0004)
Debts on CRB(#) 0.3653*** 0.4261*** 0.7003*** 0.3073*** 0.1790*** 0.3184*** 0.2396***
(0.0072) (0.0131) (0.0223) (0.0076) (0.0087) (0.0093) (0.0002)
% Debt at Risk on CRB -0.1014** -0.2512** 0.1081 0.0601 -0.1799* -0.0450 -0.9281***
(0.0409) (0.1143) (0.2443) (0.0622) (0.0962) (0.0801) (0.0014)
Returned Checks=1 0.2614*** 0.1942*** 0.8181*** 0.1640*** 0.1055*** 0.2400*** 0.6428***
(0.0234) (0.0612) (0.1872) (0.0536) (0.0397) (0.0385) (0.0009)
Ytd.Avrg.Payments/Cr.Balance -0.2815*** -0.0796 1.2824*** -0.3482*** -0.1970** -0.5987*** -0.5325***
(0.0706) (0.1295) (0.2659) (0.0651) (0.0912) (0.0781) (0.0027)
Microcredit=1 -0.2654*** -0.2465*** -0.8589*** -0.1995*** -0.1807*** -0.2220*** -0.1451***
(0.0228) (0.0628) (0.1732) (0.0365) (0.0318) (0.0323) (0.0010)
Portfolio/Tot.Debt 0.1042*** 0.3952*** 0.1920** -0.1148*** -0.1646*** 0.2279*** -0.1089***
(0.0383) (0.0495) (0.0924) (0.0370) (0.0360) (0.0382) (0.0011)
Hist.Wgtd.Deferred/Tot.Debt 1.1233*** 1.8387*** 1.8764*** 0.5619*** -0.0265 1.1737*** 0.6955***
(0.0776) (0.0746) (0.1132) (0.0558) (0.0531) (0.0681) (0.0015)
Tot.CC Debt/Income 0.0642*** 0.0105 0.0141 0.0558*** 0.0881*** 0.0982*** 0.1106***
(0.0033) (0.0125) (0.0153) (0.0080) (0.0099) (0.0089) (0.0002)
Times Debt Refin. [#:1 to 5] 0.1102 0.3794* 1.7184*** 0.0000 0.0139 -0.1311 -3.4668***
(0.0763) (0.2212) (0.2326) (.) (0.3180) (0.2044) (0.0009)
Mth.Bal.Payment/Income 0.3726*** 1.2208*** 0.6049*** 0.1275*** 0.0756*** 0.0882*** 0.2424***
(0.0165) (0.1114) (0.0729) (0.0257) (0.0262) (0.0308) (0.0005)
Income(USD) 0.0002*** 0.0002*** -0.0001 0.0002*** 0.0001*** 0.0003*** 0.0002***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Tot. Net Worth (USD) 0.0000*** 0.0000** -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000*** 0.0000***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Time of membership (months) 0.0012*** 0.0017*** 0.0036*** 0.0187*** 0.0009*** 0.0004*** 0.0011***
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0007) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Constant 4.7746*** 4.1422*** 1.1098*** 5.9957*** 8.0141*** 6.3223*** 7.1962***
(0.1035) (0.1776) (0.3967) (0.0881) (0.1023) (0.1289) (0.0022)
Sigma 0.8293*** 1.4715*** 0.6467*** 0.5381*** 0.6370*** 0.0012***
(0.0189) (0.0186) (0.0200) (0.0167) (0.0239) (0.2698)
Percentage per type 100 14.48 3.93 23.82 15.69 41.81 0.26
Observations 88794 88794
AIC 263199.134 241230.667
BIC 263480.956 243109.482
LogLik -131569.567 -120415.334
Estimations performed using the fmm Stata module from Deb (2007) and post estimation
command fmmcl from Luedicke (2011).
Percentage classification based on most likely class from the posterior probabilities.
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Credit analysis relies traditionally on the observed historical information of their
clients to define credit policies such as: access, credit limits, interest rates; besides
other non-pricing alternatives. In this context, knowledge of the individual hetero-
geneity of clients reduces the informational asymmetries in the market that poten-
tially degenerate into credit rationing. When observing default behavior, we find
evidence for two quality-types of clients that are very different from each other, sup-
porting previous findings (Gan and Mosquera 2008), although relying on a slightly
different identification strategy and a more detailed data set. I find no evidence of
education being an important factor for types classification; yet, I am cautious about
this evidence since there is no big heterogeneity in this covariate among clients in
the data set at hand. The most informative variables for type identification are job
description, family composition, age and gender. More importantly, economic deter-
minants of credit default behavior are statistically different conditional on client’s
types. Out-of-sample predictions show important improvements in potential clients’
selection mechanism when using the Type Consistent estimation (conditional or un-
conditional on types) versus any other regresion alternative (OLS, Probit, Logit,
Stepwise forward/backwards logit) Higher rigurosity involves a trade off in predic-
tion accuracy, as a result, the probability to reject “good” clients (Type I error)
mildly deteriorates, nevertheless, the main potential error, from an adverse selection
perspective, in any scoring process, i.e. failing to reject “bad” clients (Type II er-
ror)is substantially reduced when considering the unobserved heterogeneity through
the finite mixture estimation proposed.
Finally, when it comes to credit card demand, I successfully identify 6 quality-
types with distinguishable behavioral differences over the economic determinants
in the model. Predictably, the demand function fit increases precision and offers
better statistical performance over traditional estimation strategies. Risk pricing
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and credit risk management strategies can be highly improved when considering
types stratification derived from individual preferences.
The policy implication of the type-consistent estimation supported in this paper
leans towards a more efficient credit market allocation, potentially reducing credit
rationing. There are important welfare gains (Pareto improvements) by accounting
for heterogeneous types selection since a better identification of quality-clients al-
lows lenders to offer multiple (finer) contract conditions and risk pricing strategies,
incorporating into the market reliable (credit worthy) clients that were crowded out
due to inconsistent credit score selection process. At the same time, better contract
conditions or other non-pricing techniques of lenders can improve their risk man-
agement decision process, a fundamental topic for systematic financial health in a
modern economy.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis compiles three essays on experimental and applied economics that
study unexpected influences of heterogeneous institutional environments.
The first essay documents exact replications of four classic experiments in social
dilemma games. The most relevant finding echoes the call on other experimental dis-
ciplines for the need of replication studies to confirm and advance in the gathering of
robust scientific knowledge. Selective reporting, publication bias and even scientific
dishonesty, particularly in social sciences, are important problems of scientific dis-
semination that can bias not only the knowledge within the discipline but negatively
influence policy implementation. We offer compelling evidence of an attenuation
effect in replication studies also pervasive in experimental economics. Most out-
comes in the original studies do not replicate and, when they do the effects are much
smaller. Also, we show the presence of unexpected context influences; experimental
subjects in Texas, mostly undergrad students, contribute consistently more and free
ride less than in the original studies. Beyond predictable sample differences, there
are other factors that filter to results in the lab and which interdependence is not
well understood. Cultural differences, political dominance, social cohesion, economic
institutions, formal or informal markets, among others, all play a role in economic
decisions, hence the only way to permeate findings in the discipline is to promote
more robust replications.
The second essay studies economic efficiency on two different institutional ar-
rangements of sanctioning power in social dilemmas: endogenous versus exoge-
nous power delegation. The introduction of a democratic participation mechanism
into sanctioning power institutions for a public good provision, reduces the free-
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riding problem and enhances collective action, without sacrificing economic efficiency
(cost/effective). Although a weak effect, this result offers valuable insights to explain
differences in governance outcomes of common pool resources and provision of pub-
lic goods whether in the lab or in the field. Further research in social dilemma
environments should consider the fact that the manager selection mechanism is not
innocuous, and unobserved incentives, such as the perception of authority legitimacy,
and other beliefs might be at play.
The final essay, chapter IV, offers an empirical alternative to unravel unobserved
heterogeneity in the credit market as a means to reduce the potential credit rationing
problems (lack of credit supply). Specifically, the adverse selection problem can be
greatly reduced by the implementation of a finite mixture estimation to account
for different quality-types of clients for default decisions and credit demand. This
essay successfully shows that behavior predictability greatly improves over traditional
scoring techniques. The probability of accepting a non-creditworthy client reduces to
less than half when compared to baseline models. Acknowledging client’s unobserved
preferences supports the transition towards behavioral scoring techniques that favor
the willingness to repay the loan over strictly the ability to pay, where most current
practice lies. Extensions require more experimental work that reconcile dominant
statistical techniques.
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APPENDIX A
EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS: LEVIATHAN VS. DEMOCRACY
A.1 General instructions
You are now taking part in an economic experiment. Depending on your decisions
and the decisions of other participants, you will be able to earn money. How you can
earn money is described in these instructions. Please read them carefully. You
will have to answer some questions to check that you understand the instructions.
During the experiment you are not allowed to communicate with other partic-
ipants. If you have a question, raise your hand. We will come to answer your
questions. Sometimes you may have to wait a short while before the experiment
continues. Please be patient. Thanks for your patience and cooperation.
Your earnings in the experiment will be calculated in points. Points will be
converted to RMB at the following exchange rate:
1 point = 0.05 RMB
Upon the completion of the experiment, you will also receive a participation fee
of RMB 10. At the end of the experiment your total earnings will be paid out to you
in cash.
The experiment has two phases (10 periods for each, 20 periods in total). The fol-
lowing instructions explain the details of phase 1. The instructions of the subsequent
phase will be handed out later.
A.2 Instructions for the first phase
Please read these instructions carefully. Again, you will have to answer
some questions to check that you understand the instructions.
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In the experiment, all participants are randomly divided into groups of 5. That
is, you are in a group with four other participants. The group members will be the
same throughout the entire experiment. Nobody knows which other participants are
in their group, and nobody will be informed of who was in which group after the
experiment.
Phase 1 includes 10 periods. In each period, each group member, including
yourself, will have to make a decision on how to allocate an endowment of 20 points.
In each period, you and the four other members in your group simultaneously decide
how to allocate the endowment into two accounts: 1. Group account. 2. Private
account. You will decide how many points to allocate to the group account. Only
integers between 0 and 20 are allowed for this purpose. The remaining points will
automatically be allocated to your private account.
Your earnings
Your earnings depend on the total number of points in the group account, and
the number of points in your private account.
Your total earning in each period can be calculated by the following formula:
20 – (points you allocated to the group account) + 0.4 * (sum of points allocated
by all group members to the group account)
For each point you allocate into your private account you get 1 point as earnings.
For example, your earnings from the private account equal 10 points if you allocate
10 points to it.
Your earnings from the group account equal the sum of points allocated to the
group account by all 5 group members multiplied by 0.4. For each point you allocate
to the group account everyone in your group get 0.4 points as earnings. For example,
if every group member, including yourself, allocates 10 points to the group account,
the sum of points in the group account is 50 and then your earnings from the group
139
account are equal to 20 points.
Note that you receive 1 point for each point you allocate to your private account.
If instead you allocate 1 extra point to the group account, your earnings from the
group account increase by 0.4 points and your earnings from your private account
decrease by 1 point. However, allocating 1 extra point to the group account can
increase the earnings of all the other 4 group members by 0.4 points. Therefore, the
total group earnings increase by 2 points. Note that you also obtain earnings from
points allocated to the group account by others.
Examples
Suppose you allocate 10 points to the group account, the second and third mem-
bers of your group each allocate 20 points to the group account, and the remaining
two members both allocate 0 point to the group account. Then the sum of points in
the group account is 10 + 20 + 20 + 0 + 0 = 50 points. Each group member receives
earnings of 0.4 * 50 = 20 points from the group account. Your total earnings are: 20
– 10 + (0.4 * 50) = 10 + 20 = 30 points. The second and third members’ earnings
are: 20 – 20 + (0.4 * 50) = 0 + 20 = 20 points. The fourth and fifth members’
earnings are: 20 – 0 + (0.4 * 50) = 20 + 20 = 40 points.
Please raise your hand if you have any question.
A.3 Instructions for the second phase
A.3.1 Leviathan treatment
Please read these instructions carefully. Again, you will have to answer
some questions to check that you understand the instructions.
This phase, including 10 periods in total, is like the previous one in that you
continue to interact with the same four participants in your group and in each period
you make a decision about allocating 20 points to either a private account or a
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group account. Your earnings are determined in the same way as in Phase 1 of the
experiment. (For each point you allocate to your private account you get 1 point as
earnings. Your earnings from the group account equal the sum of points allocated
to the group account by all 5 group members multiplied by 0.4).
However, in this phase, before you begin to make decisions, ONE participant in
your group will be selected as a manager by the experimenter. The selected manager
will be unchanged throughout this phase.
How is the manager selected?
Between phase 1 and phase 2, you can observe the allocation decisions of each
group member in phase 1. Then the experimenter will choose the manager based on
a predefined distribution, unknown to you. You will observe who was chosen among
the information from phase 1. Note that the Manager will be the same during the
remaining periods (i.e. until the end of the experiment).
Your decisions in this phase
There are two stages in each period. In the first stage, you make your allocation
decision and then observe the decisions of the other group members along with your
earnings. In the second stage, 4 points are automatically collected from each group
member. Hence each group has an account of 20 points in each period. The manager
has an opportunity to use the points in this account to reduce the earnings of one
participant in your group.
Suppose you are selected as a manager. After the first stage of each period, you
will observe the amount allocated to the group account by each member in your
group. Meanwhile, you will receive 4 points from each group member including
yourself. Then you will be asked to choose up to one group member and how much
you want to reduce his/her earnings by using the 20 points. Each point you want
to reduce that participant’s earnings costs 1 point. You are free to leave all group
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members’ earnings unchanged. Note that the points that are not used to reduce
others’ earnings will be returned to every group member equally.
Earnings in each period are calculated as follows:
20 -4 points – (points you allocate to group account) + 0.4*(sum of points allo-
cated by all in group to group account) – (points the manager uses to reduce your
earnings if you are selected) + (the remaining points not used by the manager),
Examples
Suppose you are the manager in your group. In this period, you allocate 20 points
to the group account, the second and third members of your group each allocate 10
points to the group account, and the remaining two members both allocate 5 point
to the group account. Then the sum of points in the group account is 20 + 10 + 10
+ 5 + 5 = 50 points. Each group member receives earnings of 0.4 * 50 = 20 points
from the group account. Your gross earnings are: 20 – 20 + (0.4 * 50) = 0 + 20 =
20 points. The second and third members’ gross earnings are: 20 – 10 + (0.4 * 50)
= 10 + 20 = 30 points. The fourth and fifth members’ gross earnings are: 20 – 5
+ (0.4 * 50) = 15 + 20 = 35 points. In the second stage, you receive 4 points from
each group member, 20 points in total. Now you decide to reduce the fifth member’s
earning by 10 points. Then the remaining 10 points will be returned to all group
members, 2 point for each.
Your net earnings are 20 - 4 + 2 = 18 points. The second and third members’
net earnings are: 30 – 4 + 2 = 28 points. The four member’s net earnings are: 35 –
4 + 2 = 33 points. The fifth member’s net earnings are: 35 – 4 – 10 + 2 = 23 points.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
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A.3.2 Democracy treatment
Please read these instructions carefully. Again, you will have to answer some
questions to check that you understand the instructions.
This phase, including 10 periods in total, is like the previous one in that you
continue to interact with the same four participants in your group and in each period
you make a decision about allocating 20 points to either a private account or a
group account. Your earnings are determined in the same way as in Phase 1 of the
experiment. (For each point you allocate to your private account you get 1 point as
earnings. Your earnings from the group account equal the sum of points allocated
to the group account by all 5 group members multiplied by 0.4).
However, in this phase, before you begin to make decisions, ONE participant in
your group will be elected as a manager by voting. The elected manager will be
unchanged throughout this phase.
How is the manager selected?
Between phase 1 and phase 2, you can observe the allocation decisions of each
group member in phase 1. Then you will vote for any member in your group (except
yourself) to be the Manager. The one who receives the most votes will be elected.
In case of a tie, the Manager will be randomly selected from those tied ones. Note
that the Manager will be the same during the remaining periods (i.e. until the end
of the experiment).
Your decisions in this phase
There are two stages in each period. In the first stage, you make your allocation
decision and then observe the decisions of the other group members along with your
earnings. In the second stage, 4 points are automatically collected from each group
member. Hence each group has an account of 20 points in each period. The manager
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has an opportunity to use the points in this account to reduce the earnings of one
participant in your group.
Suppose you are selected as a manager. After the first stage of each period,
you will observe the amount allocated to the group account by each member in
your group. At the meanwhile, you will receive 4 points from each group member
including yourself. Then you will be asked to choose up to one group member and
how much you want to reduce his/her earnings by using the 20 points. Each point
you want to reduce that participant’s earnings costs 1 point. You are free to leave
all group members’ earnings unchanged. Note that the points that are not used to
reduce others’ earnings will be returned to every individual equally.
Earnings in each period are calculated as follows:
20 -4 points – (points you allocate to group account) + 0.4*(sum of points allo-
cated by all in group to group account) – (points the manager uses to reduce your
earnings if you are selected) + (the remaining points not used by the manager),
Examples
Suppose you are the manager in your group. In this period, you allocate 20 points
to the group account, the second and third members of your group each allocate 10
points to the group account, and the remaining two members both allocate 5 point
to the group account. Then the sum of points in the group account is 20 + 10 + 10
+ 5 + 5 = 50 points. Each group member receives earnings of 0.4 * 50 = 20 points
from the group account. Your gross earnings are: 20 – 20 + (0.4 * 50) = 0 + 20 =
20 points. The second and third members’ gross earnings are: 20 – 10 + (0.4 * 50)
= 10 + 20 = 30 points. The fourth and fifth members’ gross earnings are: 20 – 5
+ (0.4 * 50) = 15 + 20 = 35 points. In the second stage, you receive 4 points from
each group member, 20 points in total. Now you decide to reduce the fifth member’s
earning by 10 points. Then the remaining 10 points will be returned to all group
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members, 2 point for each.
Your net earnings are 20 - 4 + 2 = 18 points. The second and third members’
net earnings are: 30 – 4 + 2 = 28 points. The four member’s net earnings are: 35 –
4 + 2 = 33 points. The fifth member’s net earnings are: 35 – 4 – 10 + 2 = 23 points.
Please raise your hand if you have any questions.
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APPENDIX B
CHAPTER 3: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
B.1 Summary
Table B.1: Demographic summary
Leviathan Democracy p-value
mean st dev obs. mean st dev obs. Mann-Whitney U test
Female 0.53 0.50 75 0.53 0.50 80 0.642
Econ Major 0.51 0.50 75 0.39 0.49 80 0.000
Math 119.20 13.43 59 120.29 9.85 56 0.637
Freshmen 0.43 0.49 75 0.64 0.48 80 0.000
Sophomore 0.20 0.40 75 0.18 0.38 80 0.075
Junior 0.16 0.37 75 0.05 0.22 80 0.000
Senior 0.11 0.31 75 0.05 0.22 80 0.000
Graduate 0.11 0.31 75 0.09 0.28 80 0.071
Scholarship 0.35 0.48 60 0.40 0.49 65 0.010
Party member 0.12 0.32 60 0.12 0.33 65 0.622
Urban 0.58 0.49 60 0.63 0.48 65 0.015
Major Ethnicity 0.98 0.13 60 0.98 0.12 65 0.799
Income: below 50000 0.22 0.41 60 0.31 0.46 65 0.000
Income: 50000-100000 0.42 0.49 60 0.38 0.49 65 0.102
Income: 100000-200000 0.25 0.43 60 0.18 0.39 65 0.000
Income: above 200000 0.12 0.32 60 0.12 0.33 65 0.622
Single Child 0.38 0.49 60 0.31 0.46 65 0.000
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B.2 Robustness checks
Table B.2: Determinants of contributions: robustness checks
Dependent variable: Contributions (ECU)
Fixed Effects: different specifications
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Democracy vs.Leviathan (PxD) 1.135*** 0.642* 0.753* 0.681*
(0.390) (0.346) (0.404) (0.401)
Punishment (P) 4.684*** 2.280*** 2.746*** 4.015***
(0.280) (0.272) (0.317) (0.626)
Democracy (D) 0† 0† -0.792 -0.733
(.) (.) (0.820) (0.814)
Other’s Avg.Cont. (t-1) 0.647*** 0.527*** 0.559***
(0.0218) (0.0251) (0.0279)
Punishment received (t-1) -0.0718* -0.190*** -0.194***
(0.0405) (0.0457) (0.0454)
Punishment in the group (t-1) 0.00417 0.0266 0.0689***
(0.0219) (0.0255) (0.0266)
Trend (within phase) -0.230*** -0.193*** -0.466***
(0.0322) (0.0375) (0.0746)
Constant 7.080*** 3.560*** 6.439*** 6.817***
(0.138) (0.256) (0.668) (0.775)
R2 (overall) 0.136 0.411 0.451 0.463
F 370.2 311.8 66.46 48.02
N 3100 2945 2945 2945
Individual FE Yes Yes No No
Group FE No No Yes Yes
Time FE No No No Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Sample differences are due to the
use of lags.
† Variable dropped. Time invariant once controlled for individual FE.
***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1.
147
APPENDIX C
CHAPTER 4: ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
C.1 Summary
Table C.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Age(in years) 45.168 12.849 20 89 171044
Woman=1 0.413 0.492 0 1 171044
Married=1 0.629 0.483 0 1 171044
Widower=1 0.016 0.124 0 1 171044
Divorced=1 0.073 0.26 0 1 171044
College(pf)=1 0.335 0.472 0 1 171044
Science degree 0.14 0.347 0 1 171044
H/M Responsibility(wd)=1 0.586 0.493 0 1 171044
Mltry/Police(pf)=1 0.041 0.198 0 1 171044
Family Members (#) 0.381 0.89 0 7 171044
Quito 0.416 0.493 0 1 171044
Guayaquil 0.206 0.404 0 1 171044
Cuenca 0.066 0.248 0 1 171044
Ambato 0.034 0.18 0 1 171044
Income(USD) 1840.834 1186.304 700 15000 171044
Tot. Net Worth (USD) 39326.294 57865.434 0 2400000 171044
Tot.CC Debt in CRB 5880.353 7240.986 1 208370.64 147817
Tot.CC Debt/Income 1.676 1.766 -29.989 33.42 171044
% Debt at Risk on CRB 0.03 0.123 0 1 171044
Ownerwhip Type 0.251 0.434 0 1 171044
Properties (#) 0.1 0.321 0 4 171044
Houses(#) 0.59 0.643 0 4 171044
Cars(#) 0.552 0.701 0 4 171044
Debts on CRB(#) 2.729 1.579 0 17 171044
Returned Checks=1 0.023 0.148 0 1 171044
Ytd.Avrg.Payments/Cr.Balance 0.949 0.113 0 1 171044
Microcredit=1 0.044 0.206 0 1 171044
Portfolio/Tot.Debt 0.257 0.285 0 1 171044
Mth.Bal.Payment/Income 0.524 0.535 0 10.212 171044
Time of membership (months) 98.460 95.571 0 552 171044
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Table C.2: Average default probability by model and sample
Model/Sample Overall Control Sample Out-of-Sample
(%) (%) (%)
Observed (whole sample) 10.31 10.26 10.38
One type
Predicted default Probit 6.31 6.36 6.25
Predicted default Forward Logit 6.20 6.26 6.11
Type consistent (H/L types)
Predicted default (unconditional) 6.47 6.52 6.40
Predicted default if H-Type 6.61 6.67 6.53
Predicted default if L-Type 6.08 6.08 6.06
Predicted default (conditional on types) 15.66 15.69 15.62
Predicted default if H-Type 5.71 5.73 5.68
Predicted default if L-Type 73.17 73.13 73.22
N 171,044 102,657 68,387
Conditional results assigns the corresponding outcome based on the class assigned
through the posterior probabilities.
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C.2 Life cycle patterns and model selection
Figure C.1: Income and debt distribution by age
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Figure C.2: Model selection by number of components: model fit marginal changes
(a)
(b)
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